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I. INTRODUCTION
This report documents results of the redundant strapped-down
(strapdown) Inertial Navigation System (INS) preliminary design
study conducted by Litton Industries Guidance and Control Systems
division under contract number NAS1-13847 for the NASA Langley
Research Center (LaRC). This study is part of the LaRC VTOL
Automatic Landing Technology (VALT) program. The purpose of the
VALT program is to foster the development of the various tech-
nologies needed by the VTOL aircraft in an intra-urban setting.
Low-cost, highly reliable avionics are essential for the economic
viability of this mode of transportation.
One means of achieving lower costs for both VTOL and conventional
aircraft is improved integration of avionics functions. Cur-
rently, there is considerable interest in replacing the multiple
flight control sensors of a typical, modern commercial aircraft
with a skewed array of strapdown inertial navigation sensors,
and using redundant computers to perform multiple functions such
as flight control, air data, and strapdown navigation. Net cost
has been shown to be less than current, non-integrated systems.
Inertial navigation capability is thus available without addi-
tional cost. This integrated avionics approach depends upon
redundancy to achieve the reliability needed in flight control
loops. VTOL and other modern aircraft will be designed to depend
upon the flight control avionics for their flight stability in
order to achieve various performance and economic improvements.
Thus, flight control system reliability and flight safety depend
upon integrated avionics reliability. Thorough analysis of
skewed sensor system reliability, then, is essential.
This redundant strapdown INS preliminary design study demonstrates
the practicality of a skewed sensor system configuration by
means of:
• Devising a practical system mechanization utilizing proven
strapdown instruments.
• Thoroughly analysing the skewed sensor redundancy manage-
ment concept to determine optimum geometry, data process-
ing requirements, and realistic reliability estimates.
• Implementing the redundant computers into a low-cost,
maintainable configuration.
• Providing a practical, maintainable packaging concept
suitable for airline use.
• Estimating system size, weight, power and cost for a
production system configuration.
1
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The redundant strapdown INS design is founded upon proven strap-
down gyros and accelerometers used in Litton's LN-50 developmental
strapdown system. This system, undergoing flight test at the
time this report was written, is proving the practicality of
strapdown navigation using two-degree-of-freedom (TDF), tuned-
gimbal gyroscopes. These gyroscopes are an extension of the type
of instrument used on a wide variety of production, gimballed
inertial systems manufactured by Litton, and other companies.
They employ conventional, non-exotic techniques very close to a
production configuration.
The TDF capability of these tuned-gimbal gyroscopes is partic-
ularly suited to a redundant system configuration. A fail-
operational/fail-operational (fail-op/fail-op) system can be
achieved using only four gyros versus six single-degree-of-
freedom instruments. Tuned-gimbal gyro costs are quite low
compared to present forms of exotic instruments, resulting in a
particularly low cost for the high-reliability, redundant system.
The compact size of the tuned-gimbal gyro lends itself to a
redundant system, resulting in a small net configuration. This
is useful in solving aircraft installation problems, improving
maintainability, and in assuring the required gyro-to-gyro me-
chanical alignment stability needed for accurate strapdown
navigation.
The preliminary electronics estimates of the remaining system
constituents are based on current technology. Extensive tech-
nology extrapolations are not employed. The size and cost esti-
mates presented in this study are thus very realistic for
application of such a system into airline use in the early 1980's.
403314
I I. SUMMARY
2.1 General Proqram Description
This report documents the preliminary design of a redundant
strapdown navigator using four, two-degree-of-freedom, tuned-
gimbal gyroscopes. NASA/Langley Research Center requirements
defined in Contract NASI-13847 are for fail-operational/fail-
operational reliability with a failure probability per 0.5 hour
flight of less than i0-_. Accuracy is required to be 1.03 m/sec
(2 knots) with radio aid updates having drop-outs up to 60 seconds
in duration. Exceptionally low system cost is a firm requirement.
The fail-op/fail-op navigator designed to meet these requirements
in this study has been configured to consist of four, inter-
changeable plug-in units for lowest cost. Each unit contains one
channel of hardware consisting of a TDF tuned gimbal gyro, two
linear accelerometers, a computer, and a power supply.
The gyro/accelerometer axes are skewed within each chassis so
that when the four channels are installed as shown in figure 2-1,
the four gyro, eight accelerometer axes are distributed in space.
This distribution assures that normal operation continues regard-
less of which two sensors fail. A precision alignment block
would be located within the central core of the array. Thus,
accurate angular registration between instruments of the four
channels can be obtained easily.
Some applications may require a physical separation between
channels to reduce overall system susceptibility to a common
disaster. Other solutions to this susceptibility are preferred,
however, such as proper location of the units in the aircraft
and/or structural and thermal isolation. If these methods are
not adequate, the four channels can be split into pairs as shown
in figure 2-2. Stiffness of the aircraft must be assured or the
reliability and performance of the second fail-op level are
significantly degraded. Added software is also needed if pre-
cision boresighting between location is to be avoided. This
report concentrates on the preliminary system design for the in-
stallation method of figure 2-1.
The system characteristics for the full fail-op/fail-op redundant
strapdown INS are as follows:
Power:
Weight:
Dimensions :
540 watts
27.7 Kg (61 pounds)
0.33m x 0.33m x 0.36m
(13" x 13" x 14")
403314
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Accuracy*:
Reliability, 1 hour flight
Flight control outputs:
Navigation outputs:
Cost (production):
1.03 m/sec (2 knots)(95%)
0.4 x l0 -I0
0.5 x 10 -9
$98,000
A baseline system specification is included as Appendix A of this
report. The preliminary design of the redundant strapdown INS
indicates that production equipment meeting these specifications
could be available in the early 1980's.
2.2 System Description
A simplified system block diagram for the redundant strapdown
INS is shown in figure 2-3. The complete system is composed of
four identical channels. Each channel of the INS consists of
the following elements:
a. An Inertial Measurement Module (IMM) containing the
basic inertial sensing devices, one TDF tuned gimbal
gyro and two axes of acceleration measurement, with
the associated electronics.
b. A computer which performs redundancy management, instru-
ment compensations, coordinate transformations, and the
inertial navigation computations.
c. External I/O which interfaces the computer with other
aircraft equipment. Note that there is no self-contained
voting in the system between the computers and these
outputs. The external equipment must perform some
voting between channels (in addition to using validity
information provided by each channel) in determining
the final navigation variable to be used.
d. Inter-computer I/O which is used to transfer gyro and
accelerometer measurement data from one channel to all
others for use in redundancy management, and for deriva-
tion of the full 3-dimensional rate and acceleration
inputs.
e. A power supply used to drive all elements in a channel.
Note that there is no cross-feeding of power between
*With position updates from DME, differential Omega, Loran C, or
GPS.
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channels. This results in a simple, low-cost power
supply design with a negligible decrease in system reli-
ability over a modularly redundant power supply
configuration
A more detailed block diagram for one of the four Inertial Navi-
gation Modules (INM) is shown in figure 2-4. The equipment
shown is packaged in its own chassis and four of these chasses
installed into a common mount comprise the complete redundant
strapdown INS.
G-6 Gyroscope (Fiqure 2-5)
The baseline gyroscope for the production program is designated
the G-6. It is used in the LN-50 program and has proven per-
formance. The design is based on the production Litton G-1200
gyro used in the LN-30 family of gimballed inertial navigation
systems and the LTN-72 commercial system. It has a considerably
increased torquing rate capability (up to 240°/sec) to be suited
to strapdown INS usage. A smaller, lower-performance, lower-
cost version of this instrument (designated the G-7) is currently
under development. Its applicability to LaRC requirements has
been considered due to the stringent cost goals of the study
program.
Both the G-6 and G-7 are TDF, tuned gimbal, nonfloated gyro-
scopes. The gyroscopic element is attached to the rotor of a
synchronous motor by means of two pairs of flexible hinges
separated by an intermediate gimbal. The kinetic forces on the
gimbal when rotating at operating speed are designed to cancel
the hinge torques occurring at normal gyroscope displacement
angles. Thus the gyroscope is capable of accurately measuring
the extremely small angular rates required for inertial
navigation.
Electromagnetic pick-offs are provided to sense displacements
between the gyro case and the gyroscope rotating wheel. These
pick-off outputs are then used in electronic circuitry to pre-
cess the gyro wheel to null the displacement in a high-speed,
closed loop.
Gyro precession is produced by a pair of electromagnetic torquers
attached to the gyro case, acting against a permanent magnet
on the rotating wheel. The amount of current in the torquers
required to keep the pick-offs nulled is the measure of vehicle
angular rate about the two torquing axes. Special design features
are provided in the torquing mechanization so that the torquing
current accurately represents precession rate over the wide
dynamic range appearing in a strapdown INS.
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A-1000 Accelerometer (Figure 2-5)
The baseline accelerometer selected for the production program
is designated the A-1000. It is a single-degree-of-freedom
instrument used in the production LN-30 gimballed inertial navi-
gation systems, the LTN-72 commercial gimballed systems, and the
LN-50 strapdown navigation program. Minor modifications are
made to the external instrument circuitry when used in the strap-
down program to provide for digital rebalance instead of the
normal analog rebalance.
The A-1000 accelerometer is a flexible hinge (dry), torque-to-
balance instrument. It has a capacitive pick-off to detect
rotations of the rotary, pendulous sensitive element. Pick-off
deflections are then used in external electronics to produce
current in an electromagnetic permanent magnet torquer in the
accelerometer to drive the pick-off to null. The torquer current
is then a measure of vehicle acceleration normal to the pendulous
and rotary axes.
Gyro/Accelerometer Rebalance Electronics
Each of the gyro and accelerometer rebalance electronics takes
essentially the same form, as shown in figure 2-4. The gyro
loops have more difficult requirements so the following loop
description and design criteria will be directed towards their
concepts. Accelerometer loops are somewhat simpler but with
wider bandwidth.
The gyro pick-offs are amplified, demodulated from their 54 KHz
carrier, and the resultant is further amplified with frequency
compensation. This compensation provides appropriate character-
istics when the loop is closed through the gyro torquer. When
the output of the compensation amplifier crosses a threshold,
the duty cycle of a switched, constant-current supply is modified
proportionately to change the gyro torquing level. This closed
loop system is designed to be of a wide bandwidth within the
capability of the gyroscope (approximately 80 Hz), and thus
provides an accurate representation of vehicle angular rates
during normal vehicle vibration. Dynamic errors which might
occur during such vibration may then be compensated in the
computer.
Designed in this manner (fixed-frequency square wave, duty-cycle
modulated), the loop design is linear and well-behaved. An
excellent incremental angle resolution of 0.5 arc seconds is
achieved. Furthermore, loop compensation design is much simpler
than for nonlinear systems. High noise methods such as lead
ll
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networks and cross-coupled loops can be avoided in the stabiliza-
tion of gyro nutation and for the elimination of spin-frequency
pick-off noise.
The switch which injects a constant current of alternating
polarity into the gyro torquer is carefully designed to achieve
exactly equal current in each direction. Imbalance of current
leads to an equivalent gyro drift which is proportional to the
maximum current supplied. To further decrease the electronics
contribution to gyro drift, a mode change is incorporated which
increases the current by a factor of 8 at high vehicle angular
rates. Thus, during normal flight, the dynamic range of gyro
torquing (the ratio of msximum vehicle rate to maximum allowable
sensor rate error) is reduced for improved performance.
Temperature Sensitivity Correction
The gyro and rebalance electronics parameters are designed to
have low sensitivity to operating temperature. There are limits
to how insensitive these devices can be made, however. The
residual coefficients are sufficiently stable with time so that
the net system error budget can be achieved either with
monitoring of component operating temperature, with
computer corrections applied using factory-calibrated
coefficients, or
rapid component warmup and temperature control.
The advantages of the calibration method are:
system power consumption is reduced
component operating temperature is lower, resulting in
improved reliability.
Additional benefits derived from avoiding a large thermal tran-
sient at turn-on are: i) Electronics failures are often induced
by the stresses associated with large thermal gradients, so net
reliability is further improved over straight parts-count con-
siderations: 2) A thermal, and thus instrument performance
transient during ground alignment is eliminated. Such a transient
can seriously contaminate gyrocompassing if not controlled. The
instrument/electronic thermal design becomes very critical in
temperature-controlled systems so that transients are completed
soon enough to achieve alignment in the required i0 minutes.
Increased calibration costs result with this method, however,
since instrument/electronic constants must be derived at a number
12
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of temperatures instead of at a single point. Test equipment
complexity, test time, and the number of testers needed for
significant production rates are all increased.
The final tradeoff of whether or not to temperature-control
instruments is left until the final production equipment design.
System design is described for a compensated implementation.
Inertial Instrument/Computer Interface
The interface between the inertial instruments, the gyros and
accelerometers, and the digital computer is shown in the block
diagram of figure 2-4. Four of the inputs are the duty-cycle
modulated squarewaves from the gyro and accelerometer digital re-
balance loops. An indication of high rate mode is also required
to change pulse weighting.
The conversion of duty-cycle modulated square-waves to a parallel
digital word for entry into the computer is performed by up-down
counters. While gyro or accelerometer torquer current is posi-
tive, the count in a register increments at some fixed clock
rate. When torquer current switches negative, the register count
decrements. The net counter value over one digital torquing
interval (approximately 500 microseconds for gyros, 250 microsec-
onds for accelerometers) is representative of the angular change
of the vehicle about that axis during the interval for gyros,
and velocity change for accelerometers. No unusual design tech-
niques are needed for this function since clock rates of approxi-
mately 400 kHz can be employed. The main constraint is that the
digital rebalance duty-cycle transition occurs only at one of
the counter clock pulses so that no information is lost.
Temperature sensors are installed at the instruments for computed
compensations. These sensors are platinum resistance elements
put into a bridge circuit, the outputs of which are dc voltages
proportional to temperature. Thus a 10-bit analog-to-digital
converter is needed to develop the digital words for application
to the computer data bus.
Since the digital rebalance circuits have their own sensitivity
to temperature, gradients between the gyro temperature sensor
and the thermally sensitive electronic components with, for
example, different cooling air flows must also be considered.
Adding a temperature sensor to the electronics implies that in-
struments and electronics are calibrated at the factory
separately. This not only increases cost, but also may be
impractical due to the accuracy requirements. Therefore,
sensitive portions of rebalance electronics will be closely
packaged with their corresponding instruments to assure a common
thermal environment, and then will be calibrated together.
13
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Digital Computer Desiqn
A specific digital computer was not selected for the production
redundant strapdown INS. There are two reasons for this decision.
Digital computer technology is evolving so rapidly that
lowest system cost can be achieved by making such a
choice when production system detailed design is started.
Cost and reliability estimates for the preliminary
design are made based on use of components recently
announced in the literature with price extrapolation.
The primary use of a redundant strapdown INS is in a
highly integrated avionics suit. Therefore, computer
duty cycle and memory margin are needed for other
functions such as flight control and display. A firm
computer choice cannot be made until these other func-
tions are delineated.
The redundant strapdown computation requires approximately 8000
words of memory. Throughput requirement is approximately 198 000
instructions per second. Modern digital computers employing
features such as microprogrammability, general registers, vectored
hardware interrupts, floating point, DMA, etc. are available with
more than adequate speed. 32-bit arithmetic, including multi-
plication, is highly desirable.
A combination ROM/RAM semiconductor memory was chosen for lowest
cost. This choice is based on the assumption that few software
changes will be needed once the program is de-bugged. This
assumption is valid for the LaRC problem as defined since the
redundant strapdown INS is basically a sensor. If functions such
as steering, flight control, or display are added, these would
generally change from aircraft to aircraft. Therefore, higher-
cost approaches such as all-RAM, EAROM, EPROM, or core would
need to be considered.
The RAM chosen is of the CMOS type. The lower power dissipation
of CMOS allows the addition of a small battery which prevents
loss of memory (self-test data, modified calibration values,
initial position) during power shutdown. A high speed construc-
tion technique such as Silicon-on-Saphire (SOS) is needed to
maintain throughput.
A PROM is also included which stores factory-derived instrument
coefficients such as bias, scale-factor, g-sensitivity, etc. It
is read out by the computer at the start of every flight. It is
programmed only at the factory or repair depot following system
calibration.
14
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Computer I/O
Input/output format between each redundant strapdown INS computer
and external avionics has been assumed to be in a serial format
commonly used by commercial aircraft, ARINC-575. This format is
clearly subject to change in future avionics. The low bit-rate
(approximately i0 kHz) is quite marginal for modern-day, digital
avionics. I/O cost, however, was felt to be representative. A
failure output discrete is also planned, in addition to the
serial data, to inform external equipment and failure annuncia-
tors of channel failure condition.
The internal I/O consists primarily of computer-to-computer data
transfer. During normal operation the data to be transferred
between computers is relatively light, consisting basically of
corrected instrument measurement, 6 words at a rate of 128 times
per second. Initialization modes are provided to correct one
potentially erroneous computer with a known good one following
a pre-flight channel replacement and following some instrument
failures. A transfer of about 75 words of the variable-data
memory would then be required.
Data transfer is shown in figure 2-4 as a read-only function from
the RAM. This assures that failure of one of the three other
INM computers cannot cause destruction of RAM data. Since in-
struction storage is in unmodifiable ROM, the possibility of
multiple-channel instruction-sequencing failure modes is
precluded.
Serial data transfer between channels is preferred due to the
reduced connector/wiring requirements. Data transfer rates must
be high enough to achieve the above initialization timing. Bit
rates of 1 to 2 MHz are practical with present technology.
Interrupt Sznchronization
The software in each computer is driven by an external interrupt
occurring once for each fast cycle (128 per second). Since gyro
and accelerometer data are transferred between computers and
time-coherence of samples is required, each computer must start
its fast cycle at the same time. Circuitry is needed to lock the
four interrupt pulse generators together. In addition, the cir-
cuit design must be protected so that failure of circuitry in
one interrupt generator does not cause failure in any other
unit's interrupt and deactivate its computer.
Power Supply
The INM power supply design is conventional, based primarily on
use of a converter-regulator and switching regulators for high
power-utilization efficiency. Primary power is assumed to be
l15v, 400 Hz from one of the aircraft generator busses.
15
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One relatively high-voltage supply (80 volts) is needed to
generate the high temporary currents needed when gyro rebalance
loops switch into the high rate mode.
Software
The software organization for the four-computer system is shown
in figure 2-6. Gyro and accelerometer data are requested via
the I/O. Static and dynamic compensation are then applied as
follows:
Accelerometer Compensation
a. Scale Factor
b. Axis alignment
c. Bias
Gyro Compensation
a. Scale factor (normal/high rate)
b. Torquer axis transformation
c. Inertial compensation
d. Spin axis alignment
e. G-Sensitive drift
f. Bias
Following compensation and transformation from skewed instrument
coordinates to aircraft body coordinates, the corrected gyro and
accelerometer data are available for use by other channel
computers. Note that each computer compensates only one gyro.
Thus, the selected redundant configuration has a lower computer
throughput requirement than a nonredundant (2-gyro) strapdown
system. The inertia compensation must be performed at high rates
to be effective so is very significant in duty cycle calculations.
The FDI equations accept data from the four (or three during
failure modes) gyros and up to 8 accelerometer axes for failure
detection, isolation, and system reconfiguration. The selected
instrument axis orientation is shown in figure 2-7. Spin axes
S i, are configured normal to faces of one-half of an octahedron,
represented by the pyramid constructed from equilateral triangles.
Gyro torquer axes and accelerometer input axes, x i, Yi' are also
shown.
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Parity equations are derived by comparing one gyro's rate
measurement with another's along a direction eij parallel to the
intersection of the two gyro measurement planes. Since the gyro
measurement planes are on the faces of the octahedron, the edges
of the octahedron are these intersections. Thus, two gyro
measurements of the same component of vehicle angular rate can
be directly compared to detect errors.
Six unique parity equations Tij are available as shown in figure
2-7. If two or more equations involving a specific gyro indicate
an error condition, that gyro is classified as failed. After
one gyro failure, only three equations remain. The "two-or-more"
criterion still applies, however. A more sophisticated detection/
isolation method is presently under consideration and will be
described in Paragraph 5.3.
Processing of a parity equation involves an imperfect integration.
For very small nonfailure gyro drift errors, the output remains
below the error detection threshold. The threshold may thus be
kept constant as a function of time. For large drift errors, the
output is essentially an angle. Thus, angular transients to the
flight control system during failure modes can be kept below a
desired level.
Design equations form a least-squares solution of the angular
rates from two gyros (format is similar for accelerometers) to
derive three orthogonal axes of data from four measurement axes.
The logic for selection of instruments to be used in the design
equations is shown in figure 2-6. When all four channels are
operating normally, channel 1 design equations use instrument
data from channels 1 and 2. If channel 2 is determined to be in
error by parity equations, instrument data from channels 1 and 3
are used, etc.
The resultant rates and acceleration data are then processed by
the coordinate converter to determine aircraft body angles rela-
tive to the inertial navigation coordinate system and to
convert body accelerations into that system. A partial 5th
order quaternion integration algorithm is employed.
The basic inertial navigation equations are of a relatively con-
ventional form, and include provisions for rapid ground align-
ment with optimally-derived, time-varying coefficients. Inertial
angular rates are derived based on alignment equations on the
ground, or vehicle position and velocity during flight to correct
the body-to-computer axis quaternions.
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The computation rates for the various software modules will be
as follows:
Gyro compensation
Accelerometer compensation
Parity equations
Design equations
Quaternion integration
Coordinate transformation
Outputs
Navigation
Alignment
128/see
128/see
12S/see
64/see
64/see
64/see
32/see
S/see
S/see
Table 2-1 lists the major software FDI features recommended as a
result of the study. Table 2-2 gives a conservative estimate of
word-count and duty cycle requirements for the baseline computer.
Various means of reducing computation time will be investigated
during system final design. They include reduction of compen-
sation and quaternion integration iteration rates by a factor of
two, and use of special microprogrammed instructions.
TABLE 2-1. FAILURE DETECTION, ISOLATION, SWITCHING CONCLUSIONS
PROCESS EACH PARITY EQUATION WITH SIMPLE LOW-PASS
FILTER
USE TABLE LOOK-UP OR LOGIC EQUATIONS FOR FAULT
ISOLATION
CONSIDER ADDITION OF PROCESSED PARITY EQUATIONS FOR
TIGHTER DETECTION LEVELS
EQUATIONS AND/OR SWITCHING LEVELS SHOULD BE MODIFIED
BETWEEN GROUND ALIGNMENT, NORMAL AND MANEUVERING
FLIGHT SINCE ERROR MODEL CHANGES
CONTINUE MONITORING SOFT-FAILED GYRO.
CONSIDER USE OF SOFT-FAILED GYRO FOR THIRD FAIL-SAFE
OR TO RESOLVE 3-GYRO ISOLATION AMBIGUITY
TREAT ACCELEROMETER AND GYROS AS BEING INDEPENDENT
2O
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TABLE 2-1. FAILURE DETECTION, ISOLATION, SWITCHING
CONCLUSIONS(Cont)
IF ONE AXIS OF A CHANNELFAILS, SWITCH OUT BOTHAXES
CONSIDERREINITIALIZATION FOLLOWINGANY SWITCHING
CONSIDERCOMPARISONBETWEENOUTPUTTABLES IF SOFT-
WARE, AND REINITIALIZATION IF SIGNIFICANT ERRORIS
DETECTED. ACCOUNTSFOR COMPUTERTRANSIENT ERRORS
BETWEENINSTRUMENTCOMPARISONSAND OUTPUTFORMULATION
USE RADIO AID UPDATESTO DETECT SMALL ERRORSOR TO
RESOLVE 3-GYRO ISOLATION AMBIGUITY
TABLE 2-2. COMPUTERRESOURCEESTIMATES
TASK
COMPENSATION- FAST
COMPENSATION- SLOW
FDI - DESIGN EQN
COORDINATECONVERTER
NAVIGATION - FAST
NAVIGATION - SLOW
ALIGNMENT GAIN SELECT
MODECONTROLLER
BARO-ALTITUDE
EXECUTIVE-SCHEDULER
OUTPUTFORMATTER
DATA BASE - SUBROUTINES
TOTALS
DUTY
CYCLE (%)
15.2
0.3
16.6
15.9
2.1
2.1
0.i
0.7
0.I
4.8
2.1
MEMORY
60.0
5OO
200
700
750
650
300
I00
600
150
250
200
2000
6400
RATE (Hz)
128
2
128
64
8
2
l
1
2
128
32
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Accuracy Input-Output
The redundant strapdown INS will have the following output
accuracy:
Attitude rate
Attitude
Heading, True
Position Rate
Acceler at ion
0_05°/sec, rms, per axis
0.i °, rms, per axis
0.2 ° , rms, 0.5 hr. flight
1.03 m/sec (2 knots)(95%) radial
with external updates every 5 sec.,
update noise of 122m rms, zero
correlation time, 61m, rms, 20
sec correlation time per axis,
3(] minutes flight duration
0.003m/sec2
This accuracy applies with either 0, i, or 2 hardware failures,
and through the required operational environment. It is assumed
that aircraft installation errors are not included, aircraft
parking coordinates have been entered perfectly and a full gyro-
compassing alignment has been completed in i0 minutes after
turn-on, at a latitude of 45 ° prior to first aircraft motion.
The system error expected per channel is illustrated in figures
2-8 and 2-9. The simulations are based on a realistic error
budget and show 50 percent probability errors with and without
radio aid updating. Aided performance is essentially 1 m/sec
(95%) as required.
Outputs provided by the redundant strapdown INS are as follows:
Category Quantity Resolution Range Bits Cycle Time
14 0.031 sec
Attitude
Attitude
Rate
Pitch
(Elevat ion)
Roll
Heading,
true
Pitch rate
Roll rate
Yaw rate
2r/215
2_/215
2_/215
0.05°/sec
0.05°/sec
0.05°/sec
+=/2"
_+_
±4 rad/
sec
±4 rad/
sec
±4 rad/
sec
15
15
14
14
14
0. 031 sec
0.031 sec
0.031 sec
0. 031 sec
0.031 sec
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Category
Body**
Accel.
Nav
Output s
Quantity
Longitudinal
Accel.
Lateral
Accel.
Vertical
Accel.
(Body)
North
Velocity
East
Velocity
Vertical
Resolution
0.003 m/
sec 2
0.003 m/
sec 2
0.003 m/
sec 2
0.03 m/
sec
0.03 m/
sec
o.03 m/
Range
±i0 g
+I0 g
+i0 g
±1686
m/sec
±1686
m/sec
±1686
Bits
ii
ii
ii
16
16
16
Velocity
(Earth)
Latitude
Longitude
Altitude
sec
2_/219
2_/219
0.3m
m/sec
±_/2"
±=
-305m to
18.3 km
18
19
16
Cycle Time
0.031 sec
0.031 sec
0.031 sec
0.125 sec
0.125 sec
0.125 sec
0.125 sec
0.125 sec
0.125 sec
*These outputs are generally scaled at ±_.
**Installation is assumed to be at the aircraft center of
gravity, so lever-arm accelerations are not included.
An output line indicating failure of one or more system
components/subsystems will be provided from each redundant
computer.
Input requirements consist of altitude from an air-data system
and update data, for example, Kalman filter updates based on
VOR/DME or OMEGA data. Baseline update quantities are 2 velocities
and 2 position, (4 total) at a rate of one full update at least
every 30 seconds. Additional inputs, TBD, will be received from
a display.
Packaginq Description
The complete redundant strapdown INS consists of 4 identical
inertial navigation modules plugged into a common mount. One of
25
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the inertial navigation modules is illustrated in figures 2-10.
It consists of the chassis, power supply, electronics cards, and
an instrument block, and has a weight of approximately 5.9 Kg
Cooling is assumed to be direct impingement of cabin air on the
components, so no heat exchanger is required.
The instrument block is attached to the chassis by means of a
lever mechanism. When the chassis is plugged into the common
mount, a plunger pushes on the engagement lever causing the block
to move so the alignment feet can engage a central alignment
block in the mount. This mechanism provides for angular align-
ment accuracy of 10-20 arc seconds between the four instrument
blocks of the entire system. Each instrument block consists of
one G-6 Gyro, two A-1000 Accelerometers, and an electronics
card, as shown in figure 2-11.
The mount chassis shown in figure 2-10 forms a common shell for
the four inertial navigation modules. The mount chassis weight
is approximately 4 Kg for a total installed weight of under
27.7 Kg. Module orientations are rotated by 90 degrees within
the mount chassis. This allows all four plug-in inertial navi-
gation modules to be identical yet achieve the desired gyro and
accelerometer axis orientations. After an inertial navigation
module is inserted into a slot, a lever on the actuator assembly
is pushed forward, causing the instrument block to be pressed
onto a common alignment block in the rear of the mount.
The unit cam-lock handles are of a type used on commercial
avionics. The bottom of the handle engages a hook on the mount
(figure 2-12), and when the lever in the handle is pushed in,
the chassis mates with the connector and the unit is locked in
place.
Figure 2-13 shows some details of the actuator assembly and the
alignment block.
Environmental/Aircraft Characteristics
General environmental and aircraft specifications are derived
from the present commercial inertial specifications, ARINC 561,
and the LaRC SOW. To make the redundant strapdown INS more
broadly applicable, civil or general aviation performance limits
are assumed to apply. The required and desired aircraft opera-
tional performance limits are:
Angular Rates
Angular Acceleration
Linear Accel (maneuver)
VTOL
4 rad/sec
50 rad/sec 2
±3 g
Civil or General
Aviation
4 rad/sec
50 rad/sec 2
±3 g
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VTOL
Civil or General
Aviation
Velocity (max)
Altitude
Aircraft tilt (parked)
Range of operation
(nat)
Normal ambient
temperature:
Maximum continuous
operation:
Short-term (30 min)
overtemp:
Low operating temp:
Vibration (flight)
154 m/sec
3,048 m
±5 °
±70 °
1029 m/sec (ARINC 561)
18,288 m (ARINC 561)
±5 °
Worldwide
30°C (ARINC 561)
50°C
71°C
-15°C
0.762 mm 10-55 Hz
5 g 55-500 Hz
It is assumed that ARINC 404 cooling air will be available with
a flow of 13.6 kg/hour/100 watts of dissipation, but that the
ARINC 404 form factor and cooling air attachment methods are not
applicable. ARINC 600 will require review when available.
Reliability
The reliability of a single channel of the redundant strapdown
INS has been calculated to be 4100 hours MTBF. This calculation
is based on MIL-HDBK-217B failure rates, an "Airborne Inhabited"
application with part ambient temperatures stabilized at a
maximum of 70°C. The'detailed failure rate breakdown is given
in Appendix G.
This reliability may be expected for a production system in com-
mercial airline use at some time after introduction into service.
Reliability is expected to grow with time from some initial
value as marginal components and circuits are weeded out of the
system. An example of this reliability growth is shown in
figure 2-14 for a first generation gimballed commercial inertial
system. Approximately three years is needed to achieve mature
reliability. One channel of the redundant strapdown involves
considerably less equipment than a present ARINC system (no
gimbals, one less gyro, one less accelerometer, smaller power
supplies, more modern computer, considerably less I/O) so 4000
hours MTBF appears a reasonable prediction for mature channel
reliability.
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The system failure probabilities are given in figure 2-15 for a
channel MTBF of 2000 or 4000 hours, flight durations of 0.5, 1
and 8 hours. In addition, reliability is also a function of the
allowable errors, improving significantly for outputs to the
flight control system where it is needed for flight safety. In-
strument noise, probability of two simultaneous failures, and
information limitations of the 4 and 3 TDF gyro array were con-
sidered in these calculations.
Note that for flight durations of 8 hours, reliability is signif-
icantly degraded. Reliability can be improved for these long
missions, particularly for flight control outputs, with a more
flexible I/O structure between instruments and computers so any
computer can read any instrument without other computers working.
Probability of flight control reference failure is reduced by a
factor of 40. For the short flight-time VTOL application, the
lower-flexibility, lower-cost configuration is adequate.
Maintainability
Particular attention was focused on airline maintainability
considerations during the preliminary system design. For example,
the total cost of spares needed by the airlines to support the
equipment during operational use is considerably reduced by
having the system consist of four identical modules.
Since the redundant strapdown INS is designed to provide signals
to the flight control system, it must be considered a dispatch
critical item. This means that if any of the four channels
indicates a failure, the aircraft will not take off. Thus,
removal and replacement time must be minimized in order to limit
dispatch delays - a costly action for airlines, particularly in
short-haul applications.
The packaging design of the redundant strapdown INS was especially
directed toward rapid removal and replacement of a module in the
aircraft. Very simple latching mechanisms are used to engage
the connector, lock the unit in place, and lock the inertial
instruments into precise alignment with each other. Furthermore,
this maintenance action can be performed without removing power
to the remaining 3 channels so therefore the ground gyrocompas-
sing mode need not be reinitiated, further shortening dispatch
delay. Once redundancy management equations are satisfied, the
complete fail-op/fail-op system is ready for takeoff.
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III. SPECIFICATION OF SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The detailed INU design requirements are based first upon the
LaRC Statement of Work [i]. Expansions upon these requirements
are also provided in the Litton proposal to LaRC [2] and the
preliminary study for NASA, CR-132419 [3]. The means utilized
to fill in the remainder of design requirements is to use the
commercial INS specifications, ARINC 561 and 571 [4] and [5] as
guides. Additional material is utilized where appropriate with
the source identified.
ARINC 561 formed the basis for introduction of inertial systems
into commercial airlines. It was prepared by a committee com-
posed of both INS manufacturers and airlines and thus represents
environmental, installation, and design standards accepted by
the majority of the commercial avionics community. It also
references the other applicable general specifications accepted
by the airlines such as for packaging and environmental testing.
Some ARINC 561 requirements are not applicable to redundant
strapdown INS, and these will be analyzed as required. The
input/output and display requirements of the strapdown INS will
not be included in this report except in a very general manner.
3.1 Cost Factors
The system cost goal of the redundant strapdown navigator shall
be under $50,000 for initial production quantities of approxi-
mately 200 units. The cost data are to be presented in the form
of CR-132419 [3], tables 4 and 5, per the LaRC SOW. Amortized
design, development and test equipraent costs shall be included
so that unit cost to an airline is developed. Cost of warranty
and training shall not be included at this time.
This system cost goal is a considerable challenge judginq from
present generation, non-redundant INS costs of $80K- $100K per unit,
and the conclusion from CR-132419 (page 278) that a best-case
10-6 reliability system would cost about $78K (excluding develop-
ment and test equipment). The CR-132419 report concluded that
only an "advanced strapdown configuration" requiring significant
technology advances could meet the goal. Further, fail-op/fail-
op capability adds considerably to the amount of redundant
hardware needed. In fact, the system reliability requirement is
effectively increased from a 10-6 failure probability to almost
a 10-9 failure probability for a 30-minute flight. Best-case
INS cost for this reliability is projected to be about $90K in
the CR-132419 report, excluding development, test equipment and
tooling.
The redundant strapdown INS is considered to consist of the
following elements, as a minimum:
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Four two-degree-of-freedom tuned gimbal gyroscopes.
Eight single axis accelerometers.
Capture electronics for each of the above.
Temperature sensor/control electronics for the above,
as needed to meet system accuracy requirements.
Redundant computers to process data from the instru-
ments to produce required system outputs. For the
purpose of preliminary design, four computers will
be assumed.
Redundant instrument-to-computer input/output
provisions.
Redundant computer-to-computer interface provisions.
Representative system digital input/output channels
to tie the redundant strapdown INS to displays and
other aircraft avionics.
Redundant power supplies, clocks, etc. required for
system operation.
The design of the redundant computers with associated I/O will
be based on representative hardware expected to be available for
production go-ahead in the late 1970's. Digital subsystem
designs will only be detailed to the extent needed for costing
and reliability estimating and will not necessarily reflect the
optimum redundancy management approach.
To achieve a clearer understanding of cost vs. system design
parameters, trade-off analyses are required in the following
categories:
a. Derive cost as a function of packaging philosophy. The
optimum packaging to be employed for all the various
elements of the redundant strapdown INS is a function
of not only unit cost, but also airline maintenance
methods and aircraft dispatch constraints. A broad
analysis, including airborne-incurred cost factors
such as spares costs and dispatch-delay costs is
required.
b. Determine optimum power supply (including clocks,
reference voltages, etc.) configuration (three with
switching as described in the Litton proposal [2] vs
four unswitched).
Co Determine the lowest-cost redundancy mechanization
which will meet the fail-op/fail-op and system
reliability requirements.
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A common means of reducing the cost of an item is to increase the
production base through sales to a variety of customers. The
ARINC 561 INS is a good example. A standardized design allowed
application of the system to a variety of customers, commercial
and private. This increased the production base and maintained
a relatively low price for an item of rather sophisticated
avionics. Therefore, the redundant strapdown INS should not be
tailored precisely to expected VTOL needs unless the cost
benefits are clear.
Present generation INS have a material/labor split of approxi-
mately 60%/40%, respectively. Labor costs normally follow a
learning curve such as the Northrop 87 curve, and _Duld reduce
by approximately 13% if the system quantity is doubled (200 to
400 systems). Material costs savings only benefit if large
single buys can be made. Assuming labor cost savings only, a
system costing $50K at quantity 200 will cost $47K for 400.
Therefore, some cost penalties may be allowed in the interest of
standardization for an increased production base. One example of
this concept is to include a small amount of extra computer
memory for wider aircraft altitude, speed, and latitude capa-
bility rather than limiting performance to the VTOL envelope.
3.2 Reliability
The redundant strapdown INS shall be a fail-op/fail-op design,
such that any two failures of any component or subsystem can be
detected, isolated and disconnected without compromising system
performance as specified in Paragraph 3.3 of this report.
The probability that more than two failures occur or are detected
and disconnected (even if they did not occur), shall be less than
10-6 for a 30-minute flight. It is assumed that take-off will
not proceed if one or more failures have been detected prior to
flight.
Failures are classified as either hard or soft failures. A hard
failure is defined as a condition where a subsystem (gyro,
accelerometer, computer, power supply) becomes totally incapable
of performing its intended function due to a component failure
or out-of-tolerance failure mode. A soft failure is defined as
a condition where a subsystem looses a portion of its intended
function due to a component failure or out-of-tolerance failure
mode, resulting in degradation of system output accuracy.
A "failure" of the redundant 8trapdown INS is defined as the
condition where the outputs required in Paragraph 3.4 are not
available due to a number of hard failures, or where the accuracy
of one or more of the system outputs has degraded to greater than
(TBD) times the required rms accuracy.
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Completely separate computer I/0 channels to other aircraft
avionics will be assumed for each computer, with the selection
of the proper channel performed by the external equipment, based
on redundant strapdown INS self-test indications and external
voting logic. All other redundancy management and switching
will be self-contained. Any switching circuitry included for
redundancy management is also subject to the fail-op/fail-op
requirement.
Present generation commercial (e.g., Litton LTN-72) INS are
currently achieving an in-service MTBF of abou_ 2000 hours.
Therefore meeting considerably better than i0 -p probability of
complete system failure for the redundant strapdown INS is
assured once the fail-op/fail-op design is implemented. Achiev-
ing high total part-count MTBF if also highly desirable, however,
in order to reduce maintenance costs and minimize dispatch de-
lays. A sound, system thermal design is essential to meet this
goal. As stated in ARINC 561, "....the rule of thumb on elec-
trical component failures indicates a four-fold increase in
failure rates when the normal operating component temperature is
increased 30 to 50°C. '' While calculations performed at Litton
using RADC Reliability Notebook failure rates indicate degrada-
tion of only about 20-30% for a typical modern inertial system
under these thermal conditions, adequate cooling provisions are
still essential to good system design.
Aircraft and personnel safety are of primary concern in the de-
sign of the failure detection and disconnection mechanizations.
Redundancy management switching due to soft failures shall not
cause transients or steps in the output signals. Reconfigured
outputs shall transition from the previous to the new value with
a time constant long enough to not cause passenger discomfort.
System elements removed from output calculations shall still be
monitored for both hard and soft failure criteria. In the event
of more than two component failures, the soft-failure component
may be restored to operation if still available, if aircraft
safety is thereby improved. Once a component is rejected for a
hard failure it shall not be used for the remainder of the
flight.
The concept of redundancy also includes the external effects on
proper INS operation. Thus, separate aircraft power circuits
must be available for the redundant INS power supplies. This
concept could be carried further to the cooling system. How-
ever, since the INS can probably be designed to operate for
30 minutes without cooling air, redundant cooling is not required.
Triple redundant INS are presently installed side-by-side in the
Boeing 747, cooled by the same down-draft blower. While it is
also desirable that redundant elements be located in different
parts of the aircraft so they are not subject to the same
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catastrophic event (e.g., lightning strike, explosion, etc.) it
appears impractical to do so with strapdown system components.
Substantial accuracy degradation occurs with aircraft flexure.
Aircraft designers must locate the strapdown redundant INS away
from rotating machinery such as engines or APU's which could
shed debris during failure modes and thus simultaneously cause
complete redundant strapdown INS failure.
Chain type failures must also be avoided within the INS, partly
to reduce maintenance costs but primarily to avoid excessive
heat or tripping of breakers which could lead to loss of other
redundant functions. The need for partial power supply shut-
down, short-circuit and overvoltage protection should be
considered for this purpose.
3.3 Accuracy
The redundant strapdown INS shall have the following output
accuracy:
Attitude rate
Attitude
Heading
Position rate
Acceleration
0.05°/sec, rms, per axis
0.i °, rms, per axis
0.2 ° , rms
1.03 m/sec (95) radial with external
updates every 5 seconds, update noise
of 122m rms, zero correlation time,
61m rms, 20 second correlation time,
per axis
0.003 m/sec 2
This accuracy shall apply with either 0, 1 or 2 hardware failures,
through the operational environment described in paragraph 3.7
of this report and with an external update outage of 60 seconds.
It is assumed that aircraft installation errors are not included,
aircraft parking coordinates have been entered perfectly and a
full gyrocompassing alignment (paragraph 3.5) has been completed
at a latitude of 45 ° prior to first aircraft motion.
3.4 System Input/Output
Output requirements are as listed in the following table.
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This list contains the minimum of items typically provided by an
aircraft INS. It does not include special functions such as way-
point steering which are assumed to be performed by a central
computer complex and display. For the purposes of size, weight,
reliability and cost estimates, one ARINC 575 serial output
channel shall be provided for each of the redundant INS computers.
The capacity of this type of I/O is 439 24-bit words/sec vs 300
words/sec for the above list, not including the display. The
parts count for implementation is considered representative of
moderate performance, serial digital I/O techniques.
A separate output line indicating failure of one or more system
components/subsystems shall be provided from each redundant com-
puter.
Input requirements consist of altitude from an air-data system
and filter updates based on VOR/DME or OMEGA data. Baseline
update quantities are 2 velocities and 2 position, (4 total), at
a maximum rate of one full update every 5 seconds. Additional
inputs, TBD, will be received from a display. The present ARINC
575 digital I/O format cannot drive a receiver from more than one
transmitter. For the purposes of size, weight, reliability and
cost estimates, therefore, three ARINC 575 serial digital input
channels shall be provided for each of the redundant INS com-
puters. Additional channels may be needed for inter-computer
data transfer (not necessarily to ARINC format).
3.5 Reaction Time
The redundant strapdown INS shall complete its self-contained
alignment in less than I0 minutes from system turn-on. No
external inputs shall be required, with the exception of air-
craft latitude and longitude entered within two minutes after
system turn-on. Aircraft motion during alignment shall consist
of the model described in Paragraph 3.7.4.1 of this report. The
alignment time required applies for a starting ambient tempera-
ture greater than 0°C (ARINC 561) and less than 50°C and for a
latitude less than 70 ° .
3.6 Modes of Operation
OFF
ALIGN
All power is removed from the system.
Automatic sequencing through the various steps
needed for alignment shall be provided. The align
mode is initiated only on the ground. Automatic
transfer to the navigate mode shall occur if
aircraft motion is detected via the INS acceler-
ometers.
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NAY All outputs shall be provided to full accuracy in
this mode.
UPDATE External inputs to the INS shall be accepted while
in the NAV mode to correct INS position and
velocity.
ATTITUDE Consideration shall be given to use of a pendulous
attitude mode in flight during certain failure
conditions if the end reliability of attitude and
attitude rate outputs can be improved.
3.7 Environment
The redundant strapdown INS shall be designed in accordance with
ARINC 414 [6] except as modified herein, and be capable of being
tested in accordance with RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-I08, [7], with
conditions modified to be consistent with this specification.
3.7.1 Fliqht Profile Operatinq Conditions
A typical flight profile for the VTOL application consists of:
a.
b•
C.
d.
e.
f•
g.
h.
i.
j •
System turn-on at 20°C, start alignment, passenger
loading/refueling in progress, aircraft subject to
wind gusts, ground power applied to the aircraft.
Engine turn-on after 5 minutes.
System advanced to Navigate Mode after i0 minutes,
remove ground power•
Engage rotors, perform vertical take-off.
Climb to 300 m altitude, turn left 90 ° at a turn
rate of 3°/sec.
Accelerate to 103 m/sec and cruise for 6 minutes.
Turn left 90 ° then spiral down at turn rates of 3°/sec.
(typical peak turn rate of 30°/sec is indicated in
the data of the reference [i0] CH-46 flight testing)•
Decelerate and perform vertical descent to touchdown.
Disengage rotors, unload/reload passengers for 3.5
minutes.
Repeat d. thru h. two additional times, then turn off
system power.
The non-VTOL applications are assumed to have the flight profile
as follows:
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a. through c. - Same as above
d. Take-off, climb to 9,000 m altitude, accelerate to
257 m/sec,
e. Turn left 90 ° at a turn rate of 3°/sec.,
f. Cruise for 2 hours with two i0 ° course changes at
turn rates of l°/sec.
The required and desired aircraft operational performance limits
are :
CIVIL OR GENERAL
VTOL AVIATION
Angular Rates 4 rad/sec
Angular Acceleration 50 rad/sec 2
Linear Accel.(maneuver) ±3 g
Velocity (max.)
Altitude
Aircraft tilt (parked)
Range of operation
(latitude)
154 m/sec
3,048 m
±5 °
±70 °
4 rad/sec
50 rad/sec 2
±3 g
1029m/sec (ARINC 561)
18,288 m (ARINC561)
±5 °
Worldwide
3.7.2 Ambient Temperature (Per ARINC 561)
Normal ambient temperature: 30°C
Maximum continuous operation: 50°C
Short term (30 min.) overtemp: 71°C
Low operating temp: -15°C
Note: The ARINC Airlines Electronics Engineering Com-
mittee is currently reviewing all avionics in-
stallation methods for next-generation aircraft.
Revised packaging and cooling methods contained
in ARINC 600, not released at this time, require
further review.
3.7.3 Coolinq Air
It is highly desirable that the redundant strapdown INS operate
without requiring the use of cooling air since ARINC 404 cooling
(impingement) produces internal contamination. This could be
accomplished if the aircraft installation design limits the
maximum continuous ambient temperature to 30°C. In order to
provide installation flexibility, however, ARINC 404 [8] cooling
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provisions should also be included, with a cooling air flow of
13.6 Kg/hour/100 watts of dissipation. The use of heat ex-
changers having small openings shall be avoided due to the high
likelihood of closure with dust. If the installation requires
extended operation at 50°C ambient conditions, the cooling air
will be utilized to achieve highest reliability.
3.7.4 Vibration
3.7.4.1 Ground
Movement of the aircraft while parked may occur due to wind gusts
impinging on the fuselage, loading and unloading of passengers,
refueling activities, and engine vibrations. The statistical
properties of wind are described in NACA Report 1272. When this
power spectrum is applied to a typical parked aircraft transfer
function, the resulting horizontal motion may be modeled as a
first order Markov process with a standard deviation of 4mm and
a correlation time of 20 seconds. This model will need to be
reviewed once the VTOL weight, form factor and INS location in
the aircraft are established. The above model is felt to be
conservative.
Data are available[9] on aircraft motion while parked for a
number of aircraft, including the British Canberra, Comet, and
the Boeing 707. These data were not reduced into a statistical
model, but horizontal motion of the Canberra (which is approxi-
mately 21m in length and weighs 13,600 Kg vs 13m and 9,000 Kg
for the CH-46) was under 3r_n peak-to-peak during wind gusts of
up to 12 m/sec and from varying directions.
Another effect described in [9] is excitation of the aircraft
undercarriage resonance, approximately 1 cps for these aircraft,
by wind, refueling and passenger movement. Motions of 2.5 arc
minutes, peak-to-peak in roll and 3.8 arc minutes in yaw were
recorded.
Data on motion of a CH-46 were taken [10] to determine errors of
a strapdown navigator in the helicopter vibration environment.
Unfortunately, the main data reduction of the report was limited
to flight data (discussed in the next section of this report).
A review of partially reduced ground data from [i0] indicates an
apparent CR-46 undercarriage resonance at approximately 4.5 cps,
and angular motion of roughly 0.4 arc minutes peak-to-peak.
For the purposes of this report, pure coning motions of 4 arc
minutes (cone whole-angle) at 1 cps and one arc minute at 4.5
cps shall be assumed.
Passenger loading also causes variable compression of the air-
craft undercarriage. Vertical motions of up to 0.I m have been
recorded [9] • This could result in pitch or roll rotations of
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up to 0.5 ° , depending on the dimensions of the aircraft and the
location of oleo struts. Also, this motion is sudden as the
static friction of the oleo struts is overcome. Sudden changes
of yaw up to 2.5 arc minutes were also observed.
In the flight profile of Paragraph 3.7.1 of this report, it was
assumed that the INS would be transferred to the navigate mode
before rotors are engaged. While this may generally be the
case, it is possible that the reverse will occur. Comparison
of the partially reduced CH-46 ground data from [i0] (rotors on)
with flight data shows PSD vibration peaks to be factors of 4 to
i00 less than those occurring during flight. Therefore, it will
be assumed that 1/4 of the in-flight coning and sculling vibra-
tion power levels are also occurring on the ground during align-
ment.
3.7.4.2 Fliqht
The redundant strapdown INS shall operate with specified accuracy
during vibration as specified by RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-I08,
Category A. This vibration level consists of a constant total
excursion of 0.762 mm from i0 to 55 cps with a maximum of 5 g,
and of 5 g from 55 to 500 cps.
3.7.4.3 Coninq and Scullinq Motions
The power spectral density and Co and Quad spectral density plots
for the CH-46C, as derived from flight test [I0], can be repre-
sented by the approximate environment shown below:
Linear
SINUSOIDAL
0.3 gRMS @ 28 HZ
RANDOM
0.00045 (gRMS)2/HZ
0-200 HZ (0.3gRM S)
Angular 1.0 DEG/SECRMs@ 15 HZ
0.033 (DEG/_ECRMs)2/HZ
0-30 HZ (I.0 DEG/SECRM S)
Linea_Angular 0.i gRMs-DE_/SECRMs@I5 HZ
0. 0033 (gRMsDEG/SECRMs )
0-30 HZ (0.i gRMS
DEG/SECRM S )
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Further analysis of these data is presented in [ii]. These data
may be used to determine redundant strapdown INS errors due to
aircraft coning and sculling. (Coning is an angular motion of a
body described by sinusoidal velocities about one body fixed
axis and one space-fixed axis which will cause a third axis to
prescribe a pure cone in inertial space. The two oscillatory
rates are in quadrature to produce the conical motion of the
third.)
(Sculling motion is made up of a combination of a linear vibra-
tion along one axis and an angular oscillation around a perpen-
dicular axis - both at the same frequency.)
These data are taken from a vibration measurement system flown
in a CH-46C helicopter at Langley Research Center in August 1969.
The motions of the vehicle were recorded for various conditions,
both on the ground and in flight. A one-minute portion of the
recorded motions during level flight with the start of a deceler-
ation was used to generate power and cross spectral densities.
Analog spectral analysis equipment was used to generate the in-
phase and quadrature portions of the spectra. The resulting
spectra indicate that most of the environment is near dc, due to
the normal maneuvering of the vehicle and near 15 Hz and 27 Hz
which is coming from the rotors. There is some energy near 400
Hz which would come from the helicopter turbine engines.
3.7.5 Shock
Operational:
Crash Safety:
6 g with a time duration of at least l0 milli-
seconds, in accordance with the procedure of
RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-I08.
15 g with a time duration of at least i0
milliseconds, in each direction.
3.8 Power
The aircraft power supply characteristics, utilization and
general guidance, are given in ARINC 413. The redundant strap-
down INS shall be designed to use II5V AC single phase power,
per MIL-STD-704, Category B. A separate input shall be utilized
for each redundant power supply.
Capability of operation from an external battery, equivalent to
Sonotone P/N CA-51N, shall be provided with each redundant power
supply. In addition, each supply shall contain a battery charger,
as required by ARINC 561. Due to the dependence of the INS upon
the battery during power interruptions such as transfer from
ground to aircraft power, the INS suppliers have traditionally
insisted upon retaining the responsibility for maintaining the
battery in a charged state. The redundant strapdown INS shall
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also have the capability of operating from redundant standby
computer DC buses for backup power, as defined in ARINC 571,
paragraph 2.4.5.1, in lieu of the battery.
3.9 Memory Non-Volatility
The computer program memory shall not be altered by short or long
primary power interruptions. In addition, permanent gyro/
accelerometer constants such as scale factors and non-
orthogonalities, shall be stored in a non-volatile memory. Also,
the last computed values of following variables shall be retained
after system power shut-down for use during the next alignment:
a. Gyro compensation constants
b. Accelerometer compensation constants
c. Other modifiable calibration constants
d. Latitude and longitude
e. Maintenance related data, e.g., self-test results
3.10 Packaqinq Philosophy
While redundant navigation/autopilot equipment currently in use
by airlines consists of separate, non-redundant boxes, no FAA
directive has been found giving this approach as a firm require-
ment. The overriding concern of systems using redundant elements
is that a failure in one element not cause a failure of another.
Separate packaging of each element is helpful in achieving this
requirement. Electrical interactions are more common problems,
however, and avoidance of these is more a function of good design
practice rather than the physical arrangement.
Low system cost in service is a major design constraint. Packag-
ing all components into a single unit reduces the number of
connectors, chassis cost, wire harness cost and special components
to drive/receive signals through cables. A more modular concept,
on the other hand, reduces the total number of spares required
(each VTOL-port needs spares since takeoff cannot occur with
failures in any redundant element), and conceivably could reduce
dispatch time if the total system can be left running during
replacement of the failed element. The selection of the packag-
ing concept will be made after a cost tradeoff, as discussed in
paragraph 3.1 of this report. To assure non-interactive failures,
the following design constraints shall apply:
a. Redundant elements shall not be packaged into the
same card or plug-in module.
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Separate ground buses shall be used to prevent high
failure currents from interfering with other elements.
Redundant signals may share the same external connector
but pins must be sufficiently separated that a bent
pin will not interfere with another element.
A high current drain due to a failure shall not cause
a power supply failure if that supply is used by
another element.
Consideration should be given to electromagnetic
isolation and/or power shutdown where high RFI
conditions may result from a failure.
The module designs shall be such that they may be
packaged into a non-redundant strapdown INS unit if
desired for other applications.
3.11 Form-Factor/Weiqht
The Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee (AEEC) of ARINC is
currently reviewing packaging and installation requirements for
future avionics. Revised packaging, form-factor, cooling, etc.,
requirements may result from this review. In the meantime,
however, as a goal ARINC 404 [8] packaging methods are assumed
to apply. Deviations to this requirement shall be supported by
cost trade-off data. For ease of handling, the weight of any
unit replaceable on the aircraft shall be less than 20.4 kg
(this is the approximate weight of present-generation ARINC 571
[5] iss).
3.12 Installation Provisions
The redundant strapdown INS shall use the mounting provisions
and handles similar to current commercial INS, per ARINC 561, if
practical. Units shall be capable of installation into the
aircraft by personnel with minimum training and in a maximum
time duration of 1 minute.
The redundant strapdown INS shall have the capability of instal-
lation with the unit long dimension either along-ship or cross-
ship. It is assumed that computer software (or firmware)
modifications are needed to change installation orientation.
The redundant strapdown INS unit will be installed in the air-
craft with an installation tolerance of ±6 arc minutes in pitch
and roll and ±12 arc minutes in azimuth (per ARINC 561 for SST
aircraft) as a goal, with ±12 arc minutes in all axes as a firm
requirement. The system accuracy requirement of paragraph 3.3
of this report does not include the effects of this misalignment.
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The INS base (mount), if needed, is considered part of the
redundant strapdown INS.
3.13 Maintenance PhilosoDhy
The maintenance philosophy generally desired by commercial air-
lines is to do all of their own repairs, down to the piece-part
level. This is partly to protect themselves against vendor
problems such as strikes, bankruptcy, etc.. In the case of INS,
however this policy is modified since test equipment and training
costs are high. Large airlines or airline pools do most of their
own repairs, with the exception of gyros and accelerometers.
Some airlines only do module replacement, smaller users send the
entire unit back to the manufacturer under a maintenance contract
(a fixed cost/unit/operating hour).
The maintenance levels have been characterized by Litton as
follows:
Level i. Unit replacement, in aircraft
Level 2. Module replacement, in the shop
Level 3. Module repair (excluding gyros and acceler-
ometers)
Level 4. Gyro/accelerometer repair
Maintenance levels 3 and 4 will not be considered further in this
report.
Level 1 maintenance is performed at all airports serviced by the
airline for units designated dispatch items. Take-off is not
allowed with a failure in a piece of avionics so designated since
flight safety is involved. The redundant strapdown INS falls
into this category since it is required by the flight control/
stability augmentation system. The speed at which such a unit
replacement may be made is very important to airlines since
flight delays result in significant cost penalties. Ability to
replace a portion of a redundant system without turning off
system power or requiring a realignment would be a very desirable
feature.
3.14 Maintainability Desiqn
Plug-in assembly construction shall be used to the greatest
extent practical. All modules bearing the same part number
shall be interchangeable. As a goal, electronic modules shall
not require adjustment or recalibration after replacement. Care
should be exercised in locating and mounting of modules and
components for ease of accessibility.
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Each aircraft-replaceable unit shall have a failure indicator,
visible from the front panel which indicates that one or more of
the internal modules has failed. This indication shall be present
with or without power applied to the system and shall only be
reset upon successful completion of self-test.
Highly reliable self-test shall be included, consistent with
redundancy management requirements. All self-test provisions
shall be continuous and automatic, with no pilot-initiated tests.
Sufficient unit test points shall be included to allow fault
isolation to the module level using the test equipment defined
in paragraph 3.15 of this report. Module test points shall be
provided to allow fault isolation to the failed component with-
out probing.
3.15 Test/Calibration
A. Level 1 Maintenance - in aircraft.
No test equipment shall be required for operation/calibration of
the redundant strapdown INS while it is installed in the aircraft.
An automatic partial-calibration of gyro drifts shall be per-
formed during ground alignment. The redundant sensor data
(during conditions of no failures) may be used for self-calibration
to the extent practical.
B. Level 2 Maintenance- in shop.
Special purpose test equipment requirements shall be identified
for use during routine maintenance. It shall be capable of
performing strapdown sensor calibrations as required for accu-
rate system operation and of entering these constants into the
non-volatile airborne system memory. The design of this test
equipment shall allow its use for Level 2 maintenance by airline
personnel.
C. Level 3 Maintenance - not considered at this time.
D. Level 4 Maintenance - not considered at this time.
3.16 Operational Service Life
The redundant strapdown INS shall be capable of operation for at
least 3,000 hours, preferably 5,000 hours, without additional
lubrication, adjustment or replacement of components (per ARINC
414). Scheduled calibrations required to be performed during
Level 2 maintenance, shall be minimized.
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3.17 Electromaqnetic Interference
The redundant strapdown INS shall meet the conducted and radiated
susceptibility and emission requirements of ARINC 413, and the
test requirements of RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-I08, for Category A
equipment. Grounding and shielding practices shall be used in
accordance with ARINC 413. (NOTE: Cateaorv A is for aircraft
greater than 5670 kg, Category B is for light aircraft and
is less stringent).
3.18 Humidity
The redundant strapdown INS shall be capable of normal operation
during conditions of a relative humidity varying from 10% to
100%, combined with temperature and altitude cycling encountered
in normal aircraft operation, as defined by ARINC 414, for
Category A (standard) environment.
3.19 Explosive Atmosphere
Explosive atmosphere is not normally encountered by electronics
equipment in airline type aircraft. Specific installations
where explosive vapor presents an operating hazard are normally
defined by the airframe manufacturer.
3.20 Atmospheric Pressure
Normal atmospheric pressure range is from -305 m to 13,700 m.
Decompression from a pressure altitude of 2,133 m to 13,700 m in
15 seconds or less shall not degrade system performance, per
ARINC 414.
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IV. SYSTEMSYNTHESIS AND DESIGN
The approach used to reach the preliminary design concept in
this report is to first present general design constraints
(paragraph 4.1), followed with a description of hardware and
software needed to implement a non-redundant, strapdown INS
(paragraph 4.2). Redundancy is then introduced to the overall
system, to the instruments, and to the complete system software
mechanization. The advantages and disadvantages of various
alternative configurations are presented, along with the ration-
ale for selection of the final design.
System redundancy requirements are analyzed in paragraph 4.3.
Methods of achieving the system reliability requirement with a
fail-op/fail-op configuration are described. The effects of
imperfect failure detection and isolation are considered in
achieving the recommended system configuration.
The information content of three and four TDF gyro systems is
analyzed in depth in paragraph4.4. Means of estimating failure
detection and isolation probability for a three gyro array is
presented. Discussion of instrument geometry, parity equations
used for failure detection and isolation, processing of parity
equations in the presence of system noise and methods of
switching information following the isolation process are also
covered in this section.
Software mechanization options are discussed in paragraph 4.5.
The selected mechanization considers maintaining visibility of
subtle errors throughout the processing to allow external
improvements in failure detection and isolation processing.
Capability of complete recovery from failures without retaining
errors needed to perform failure detection and isolation is also
provided. Software requirements for INS updating from radio
aids, and a trade-off of software compensation of strapdown
instrument errors are presented.
System packaging options are presented in paragraph 4.6. A cost-
of-ownership trade-off illustrates the large impact that the
packaging arrangement can have in airline cost. A baseline
packaging arrangement is developed.
System design decisions are summarized in paragraph 4.7.
4.1 General Desiqn Requirements
Section III of this report gives the requirements imposed on the
redundant strapdown INS by the application. These requirements
stem from various customer or potential customer needs, including
those imposed by the total operational environment. Internal to
redundant strapdown INS, additional design constraints, guide-
lines or assumptions may be imposed prior to system synthesis,
Precedingpageblank
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either to achieve more realistic cost/reliability estimates or
based on current manufacturing trends.
4.1.1 General Construction
The general construction of units has a strong impact on cost,
both unit cost and in-service cost. The following guidelines
will be applied to the preliminary design of the redundant
strapdown INS:
Simplicity of construction is more important than
minimum size.
Internal inter-module wiring should use low-cost produc-
tion techniques such as flex-print, multilayer laminates,
or automatic wiring machines, as applicable, with that
order of preference.
Electronic modules should be designed to use modern
production assembly methods such as automatic component
insertion and wave soldering, as applicable. Hand-
soldering should be minimized.
The total number of electronic modules (printed circuit
boards) should be limited, consistent with vibration
integrity and modularity needs, to reduce the number of
connectors, total printed circuit board cost, and test
cost. A multitude of small assemblies should be avoided.
4.1.2 Module Designs
The gyro design will be assumed to be the Litton G-6, tuned-
gimbal gyro. The accelerometer will be the production Litton
A-1000 (single axis).
The electronics designs should use low-power techniques where
practical. Having a low power requirement not only reduces
power supply costs, but also simplifies electronics packaging.
Heat exchangers may be eliminated or simplified and the overall
structure may be reduced. Reliability also benefits from lower
component operating temperature. In addition, aircraft battery
requirements to cover power interruptions are simplified.
Power supply cost may be further reduced by standardizing power
supply voltages. A fewer number of voltages to be generated
tends to cut down on the number of regulators needed.
The expanded use of digital components in the electronic design
(with a corresponding reduction of analog components, such as
operational amplifiers, capacitors, and even resistors) is
highly desirable. Digital component technology is evolving very
rapidly through the use of MSI and LSI (medium and large-scale
integration) techniques. Component costs are reducing
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dramatically_ with lowered power dissipation and use of a single
power supply voltage (normally) as added benefits.
The digital computer which will be assumed for the purposes of
the study is a modern hi-performance strawman machine utilizing
state-of-the-art components while meeting the strapdown speed
requirements. Computers in this class are state-of-the-art and
available in quantity at competitive prices. The computer
memory will be a semiconductor version. A core memory may be
used for flight test of early models of the redundant strapdown
INS for software validation. Production modelsa however, would
benefit from the lower cost of semiconductor memory.
4.1.3 Software Generation
It will be assumed that the software will be generated in
assembly language rather than in some higher order language such
as FORTRAN or JOVIAL. Inefficiencies incurred with compilers as
well as difficulties in real-time application result in 20%-50%
memory word-count and time penalties. The lowest unit cost,
therefore, will result from the most efficient computer program-
ming. This trade-off should be reviewed when the computer is
selected for the implementation phase of the redundant strap-
down program. Computer memory costs are becoming so low that
some memory hardware could be wasted if the costs of programming
can be significantly reduced.
4.1.4 Test and Calibration
Computer-controlled module/unit test and calibration will be
assumed for minimum cost. This will have a significant impact
on unit price since electronic labor costs are already small
through the use of automated assembly methods.
The design of the redundant strapdown INS units and modules
should include capability of automatic test. This determines
the number and type of test points (this may require additional
or larger connectors) and some additional components for iso-
lation of sensitive circuits.
4.2 Element Block Diaqrams
The system design will now be synthesized from the basic, non-
redundant constituents. Various alternative mechanizations are
shown, and trade-off discussions presented where applicable.
4.2.1 Non-Redundant System Block Diaqram
A simplified block diagram of a non-redundant strapdown INS is
shown as figure 4-1. The G-6 tuned-gimbal gyro has two degrees-
of-freedom and thus there is a redundant (R) channel. In addi-
tion, it is essentially a displacement gyro, as opposed to a
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rate gyro. Therefore, an amplifier is needed to derive angular
rate by precessing (torquing) whenever an angular displacement
(pick-off) occurs. Similarly, accelerometers are of the torque-
to-balance type where an amplifier produces an electrical cur-
rent into the electromagnetic torquer of the accelerometer.
This torque balances out the torque produced by the vehicle
acceleration acting through a pendulous mass in the instrument.
Gyro and accelerometer torquer signals must be converted into a
form which the computer can use and this conversion is desig-
nated IMU/computer I/0. After solution of alignment, attitude
and navigation equations, the computer forms the required out-
puts for the aircraft avionics. Inputs are also accepted by the
strapdown INS for update purposes. Special circuitry, assumed
to be all-digital, is required for this system I/O since the
computer signal format is not usually adaptable for use with
aircraft wiring.
An alternative gyro and/or accelerometer torquing method is
shown on figure 4-1 with dashed lines. In this method, the com-
puter closes the loop around gyros and/or accelerometers, thus
simplifying the analog amplifiers. Since a single computer
cannot solve both the loop closures and the strapdown equations
due to the speed limitations of modern computers, additional
computational capacity must be added. This will not be dis-
cussed further in this report since it is more of a detailed
circuit-design rather than system-design option.
4.2.2 Gyro Mechanization
The G-6 gyro input and output requirements are shown in figure
4-2. System mechanization factors which need consideration are:
Gyro rebalance loop design.
Temperature sensitivity correction.
Spin motor power.
Pickoff excitation supply.
Angular axis alignment methods.
Gyro Rebalance Loop Desiqn
The G-6 tuned gimbal gyro input/output characteristics are shown
in figure 4-2. Since it is basically a limited range displace-
ment gyro rather than a rate gyro, electronics is needed to
sense displacements and drive them to a null. The driving
signals into the two torquer coils are a measure of the vehicle
angular rate about two axes.
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Figure 4-2. G-6 Gyro Interface
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Loop closure can be performed either in an analog fashion or
digitally. Analog rebalance requires an analog-to-digital
converter for input of rate measurements into the digital compu-
ter. An analog mechanization is sometimes considered to have a
tighter loop gain with less noise than a digital technique. The
A/D conversion accuracy requirement on the other hand, is very
difficult to achieve. Practical circuits have been implemented,
however.
A digital mechanization produces loop closure by means of pulses
into the torquer coil rather than a direct current. It is not
the purpose of this study to determine the most cost-effective
means of gyro rebalance loop implementation, but Litton prefers
the digital method over analog plus A/D conversion on the basis
of minimum circuitry.
Reference [13] describes a number of pulse torque loop mechani-
zations. Litton uses a method very similar to what is termed
"forced binary loop" in reference _13]. With this method, a
fixed frequency square wave is derived where the duty cycle is
modulated as a function of the gyro pick-off signal.
Figure 4-3 illustrates this mechanization. Each marker clock
pulse (approximately 2 KHz) switches a positive current into
the gyro torquer coil. When the amplified, shaped pick-off
signal crosses a threshold, the next data clock pulse (approxi-
mately 400 KHz) causes the current to switch negative. The net
number of data pulses between marker pulses, counting positive
during positive torquing, negative during negative torquing, is
proportional to average gyro precession rate during the interval.
External counting logic determines net pulse changes between
computer sampling intervals for input of A8 to the computer.
The need and desirability of cross-coupling between the two gyro
rebalance loops is discussed in the detailed loop design
description given in paragraph 6.2.1.
The wheel pick-off signal may be used to detect synchronization
between wheel motion and motor power supply frequencies and is
thus useful for self-test purposes.
The advantages of the forced binary loop implementation are:
a. For high marker pulse rate, the loop is essentially
analog, and thus linear, resulting in high closed-loop
gain and band-width. Selection of high marker pulse
rate reduces digital noise to acceptable levels.
b. Good A# resolution can easily be achieved (0.5 arc
second).
c. Power into the torquer coil is constant, resulting in
constant gyro thermal characteristics and improved
performance.
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Figure 4-3. Digital Gyro Rebalance Loop Mechanization
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d. Parts count is reduced over the analog-A/D method.
e. Excellent positive-to-negative torquing symmetry can be
achieved.
The "sampling error" described in [13] for this mechanization is
easily eliminated by synchronization of computer interrupts with
marker pulses, or by buffer registers.
A critical aspect of any rebalance loop implementation is
retaining stable symmetry between positive and negative torquing
scale factors. Any asymmetry drift from a calibrated condition
causes errors when the vehicle is in a dynamic environment
through a rectification of positive/negative motion. Achieving
0.01% scale factor stability (I00 ppm) is a lesser challenge.
Null stability errors are a function of the balance between
positive and negative torquing, including pulse rise-time and
fall-time contributions. These are difficult parameters to
control and require careful circuit design. Since this bias
error is proportional to the maximum torquing rate, and very high
vehicle rates (up to 4 radians per second) are present for very
short time durations, a rate switch is included. One current
level representing 30°/sec is used during normal operation. A
second current level, 240°/sec, is applied during extreme vehicle
maneuvers.
If the aircraft autopilot is rate-limited in all three axes for
passenger comfort or other reasons, this extra rate switching
circuitry is generally not used. Safety considerations, however,
require that the sensor measurement range be higher than the
basic airframe capability.
Temperature Sensitivity Correction
The gyro and rebalance electronics parameters are designed to
have low sensitivity to operating temperature. There are limits
to how insensitive these devices can be made, however. The
residual coefficients are sufficiently stable with time so that
the net system error budget can be achieved either with
• rapid component warmup and temperature control, or
• monitoring of component operating temperature with
computer corrections applied using factory-calibrated
coefficients.
The advantages of the calibration method are:
• system power consumption is reduced
• component operating temperature is lower, resulting in
improved reliability.
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Additional benefits derived from avoiding a large thermal
transient at turn-on are: i) Electronics failures are often
induced by the stresses associated with large thermal gradients,
so net reliability is further improved over straight parts-
count considerations: 2) A thermal, and thus instrument perfor-
mance transient during ground alignment is eliminated. Such a
transient can seriously contaminate gyrocompassing if not con-
trolled. The instrument/electronic thermal design becomes very
critical in temperature-controlled systems so that transients are
completed soon enough to achieve alignment in the required i0
minutes.
Increased calibration costs result with this method, however,
since instrument/electronic constants must be derived at a number
of temperatures instead of at a single point. Test equipment
complexity, test time, and the number of testers needed for
significant production rates are all increased.
The final tradeoff of whether or not to temperature-control
instruments is left until the final production equipment design.
System design is described for a compensated implementation.
Spin Motor Power
The G-6 gyro spin motor has been designed to operate with a
square-wave, three-phase supply voltage. This allows use of a
high-efficiency switching-type power source.
Tuned gimbal gyros are susceptible to vibrations at the spin
speed and especially at twice spin speed. Therefore, if each
gyro is run at a slightly different spin speed,coupling between
gyros through self-induced vibration effects, such as bearing
noise is avoided. If this coupling is significant, separate spin
motor power supplies are needed for each gyro.
A signal is available from the G-6 gyro, the wheel pickoff,
providing a voltage pulse for each rotation of the gyro wheel.
This signal is useful for self-test purposes to detect gyro
motor or major bearing failures. The pulse frequency is equal
to 1/4 the motor power supply frequency when the motor is operat-
ing synchronously. This pulse train could also be used to
determine motor hunting, and thus compensate for some dynamic
gyro errors. This type of compensation is not expected to be
needed in a CH-46 type of environment, as described in paragraph
4.5.3.
Pickoff Excitation Supply
The supply for gyro pickoff excitation is of straightforward
design. It must be sinusoidal, however, with low harmonic
content.
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Anqular Axis Aliqnment Methods
Gyro axis misalignments of the spin axis and the torquer axes,
relative to the mounting structure, are needed to be known to an
accuracy of approximately i0 arc seconds. The cost of machining
to this tolerance would be quite high, so the approach assumed
is to machine to relatively loose tolerances and then calibrate
the misalignment angles during test. Thus, gyro axis misalign-
ments will be derived during the calibrations described for
temperature compensation, though these will probably not vary
with operating temperatures. This adds four constants per gyro
to be stored in a non-volatile memory for read-in by the computer
at the start of each flight.
4.2.3 Accelerometer Mechanization
The characteristics of the A-1000 accelerometer are very similar
to that of the gyro, except, of course, there is no spin motor.
The accelerometer rebalance loop may be mechanized in a manner
very similar to the gyro loop. Again, a digital loop is favored
for reduced parts count.
Accuracy requirements for the accelerometer rebalance loop
torquing are slightly less stringent than for the gyro, espe-
cially during flight. Approximately i0 ppm repeatability (i00
micro-g out of 10g maximum) is typically acceptable. During
ground alignment, however, accelerometer bias drifts are in-
distinguishable from gyro bias. Equivalent bias drift must be
under 3 micro-g per minute (0.01°/hr) to achieve reasonable
ground alignment accuracy. Pulse torquing circuitry can be of
a common design between the gyro and accelerometer, except that
there is no mode equivalent to the high rate condition in the
accelerometer loop. Also, avoiding temperature control with
its attendant transient will aid in achieving the low bias drift
needed during ground alignment.
4.2.4 IMU/Computer Interface
The interface between the Inertial Measurement Unit components,
the gyros and accelerometers, and the digital computer is shown
in the block diagram of figure 4-4. The diagram is structured
for a complete inertial navigator including two gyros (with one
redundant axis) and three accelerometer axes. G x through G R are
the duty-cycle modulated square-waves from the gyro digital re-
balance loops and A x through A z are the equivalent signals from
accelerometer loops.
The conversion of duty-cycle modulated square-waves to a parallel
digital word for entry into the computer is performed by the
up-down counters. While gyro or accelerometer torquer current
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Figure 4-4. IMU/Computer Interface Block Diagram
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is positive the count in a register increments at some fixed
clock rate. When torquer current switches negative, the regis-
ter count decrements. The net counter value over one digital
torquing interval (approximately 500 microseconds for gyros, 250
microseconds for accelerometers) is representative of the angu-
lar change of the vehicle about that axis during the interval
for gyros, and velocity change for accelerometers. No unusual
design techniques are needed for this function since clock rates
of approximately 400kHz can be employed.
The main constraint is that the digital rebalance duty-cycle
transition occurs only at one of the counter clock pulses so
that no information is lost.
Temperature sensors are required at the instruments forcomputer
compensation. These sensors are typically a variable resistance
element, such as platinum, which are put into a bridge circuit,
the output of which may be a dc voltage proportional to tempera-
ture. Thus, a 10-bit analog-to-digital converter is needed to
develop the digital words for application to the computer data
bus. The number of sensors needed depends upon the thermal
design of the instrument block and the thermal gradients expected
under a variety of environments and power conditions.
Since the digital rebalance circuits have their own sensitivity
to temperature, gradients between the gyro temperature sensor and
the thermally sensitive electronic components with, for example,
different cooling air flows must also be considered. Adding a
temperature sensor to the electronics implies that instruments
and electronics are calibrated at the factory separately. This
not only increases cost but also may be impractical due to the
accuracy requirements. Therefore, rebalance electronics will be
closely packaged with their corresponding instruments to assure
a common thermal environment, and then will be calibrated
together.
4.2.5 Diqital Computer Design
The basic computer performance and memory requirements for
strapdown navigation are defined elsewhere in this report.
Other aspects of the computer design such as architecture, I/O
provisions, etc., are functions of detail design trade-offs
rather than preliminary design. This type of trade-off con-
siders design features which may add to unit CPU cost but reduce
memory cost and/or one-time programming costs. Only general
design trends likely to be applicable to a strapdown INS will be
covered in this preliminary design report.
16-bit computer architecture is used extensively in the mini-
computer field for data words, with single or multiple words
used as instructions. 24-bit computers are sometimes used in
avionics for simplified addressing and reduced double-precision
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requirements. The strapdown problem requires a significant
amount of higher-precision arithmetic so some 32-bit arithmetic
capability is very desirable. This function is included in the
typical instruction mix used in the throughput definition
described in paragraph 6.3, so is contained in the throughput
specification. In other words, the problem may be solved by a
fast 16-bit computer using software 32-bit subroutines, or by a
slower computer having hardware 32-bit arithmetic. The lower-
cost unit meeting the throughput requirement is the natural
selection. The added memory for the 32-bit subroutines should
also be considered, but the downward cost trends of semiconductor
memory make this a relatively small factor. 16-bit architecture
with good 32-bit arithmetic capability is assumed for the base-
line redundant strapdown computer.
Floating-point arithmetic is also a highly desirable feature,
primarily to simplify the variable-scaling aspects of program-
ming. While the wider dynamic range is a help in some cases, it
is not as essential as in a problem such as Kalman filtering
where convariances can assume such a wide range of values. To
be of use, the floating point capability would need to be rea-
sonably fast and use a mantissa of 24-bits or greater. Fixed
point capability would still need to be retained in the computer
for high-speed portions of the problem. Low cost implementations
of floating point arithmetic are generally significantly slower
than fixed-point.
The use of index registers as pointers to memory areas has been
found very valuable in simplifying programming and reducing
memory. The general trend is to have some of the index registers
also capable of operation as an accumulator (general register),
with register-to-register arithmetic capability. These type of
non-memory-reference operations are usually very fast and add to
net throughput performance.
Many modern computers have microprogrammable instruction sets so
they can more easily be tailored to a specific application and/or
available software. Thus a computer can be configured to emulate
a previous design, with potentially significant savings in soft-
ware generation costs, or a particular instruction may be inclu-
ded for a more efficient solution of the problem. For the strap-
down problem, for example, there may be an instruction format
which could solve the quaternion integration with lower word-
count/duty-cycle impact. Speed may be improved if the instruction
takes the place of several normal instructions, since only a
single instruction-fetch is required. Execution time of normal,
long instructions, however, such as multiply and divide, is
degraded, if these are microprogrammed instead of implemented in
hardware. Thus, net performance gains, if any, need to be
clearly established.
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Most modern computers can be configured to perform input/output
operations either under software control or under hardware
control through direct memory access (DMA) by the external
device during times the CPU is not accessing memory. DMA capa-
bility is very useful in many applications in conserving duty
cycle.
The software of a real-time problem is often controlled by means
of an interrupt pulse. These pulses, occurring at some fixed
rate control the software executive. Counting of these pulses
is then used to schedule the various software tasks. An addi-
tional interrupt, usually the primary interrupt, is used to
start a sequence of software operations in the event of loss of
primary power. An example of such an operation is the rapid
storage of self-test results in non-volatile memory to aid in
post-flight evaluation of failures. A fairly simple computer
interrupt mechanization can be suitable to vector the software
to the correct memory location containing the interrupt sub-
routine. Extensive multi-level, vectored interrupt schemes are
not required. Special design features needed for redundancy
are discussed in a later section.
The total computer memory requirement may be divided into four
categories:
a. Program memory
b. Scratchpad memory
c. Electrically alterable, non-volatile memory
d. Factory-derived, instrument constant memory
The program memory contains the sequence of instructions to be
performed by the CPU. Many types of computer applications
require that the instruction memory be electrically alterable
(but non-volatile when power is off) so that program changes
can be easily incorporated. Core memories, CMOS semiconductor
RAM with a battery for non-volatility, and silicon nitride MOS
devices fall into this category. Ultra-violet-erasable PROM
also provides program modification flexibility.
Since the redundant strapdown INS as presently conceived is
basically a sensor, it is assumed that the software will have
very few changes once the system is debugged and proven. There-
fore, low-cost ROM (read-only semiconductor memory) will be
assumed. This memory will also contain various constants needed
for program execution. A variety of devices of this type are
currently available at low cost with more than adequate speed
for this application.
Scratchpad memory provides temporary storage for system vari-
ables, flags, etc,. during processing and I/O operations. It may
67
403314
be volatile since battery protection against short power
interruptions will be provided for the entire system, and the
variables are all reinitialized when the system is energized at
the start of a flight.
Some variables are required to be retained following system
deactivation, however. For example, position coordinates of the
aircraft at shutdown may be used during the next start-up
sequence if accumulated system errors are not too great. Some
system calibrations such as partial gyro biases need to be
retained so that further biasing during the next flight can
inprove on past estimates.
In addition, it is very useful to retain a record of system
variables and redundancy management or self-test results after a
failure is indicated. Since many failure modes cause a rapid
power shut-down (I00 usec is typical) to avoid chain-type
failures, the write time of the non-volatile, read/write memory
holding these variables must be faster than the power supply
shutdown time constant. Silicon nitride memories now becoming
available, cannot be used for this function since write-times
are too long.
The total read/write memory function is assumed to be implemented
with a CMOS memory supported by a small battery. Several months
of non-volatility can be obtained with such a small battery.
S0S (silicon on sapphire) versions of CMOS are now becoming
available with adequate speed for this application.
The instrument constant memory (a read-only memory which is
programmed only once using a special item of test equipment) is
required to store some instrument constants which are not nor-
mally subject to change. This includes instrument non-
orthogonalities which are determined during manufacture. A
silicon nitride memory is not recommended since certain types
of computer failures might cause alteration of the constants,
thus necessitating instrument recalibration, a time-consuming
maintenance action. The instrument constant memory would be
implemented in a programmable ROM (PROM).
4.2.6 Computer Input/Output
The input/output between the digital computer and other aircraft
avionics has been designated to be all-digital, serial and in
the format defined in ARINC 575. For the non-redundant configu-
ration, there are no unique design problems associated with this
circuitry.
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4.2.7 Power Supply and Support Electronics
The remainder of electronics needed to complete a non-redundant
strapdown INS is shown in block diagram form in figure 4-5.
Primary aircraft power is converted to DC which is used to
derive the various voltages needed by the electronic components.
It is also used to charge the battery which provides the backup
power in the event of aircraft power interruptions.
Self-test circuits monitor critical gyro, accelerometer, and
power supply signals. When a failure is detected, the computer
is sent an interrupt so it can perform its shutdown subroutine,
and a failure indication is provided to other aircraft avionics.
A variety of frequency references are provided by the crystal
oscillator and countdown circuitry for such things as instru-
ment pickoff excitation, gyro spin power, digital rebalance loop
control, I/O circuit counting and timing, computer clock, the
software executive interrupt, and a computer-read time word used
in the solution of the equations to compensate for computational
time delays. A watch-dog timer is also incorporated, reset
periodically by software. If a problem develops and software
cannot reset the timer, self-test circuits are activated to
indicate a computer failure.
Mode sequencing circuits are used to initiate gyro spin power
once power supply voltages are stabilized and close gyro and
accelerometer digital rebalance loops once gyro motors are up to
speed.
4.2.8 Software
The general software mechanization of a strapdown inertial
navigation system implemented with TDF tuned-gimbal gyroscopes
is shown in figure 4-6. Following read-in of counts representing
the incremental change in angle and velocity occurring over the
previous sampling interval, in instrument coordinates, software
compensation is applied. Compensation converts the data into
the body coordinate system and applies correction to calibrated
or predictable error functions.
Accelerometer compensation consists of a scale-factor correction,
rotation of data through calibrated misalignment angles, and
bias correction. Gyro compensation consists of similar cor-
rections plus compensation for gravity-dependent bias and dynamic
error mechanisms.
The type of dynamic error compensation employed depends upon the
vibration environment of the vehicle, gyro parameters, gyro
rebalance loop characteristics, and the desired net system
accuracy. There is a significant penalty in use of computer
duty cycle so software tends to be tailored to the application.
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The most significant dynamic compensation used in strapdown
applications corrects for gyro inertia effects. When a gyro is
torqued, it not only processes 90 ° from the torquing and spin
axes, but also deflects about the torquing axis. This is a very
predictable effect but must be compensated at a high speed in
software to minimize errors due to angular vibration of the
vehicle.
Another compensation often employed uses gyro pick-off displace-
ments to offset rectification which could occur in a vibration
environment due to finite rebalance loop compliance. This
compensation is smaller and may be considered for elimination
in error budget trade-offs.
Compensated gyro outputs are then integrated in a quaternion
integration algorithm to determine the angle between the aircraft
body coordinate system and the coordinate system used in the
inertial navigation equations. In qeneral, higher order inte-
gration algorithms such as second or fourth are used with reason-
able computer solution rates to prevent errors due to circulatory
vehicle vibration (coning).
Velocity increments are transformed from body coordinates to
navigation coordinates using these quaternions. From this point
on, equations to be solved are identical to the inertial navi-
gation equations of gimballed systems. The inertial rate of the
navigation coordinate system is also derived and returned to the
quaternion integration algorithm in a manner directly analogous
to gyro torquing.
Leveling and gyrocompassing are performed on the ground prior
to flight in the same manner as gimballed inertial systems.
Time-varying gains are normally employed, with high initial
gains to remove large initial conditions, gradually reducing to
a low value to provide filtering of either internal noise effects
or unpredictable motion of the aircraft due to wind gusts,
passenger loading, refueling, etc. The optimum time-schedule of
the gain is often determined using an off-line Kalman filtering
technique.
The design of compensation and quaternion integration must be
performed carefully to avoid undue airborne computer time con-
sumption. In a current strapdown program at Litton, approxi-
mately 40% of the total utilized duty cycle was consumed by
instrument compensation, 40% for quaternion integration and 20%
for the remainder of tasks. Compensation and quaternion time
consumption can be reduced for systems with reduced accuracy
requirements or reduced vibration environment, or can be reduced
by use of advanced techniques such as higher-order algorithms,
time-staggered A@, _V read-in, and special microprogrammed
computer instructions.
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4.3 System Redundancy Tradeoffs
System Desiqn
The synthesis of the remainder of the redundant strapdown INS is
based on comparison of a channelized approach vs lower level
modular redundancy. This tradeoff is illustrated by figure 4-7.
In the channelized approach, failure of any element of the
channel (IMM, computer, I/O, power supply) causes failure of the
entire channel. The IMM redundancy management requires communi-
cation between channels which then also provides the instrument
measurements to all computers.
The modular redundancy approach provides fault detection and
isolation at each module so that a failure of a power supply or
computer, for example, does not deactivate any other module.
The reliability of this method is higher than the channelized
approach, at some extra cost for monitoring and switching hard-
ware. This is a well-documented redundancy tradeoff [14].
An approximate calculation of redundant strapdown INS reliability
with the channelized approach will serve to scope the problem.
If reliability is marginal with this method, some modular
redundancy would need to be introduced.
One channel of the four redundant channels is expected to have
an MTBF of at least 3000 hours. This is consistent with relia-
bility actually experienced on ARINC 561/571 INS of 1500-2000
hours. These INS contain 2 gyros, 3 accelerometers, gimbals,
sliprings, servo amplifiers, considerable input/output circuitry,
and older, less-integrated component technology vs 1 gyro,
2 accelerometer axes, minimum I/O, and medium and large scale
integrated (LSI) circuitry in one redundant strapdown INS
channel.
A calculation of system reliability must take into account the
failure coverage* at each fail-operational level. The sensi-
tivity of system reliability to this variable, at each level, is
illustrated in figures 4-8a and 4-8b taken from reference [16].
Figure 4-8a (figure 3 of [16] ) shows the effect of non-unity
coverage for the first failure, with a coverage of 0.9 for the
second. The system configuration for these curves is three
channels, the first failure detected by voting and the second by
BITE. While this condition is not identical to the redundant
strapdown INS, reliability trends are applicable. It is clear
*The term "coverage" has been defined in the literature [15] [16]
as the likelihood of detection and recovery given that a failure
has occurred. Thus coverage measures the confidence associated
with a fail-operational capability.
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that nearly perfect coverage for the first failure (C I) is
needed to make full use of the inherent equipment reliability,
preferably better than 0.99999. One source of imperfect coverage
is the detection level used in the parity equations to detect
soft gyro or accelerometer errors. This detection level must be
set high enough that false failure isolation due to normal
measurement noise has a very low probability.
Figure 4-8b), a combination of figures 6 and 7 of [16], illus-
trates the effect of non-unity coverage of the second failure.
The top curve represents a 3-channel system with voting logic
(coverage of unity for one failure) and no BITE. This is analo-
gous to zero capability to fault-isolate the second gyro failure.
The second two curves show addition of BITE with increasing
probabilities of correct fault detection and isolation. The
fourth curve is a 4-channel voted system (triple modular redun-
dancy with a standby replacement channel) with perfect coverage
for two failures. From these curves it is clear that coverage
for the second failure should be greater than 0.9, preferably
greater than 0.99 to make full use of the inherent equipment
reliability. The analysis of the next section of this report
shows the practicality of achieving greater than this degree of
coverage for the second instrument failure.
From these curves, it appears that a reliability of approximately
1 X 10 -8 (for 0.5 hr) can be achieved with the channelized
approach, assuming a 3,000 hr MTBF/channel and considering
realistic failure coverage conditions.
The previous discussion is general and approximate. A more
rigorous presentation of reliability performance for the selected
system configuration is given in paragraph 5.3 of this report.
For purposes of system configuration trade-offs, however, the
following conclusions may be reached:
a. Low-level redundancy is not needed to meet the 10 -6
failure probability requirement once the system is
configured to be fail-op/fail-op, except where neces-
sary to meet coverage requirements. The design should
be driven primarily by cost factors.
b. Coverage for the first failure should be greater than
0.9999, preferably 0.99999.
c. Coverage for the second failure should be greater than
0.99, preferably 0.999. A small amount of BITE cir-
cuitry should be employed to achieve this goal.
d. BITE circuitry to provide fault isolation for a third
failure is not needed. The primary function of BITE
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will be to prevent further damage following a failure
such as power supply burn-out, gyro hinge damage, or
other secondary failures.
As an illustration of the first point, two system configurations
may be considered. Figure 4-9 shows complete redundancy of
computers* and system input/output. The computer subsystem may
thus be designed to be fault-tolerant and the techniques
described in the literature, [17] and [18] for example, may be
applied in some form. This often includes redundancy at the
computer module level, CPU or memory, for further reliability
improvement. There is additional hardware needed for this
redundancy, however. Each computer needs to be able to accept
data from all four IMM's, and the redundant I/O needs to have
considerable monitoring and switching circuitry.
Based on the need for a low cost design, the concept of figure
4-10 is recommended. An IMM interfaces with only 1 computer,
simplifying that hardware. Data is made available to other com-
puters for IMM redundancy management through the basic inter-
computer I/O. External I/O is dedicated to a computer with final
voting performed by the equipment tying into the redundant
strapdown INS.
This recommended approach essentially provides redundancy on a
channel level. Failure of any element of the channel causes
failure of the entire channel but not the failure of another
channel. This is consistent with the earlier conclusion that
low level redundancy is not needed.
The assumption that external subsystems can accept four inputs
and perform their own voting and fault masking appears reasonable
in light of redundant systems presently in service and since
future interfacing systems will probably contain a computer of
their own.
Gyro and Accelerometer Electronics
Gyro and accelerometer rebalance loops must be operating con-
tinuously to provide accurate redundancy management. Therefore,
there is no circuitry reduction which maybe achieved over includ-
ing separate circuits for each instrument. Since each gyro
*The use of 4 computers was a basic assumption of this study
program to limit the required amount of trade-off analysis.
While 3 computers are considered to have fail-op/fail-op capa-
bility when used in conjunction with BITE, added BITE circuitry
and I/O tends to offset the cost reductions offered by one less
computer. This is particularly true considering the cost trends
of computers vs special-design I/O.
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operates at a slightly different spin speed to eliminate the
possibility of errors due to vibrational crosscoupling, four
gyro spin supplies are also desirable.
IMM/Computer Interface
The interface between the instruments and the computer is
actually simpler for the redundant IMM configuration than for a
non-redundant Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). This is due to
use of the channelized approach previously described where a
computer is dedicated to a single IMM (i gyro, 2 axes of accel-
eration). This dedication not only reduces the number of inputs
but also simplifies timing requirements so that each IMM/Computer
channel may run essentially asynchronously from the others.
Diqital Computer
The recommended system approach eliminates the need for hardware
voting. Any comparison of data between channels is performed in
software. This then eliminates the need for additional levels of
interrupt to reconfigure the system,recover from transients, etc.
Thus unique design features are not needed for redundancy, con-
trolling cost.
The use of an ROM program memory is considered a Reliability
Enhancement Technique since it cannot be altered during excessive
noise conditions. It would be desirable to have the capability
of reinitializing the RAM since the integration type of pro-
cessing in an INS does not recover from transient failures. This
is a rare condition so only minor cost penalty should be incurred
to provide it.
Computer I/O
The recommended system approach where a computer is dedicated to
a single IMM (i gyro, 2 axes of acceleration) requires intercom-
munication between all computers in the system in addition to
communication to the external world. It is assumed for purposes
of this discussion that communications to the external world
will be provided via standard ARINC 575 Serial I/O Buses.
The inter-computer communication scheme, however, requires care-
ful consideration since it can greatly affect reliability analy-
sis and redundancy considerations. A key consideration in the
system design should be a method to ensure that a faulty pro-
cessor cannot destroy data in another processor.
Approximately 75 variables need to be transferred from every
computer to every other computer. Transfer of variables from the
other three computers (225) should be initiated by software and
be available in a computer before the next executive interrupt
(128 per second). The gyro and accelerometer data (6 words per
8O
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computer) should be transferred first since the software must
wait before performing other functions until these measurements
are available from the other three computers. Thus the wait-
time between data transfer initiation and receipt of instrument
data consumes computer duty cycle and should be minimized. The
use of DMA for data transfer is highly desirable due to its
speed and low impact on duty cycle.
One method of implementing this I/O is to provide every memory
unit with four ports, one local port with both read and write
capability and three external ports with read only capability.
Each computer therefore has the capability of reading all the
state variables and data of every other computer. Software
voting algorithms will be employed to effect fault detection and
recovery processes.
Two port-methods of transferring the data between the four
computers have been considered. The first approach is to use a
16-bit parallel bus that time shares data and address lines.
Assuming approximately four control lines (Address Strobe, Data
Strobe, Memory Request, Memory Enable) for completely asynchro-
nous operation, this approach requires at least 80 signals lines
of interconnect between the four systems for computer-to-computer
communication. It has the inherent advantage of being simple
to implement with very fast response time to error detection.
In addition, in the event of a channel failure just prior to
tak=-off, substitution of a channel and IMU reinitialization
could be effected rapidly since all system variables are avail-
able and may be transferred from the three active systems to the
replaced system within a few milliseconds.
In this approach the RAM memory (approximately 1024 16-bit words
for each channel) of the entire system is contiguous within the
memory address structure. A discrete bit provided in the elec-
tronic harness will identify to the software the channel number
(i, 2, 3 or 4) of the local processor. If a program is operating
out of processor 2, therefore, it will be able to read addresses
within the entire spectrum but write only between addresses 2K
thru 3K. It is assumed that with parallel busses interconnecting
the four computers, data can be read directly from another
channel without any delay or extra buffering.
A second port method is to use a serial transmission scheme
between the computers. This approach can reduce the signal line
interconnect count to approximately twelve lines. A serial-to-
parallel converter is required at each receiving memory port and
a parallel-to-serial converter is required at each External
Memory Controller (see figure 4-11a). The disadvantage of this
approach is the relative slowness of the data transfer and the
extra complexity of the I/O Controller.
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In a serial scheme the delay encountered in receiving a given
variable may adversely effect the fast iteration loops. There-
fore a block transfer of variables is assumed and a contiguous
addressing structure for the four computers is not needed.
The serial External Memory Controller of figure 4-11a) can accept
the following type command:
Read n variables from location i--_i + n from system s
and store in local locations i--_i + n.
The command is sent to the controller and the CPU then continues
with another program task. The port structure of the memory will
contain logic to ensure that no single requestor can hang up a
RAM. At completion of the data transfer, the External Memory
controller could then signal the requesting processor via an
interrupt.
A third method of data transfer is illustrated in figure 4-11b).
When data is ready in a particular computer, a programmed I/O
function initiates serial data transfer from that computer to all
other computers. When the serial I/O is receiving data from a
particular channel, the channel number, word count and wired bits
are used to form the memory address for DMA logic. Use of this
method requires that there be no component failure mode which
could cause multi-channel failure.
Selection of the specific inter-computer I/O mechanization has
been deferred to the detailed design phase. No matter which
method is selected, careful failure analysis must be performed
to retain a fail-op/fail-op capability at all levels.
Power Supply and Support Electronics
The Dower supply could also be configured to be modularly
redundant, i.e., a single power supply failure would not cause
failure of any other system element. Since monitoring (BITE)
circuits for power supplies are relatively straightforward, only
3 supplies would be needed for fail-op/fail-op capability.
Coverage could be made adequate for both failures.
After two power supply failures, however, one supply is driving
all 4 channels. Each of the supplies would need this power drive
capability, resulting in an inherent power drive capability of
4 X 3 or 12 channels, only 4 of which are applied at any one
time. For a channelized approach, a power supply is preassigned
to a single IMM/Computer. Thus a net drive capability of only 4
channels is required for the total redundant strapdown system.
Since power supply cost is strongly dependent upon power drive
capability, there is a significant system cost penalty for the
small amount of increased reliability provided by modular redun-
dancy (not even considering monitoring and switching components
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needed to switch-out the failed unit). Therefore, a channelized
approach for the power supply is selected, where a power supply
failure will cause loss of one IMM and one computer function.
Self-test circuits are applied for detection of hard instrument
and power supply failures to assist the redundancy management
function and to prevent further damage to instruments or other
components during this condition. Power shutdown of an entire
channel would be activated during such failures. Therefore,
these self-test circuits are best designed completelv on a
channel basis, having minimum or no interaction with other channels.
The various frequency references needed for system implementation
could also be implemented to be independently redundant. There
is a relatively minor amount of circuitry involved so the final
decision is influenced by other factors such as packaging and
maintainability. Again, it appears that having separate channels
is preferred to eliminate elaborate detection and switching
circuits. There needs to be some interaction between channels,
however, to approximately synchronize computations so that data
comparisons are made following calculations within the same
computer iteration. This is attained by producing the software
executive interrupt simultaneously in all 4 channels. Local
clock stability would then produce adequate synchronization for
the remainder of the iteration. Monitoring and switching cir-
cuitry is needed to prevent a single failure from deactivating
more than one channel.
Mode sequencing circuits for system start-up require a minor
amount of circuitry to produce outputs for activation of a
specific channel, such as computer reset, gyro spin-up, and
loop closures, based on power supply mode status. Thus, the
design clearly requires a channel approach vs modular redundancy,
with no interactionbetween channels.
4.4 Instrument Redundancy Trade-Offs
4.4.1 General Concepts
The preceding channel redundancy approach does not apply to the
inertial instruments. Each so-called channel contains only two
axes of information and thus is not a complete navigator.
Instruments, therefore, are treated in a modular fashion, with
Failure Detection, Isolation (FDI) and subsequent system recon-
figuration included so that a single instrument failure will not
cause the deactivation of any other instrument. This FDI and
reconfiguration has been chosen to be performed in computer
software for lowest system cost.
Definitions of the following terms are taken from reference [19].
Detection is the decision that a degradation or failure has
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occurred at a threshSld level established by mission phase
requirements. Isolation is the subsequent decision of which
particular instrument output is responsible for the system
degradation or failure.
A missed alarm is defined as an actual failure that remains
undetected and/or unisolated after the desired threshold limit
on system attitude or velocity error (or any other such detection
criterion) is exceeded.
False alarms occur when the inertial system truly has no failures
but transients or noise trigger the FDI system to falsely indi-
cate failure of a good instrument. False and missed alarm
probabilities together should form a valid criterion for mea-
suring the effectiveness (i.e., reliability) of a particular
FDI method. A more comprehensive judgment of the worth of FDI
in a particular system is derived by judging the overall relia-
bility of the composite system by combining the mean time before
failure (MTBF) estimates of the system components with the FDI
false and missed alarm probabilities over the critical mission
flight time.
Coveraqe is the probability of a successful system recovery
after any failure has occurred. Coverage then, is by this defi-
nition, the probability of a correct alarm when a failure occurs.
It is not a complete overall concept because it does not take
into account the probability of the FDI method having a false
alarm.
4.4.2 Two-Deqree-Of-Freedom Gyro (TDF) Considerations
Much of the published work on strapdown gyro redundancy manage-
ment has been directed toward application of single-degree-of-
freedom gyros. References [20], [21], [22] and [23] present
some of the dodecahedron work of the Charles Stark Draper Labora-
tory, [24], [25] and [26] the work of TRW and [27] that of
Honeywell.
A major problem in the use of single-degree-of-freedom (SDF)
gyros is the large number of gyros (6) needed for fail-op/fail-
op capability. This leads to high system cost. SDF gyros have
not differed significantly in cost from TDF gyros in the past,
and this fact has led to the dominance of TDF gyros in the
highly competitive aircraft inertial system marketplace. The
projections to strapdown instruments, such as the laser gyro
(S4,000 ea., per reference [28]) indicate the same trend.
Noting that a 4-TDF gyro system is fail-op/fail-op while a 4-SDF
gyro system is only fail-safe highlights this comparison. Con-
siderable producibility efforts are needed on laser gyros to
offset the inherent TDF advantage of the tuned-gimbal gyro.
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The present published work on TDF gyro redundancy management,
references [3], Teledyne, and [29], Kearfott make very restric-
tive assumptions as to how a TDF gyro will fail. Considering
the number of possible failure modes and the extent of inter-
action between the two axes of a TDF tuned-gimbal gyro, these
assumptions do not appear warranted.
Figure 4-12 illustrates the tuned-gimbal gyro components and
their supporting electronics. Some failure modes result in
drift errors on a single input axis. The circuitry which trans-
fers the digital data from each axis to the computer for example,
may have single-axis failure modes. This depends upon the actual
mechanization, however, since multiplexing is a con_non digital
design technique. The portion of the loop electronics or gyro
torquer which produces precision torquing from the digital sig-
nal has a number of soft failure modes which result in a dif-
ference between the rate indicated to the computer and the actual
gyro precession rate and thus a system error. Since the rebal-
ance loop may still be operating satisfactorily, there could be
little or no cross-coupling to the other axis.
Failures of components which are used in common between axesl
such as the gyro rotor and suspension system, magnet, bearings
and motor, result in degradation of performance of both axes.
In addition, errors are dependent on aircraft maneuvers. The
error due to a scale factor shift depends upon the axis about
which the aircraft is rotating. An error due to a high
g-sensitivity depends upon the instantaneous magnitude and direc-
tion of the g-vector.
Thus, the error of a TDF gyro should be considered a vector
quantity in the measurement plane of the gyro. There also exists
some probability density distribution vs. the direction of the
angle with higher probability densities in the vicinity of the
measurement (torquer) axes.
4.4.3 3-Gyro FDI Sinqularities
When all four TDF gyros are operating, there is a considerable
amount of redundant information. FDI algorithms leading to
100% coverage of the first failure are relatively straightfor-
ward, regardless of the gyro failure direction. Detection levels
must be set high enough above normal gyro drift transient effects
to avoid false alarms and missed alarms, but still be within the
level set by system accuracy requirements.
After one gyro failure, however, the ability to isolate a second
gyro failure is somewhat limited, depending on the magnitude and
direction of the failure. The majority of gyro failures are
catastrophic--they fail to spin, the rebalance loop opens, etc.,
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and are detectable by hardware means. The computer FDI is only
concerned with soft failures.
The FDI limitations for the 3 TDF gyro conditions may be con-
veniently analyzed considering three gyros with spin axes
orthogonal ands initially, with torquer axes along the three
principal axes.
The orientation of the three gyros relative to the reference
coordinate set is shown in figure 4-13. Gyro numbers i, 2 and 3
have their spin axes aligned along X, Y, and Z axes of the refer-
ence coordinate set. The gyro outputs are denoted by _'s with
subscripts and superscripts. The subscripts denote the reference
axis about which the measurement is made and the superscripts
denote the number of the gyro which performed the measurement.
Failure isolation equations (parity equations) can be written
by inspection of figure 4-13, as follows.
1 2
K 1 = w z - w z (i)
1 3
K 2 = _y - _y (2)
2 3
K3 = _X - w x (3)
(2), and (3) we may construct a truth table.Using equations (i)0
TABLE 4-1. TRUTH TABLE FOR ISOLATION OF A FAILED GYRO FOR
3 ORTHOGONAL TDF GYRO CONFIGURATION
WITH ORTHOGONAL SENSING AXES
Gyro # K 1 K 2 K 3
Failed
None
1
2
3
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
In the Truth Table 4-1, the symbol of unity denotes that a
failure has occurred and the isolation threshold level has been
exceeded. The symbol zero denotes no failure.
Since gyro outputs are incremental angles subject to noise, rate
measurements may be partially integrated for smoothing. There-
fore, isolation thresholds are often expressed in angle and
thus the symbol of unity represents a state in which the set
angular threshold has been reached or exceeded. Isolation error
is defined as the total angular error made in the time period
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bounded by the occurrence of a failure and determination of which
gyro caused the failure.
During certain failure modes, only one of the parity equations
has exceeded its threshold. Therefore, a determination of the
failed gyro from the Truth Table cannot be made. To determine
the cause and effect of this condition, let us assume that a soft
failure has occurred in gyro No. 1 and that the magnitude and
direction of this failure is represented by an error vector shown
in Figure 4-14. This error vector _ is measured relative to the
gyro axes yl and Z I. Although the angle 0 may assume any value
between 0 ° and 360 ° , it will be assumed for the purpose of the
initial discussion that 0 _ 0 < 45 ° .
It is noted that for 0 _ 0 S 45 °, the error rate along the yl
axis is larger or equal to the rate along the Z 1 axis. The error
angle accumulated along the gyro No. 1 axes is shown in figure
4-15. At the time t I, the output of the yl axis reaches the
angular detection threshold level #o" At this time the failure
detection system is aware of the fact that a failure has occurred.
The failure isolation mechanism is not actuated because it is not
known whether the error is caused by gyro No. 1 or gyro No. 3.
Referring to equation (2), it is noted that K 2 can assume a value
of unity when either gyro No. 1 or No. 3 fails. At time t 2, the
output of Z 1 axis reaches the angular detection threshold level
#o" Thus at time t 2 the failure isolation mechanism is actuated
and the failed gyro No. 1 is switched from the system. During
time t 2, isolation error has been accumulated. From figure 4-15,
the magnitude of the isolation error as a function of the angle
0is as follows:
Error angle accumulated about the Z 1 axis is:
#o = (_ sin 8) t 2 (4)
Error angle accumulated about the yl axis is:
( _ cos 8) t 2 (5)
9O
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Figure 4-14. Failure Error Vector
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Assuming the error angles are small so that they can be treated
as vectors, then the resultant isolation error is
: 2 ÷ [(% cos e)t2]2 (6)
Substituting t 2 from equation (4) into equation (6),
=\/402 + no 2 1
tan28V
o_ sin28 + cos28
n o sin28
1
= Co sin8 (7)
The isolation error in nondimensional form is shown plotted in
figure 4-16. Similar reasoning that led to equation (7) can be
extended for values of 45 _ 8 _ 360, thus obtaining nondimen-
sional isolation error for 0 < 8 < 360 as shown in figure 4-17.
As seen from figure 4-17, fault isolation singularities (isolation
error approaching infinity) occur for gyro error directions of
0°, 90 °, 180 ° and 270 °. For gyro errors along these directions,
parity equations can detect that an error has occurred (one of the
parity equations exceeds the threshold no) but a determination
cannot be made as to which gyro has failed. In table 4-1, two
parity equations must exceed their detection levels for fault
isolation to occur. If only one equation exceeds the detection
level, only one of the 3 gyros can be classified as good.
With gyro sensitive axes aligned along principal axes, that is
coincident with the spin axis of another gyro, a single-axis gyro
failure cannot be isolated. Since single-axis gyro failures are
expected to have a slightly higher probability of occurence than,
for example, an exactly equal drift rate about both axes simul-
taneously, it is appropriate to physically rotate the sensitive
axes away from the singular directions. A 45 ° rotation of the
gyro about its spin axis was suggested by Teledyne in reference
[3]. This reorientation does not remove the singularities but
simply moves them relative to probable gyro failure modes.
A physical interpretation of the singularities may be obtained
by referring to figure 4-13. In the direction along one of the
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gyro spin axes, say H 3, there are only two measurements of
1
and WZ 2 If an error in gyro #i occurs alongangular rate, _ Z
this axis, it appears in only one parity equation, which is
insufficient for the solution of two unknowns, the two gyro
drift rates. Physical rotation of the torquers about the gyro
spin axis does not introduce any more information since the same
effect can be achieved by a computational rotation.
The fault isolation singularities occur with any geometrical
arrangement of three TDF gyros, not only the orthogonal arrange-
ment, except for the trivial case of three coincident gyros.
The impact of this constraint on system design is that software
must be configured to handle the rare cases of failures along
the singular directions, gyro input axes should be oriented away
from the singular directions, and total system reliability is
slightly reduced due to non-unity coverage of the second failure.
It will be shown that coverage is much closer to unity for large
allowable isolation errors, as required for flight control use,
than for navigation errors.
4.4.4 Gyro Geometries
The geometry selected by Teledyne in reference [3] was to orient
three of the gyro spin axes orthogonal with sensitive axes
rotated 45 ° from coincidence with another gyro's spin axis, and
with the fourth gyro spin axis bisecting the orthogonal set.
This results in a rather unsymmetric condition, where perfor-
mance (FDI and navigation) and equations to be solved by the
computer after the first failure depend upon which gyro failed
first - the bisector or one of the three orthogonal gyros. A
more symmetric arrangement is desirable computationally and from
packaging considerations, provided that the computational burden
is not increased significantly.
An obvious symmetrical choice is a tetrahedron where spin axes
are directed toward the four vertexes and each gyro measurement
plane is one of the faces. Spin axes are thus distributed uni-
formly in space. Another form of the tetrahedron is half of an
octahedron. With this configuration, spin axes are distributed
uniformly about a hemisphere. This latter orientation is
directly analagous to the dodecahedron of Draper Labs, reference
[20]. In that case, distributing sensitive axes on faces of a
cube (hexahedron) results in pairs of coincident (one negative,
one positive) sensitive axes. Since the computer can make a
sign reversal, the desired angular distribution is not achieved.
Use of a dodecahedron achieves the desired distribution without
parallel axes. The octahedron has a property similar to the
dodecahedron in that pairs of the eight faces are parallel.
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Therefore, gyros on four non-parallel faces of the octahedron
are evenly distributed in space.
Figure 4-18 illustrates the octahedron, formed from equilateral
triangles, and two possible selections of gyro spin vectors.
The octahedron may be viewed as being composed of two pyramids
with the square bases tied together. In figure 4-18(a) the four
gyros are attached to only one pyramid. In figure 4-18(b) two
of the gyros are moved to the parallel opposite octahedral faces.
It can be shown that this latter configuration is equivalent to
the tetrahedron where the angles between any two spin vectors are
the familiar 109.46 °
In terms of information content, these two geometries are
identical. Certain error terms, however, behave differently in
the two configurations. In the tetrahedron, the net angular
velocity of the 4-gyro array is zero and some error terms,
notably the inertia term, cancel. Since the system must work
with one or two failed gyros, this feature cannot be fully
exploited. The semi-octahedron arrangement has certain packaging
advantages so that it is preferred over the tetrahedron.
The tetrahedron could be achieved by reversing the spin motors
of two of the semi-octahedrally mounted gyros. Many of the
instrument calibration coefficients such as bias, scale factor
and g-sensitivity, would not precisely reverse polarity with
reversed spin, so there would be additional calibration costs.
Again, the semi-octahedron is preferred for lowest system cost.
The symmetry of the semi-octahedron could still be retained with
some angle other than 109.46 ° between alternate spin vectors.
Considering spin vectors to be on a cone, this would be equiva-
lent to varying the cone angle to potentially improve some
system parameter. Some accuracy degradation would be expected
since the amount of measurement along the cone axis relative to
the measurement made in the base of the pyramid would change.
Since reliability is one of the most important of the system
parameters, some accuracy degradation might be acceptable if
improved coverage of the second failure could be achieved.
Reducing the cone angle to zero makes all four gyro spin axes
coincident. This orientation is very good for reliability
(perfect coverage for the 3-gyro condition) but disastrous for
navigation since there are only two axes of information. As
soon as the cone angle deviates from 0 ° sufficiently to obtain a
measurement about the third axis, the 3-gyro singularities appear.
A minor improvement in coverage could be achieved by reducing the
cone angle to a very small angle, say 30 °. For this condition,
large pitch or roll rate errors, i.e., 10"/sec, can be detected
and isolated. Due to the improbability of such a failure mode,
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coupled with packaging and computational disadvantages, this
non-regular tetrahedral orientation will not be considered
further.
Another trade-off which may be made is analagous to the sinqle-
degree-of-freedom analysis performed by Pejsa in reference [27].
A gyro's performance is improved when its spin axis is near
vertical due to elimination of errors which are a function of
acceleration or gravity normal to the spin vector. Since navi-
gation performance is less influenced by error in measurement
of angular rate about the local vertical, optimum performance
should occur with cone angles smaller than the ideal octahedral
i09.46 ° (assuming the cone axis is vertical). This is particu-
larly true for flight durations of about an hour and thus is
potentially applicable to some of the short-haul VTOL missions.
The application under consideration, however, includes nearly
continuous position updating from radio aids. The important
inertial system parameter is thus rate-of-change of velocity
error since this establishes how well velocity may be calibrated
from position updates and how well it will hold this calibration
during position aid outages. Velocity error is caused by a large
number of error sources and small improvements of only one of
these, for example g-sensitive bias, will not have a strong
impact on net performance. Therefore, the instrument skew angle
will be retained in the nominal octahedral orientation. A second-
ary benefit of this skew angle is that large g-sensitive drifts,
one of the normal tuned gimbal gyro failure modes, can be
detected and isolated before flight or while flying straight and
level rather than just during maneuvers.
Once spin axis skew angles have been selected, sensitive axis
definition is largely governed by avoidance of 3-gyro singulari-
ties. Since tuned gimbal gyros are sensitive to the g-vector in
both axes simultaneously, there is no optimum orientation rela-
tive to gravity. The final orientation will thus be selected for
ease of computation and packaging.
Figure 4-18 shows the selected relationship between the earth's
gravity vector and the gyro spin axes. For this orientation,
all gyros are subject to the same portion of earth's gravity.
4.4.5 Accelerometer Geometries
If a SDF accelerometer is to be employed, only 6 accelerometers
would be required for fail-op/fail-op capability. They could be
oriented in a dodecahedron orientation with redundancy manage-
ment similar to that performed, for example, on the Draper Labs
SIRU. The channel redundancy approach and the subsequent low-
cost-of-ownership packaging method described in a subsequent
section of this report are lost, however.
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Since the proposed packaging arrangement more than compensates
for the added accelerometer costs and general computational
efficiency is improved, 8 accelerometer axes will be assumed,
coincident with their associated gyro sensitive axis.
4.4.6 Parity Equations
Parity equations will now be presented for the semioctahedral
spin axis orientation. Equations are based on gyro measurements
but are applicable in form to both gyro and accelerometer outputs.
Gyro parity equations and axis definitions are given in figure
4-19. These equations are derived in Appendix B of this report.
Gyro number is designated by subscript i or j. The gyro spin
vector is identified by the letter S i and subscripts x i and Yi
define the gyro sensitive axes.
A parity equation, Ti5, represents a direct comparison between
the angular rate measured by the i and j gyros about some common
test direction e. The test direction is along the intersection
13
of the measurement planes of the two gyros. These components
may be directly compared to remove vehicle rate and thus expose
any gyro error rates.
Another form of the parity equations was investigated, namely
comparison of a gyro rate to the least-squares solution of the
other gyro measurements projected onto the plane of that gyro.
The benefits obtained were not found to be sufficiently great
compared to simple intersection comparisons to warrant the
added computational complexity.
A simple method of isolating a fault to the failed gyro is to
integrate (approximately) each parity equation and compare the
output against some detection threshold, 68, as shown in figure
4-19. Logic is then employed in the computer such that if two
or more equations involving a gyro exceed the threshold, that
gyro is classified as failed and switched out of the output
computation. Other detection, isolation and switching options
are discussed in the next subsections of this report.
A physical interpretation of the parity equations for a tetra-
hedron may be achieved by means of figure 4-20. The faces of
the tetrahedron, #i, #2, #3, and #4, represent the four TDF gyro
measurement planes. A parity equation is formed at each edge of
the tetrahedron, the intersection of two gyro measurement planes.
For example, _IA is the rate measured by gyro #i in the A
direction and _3A is the rate measured by gyro #3 in the A
direction. Since the two measurements are of the same quantity,
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namely the component of the total vehicle angular rate, w VEHICLE'
in the A direction, the two measurements may be differenced to
determine measurement error.
Consider a vector measurement error made by gyro #i in a
direction perpendicular to edge B. The WlB component of rate
measured by gyro #i will therefore not contain any error - it
would be a perfect measurement of the component of W VEHICL E in
the B direction. Assuming no errors in gyro #2, the B edge
parity equation will thus be zero. The A and C edge parity
equations will expose the error, however, and thus fault isola-
tion can be achieved.
If gyro #4 had previously failed, the C_ D and F edge parity
equations are lost. For the gyro #i error rate perpendicular to
edge B, only the A edge parity equation exceeds its threshold.
This condition could also be caused by a gyro #3 error rate
perpendicular to edge E. Therefore, this vector direction of
gyro error is a fault isolation singularity of the same type
described for three orthogonal gyros. Note that no reference
was made to the particular tetrahedron angles. This condition
applies to any non-colinear orientation of three gyros.
The preceding is not a general proof of the existence of the
isolation singularities occurring with 3 TDF gyros, however,
since parity equations may take forms other than the tetrahedron
edge comparisons. A general proof is obtained with the aid of
figure 4-21.
Consider three gyros, the sensitive axes of each represented by
a plane surface. The orientation of the two gyro input axes in
this plane is immaterial since measurements made in one orien-
tation can be changed to another with a simple coordinate trans-
formation about the spin axis.
Consider next a vehicle angular rate _ along the spin axis of
gyro #i of figure 4-21. The rates sensed by each gyro are the
projections of _ onto each measurement plan, where _i = 0
Given the gyro measurements 52 and _3' one can reconstruct an
estimate of _ along the intersection of two planes - one plane
is normal to gyro measurement plane #2 and along _2' the other
plane is normal to gyro measurement plane #3 and along L3" This
reconstructed _ is also consistent with _i = 0.
If gyro #3 has an error aw 3 along the direction of _3' the error
in the reconstructed _, _--_, is along the direction of _. The
same error could have been caused by an error in gyro #2 along
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the direction of _2" Gyro _I cannot contribute information in
determining whether _--_was caused by gyro #i or gyro #2 since
_ is normal to its measurement plane. Therefore, isolation
singularities occur in each gyro measurement plane for gyro
drift errors along the projections of the other gyro spin axes
onto that plane.
Isolation error may again be plotted vs. gyro error direction,
figure 4-22, where the origin of the abscissa is the perpendicu-
lar to edge B of the tetrahedron. This plot is directly compar-
able to figure 4-17, for orthogonal gyros. The location of
singularities has changed to account for tetrahedral geometry.
If the detection level _o is set at the noise level of the gyro,
the curve of figure 4-22 indicates that there is an amplification
of this basic noise level as a function of gyro drift direction
due to geometry, analagous to the geometrical amplification of
errors in a LORAN C net. If the allowable isolation error is
very large (for example, flight control requirements may tolerate
l°/sec, error compared to 0.5°/hr or less for navigation needs)
gyro failure modes having drift directions very close to the
singular direction can still be isolated since the noise level
of inertial-grade gyros is so low. Therefore, the effective
angular width of the singularities decreases compared with 360 ° ,
and thus the probability of non-isolation decreases. Flight
control reliability, then, will be much higher than navigation
reliability. This relationship will be expanded upon in later
sections of this report.
Parity equations for the semioctahedron form of the tetrahedron,
figure 4-19, are essentially the same as for a regular tetra-
hedron. The parity equations are again formed at the edges of
the polyhedron. Note that the intersection between gyros i and
k is parallel to the upper and lower horizontal edges. Each
face of the octahedron is still composed of an equilateral
triangle, so the behavior of parity equations is identical to the
standard tetrahedron. The selection of gyro sensitive axes has
been made to avoid coincidence with any possible singularity.
It is interesting to review the reduced cone-angle trade-off of
paragraph 4.4.4 in light of the above interpretation. Figure
4-23 illustrates a flattened semioctahedron. Faces of the octa-
hedron now deviate from equilateral triangles, approaching right
isosceles triangles. Clearly navigation errors will deteriorate
due to geometrical dilution of measurements along an axis out of
the peak of the pyramid. If this axis is made the aircraft yaw
axis, net navigation performance might be acceptable.
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Parity equations for this geometry would be very similar to
those described for the regular octahedron. 3-gyro singularities
appear as before except at different angles. Considering gyro i
in figure 4-23, singularities are perpendicular to edges A and B
if gyro k has failed, and perpendicular to edges A and C if gyro
9 has failed.
The only apparent benefit from this geometry is that an improved
reasonableness test could be performed during the remote possi-
bility of a large gyro failure along a singular direction during
3-gyro operation. Consider a prior k-gyro failure and an i-gyro
error in a direction parallel to B. The error shows up in the B
edge test with gyro j, but not in the A edge test with gyro i.
Therefore, the error is detected but not isolated to either the
i or j gyro. However, because the B and F edges are nearly
colinear, a crude comparison can be made between the i and 1
gyros, limited by how much aircraft yaw rate can be coupled
through the angle between the B and F edges. If the measurement
difference is greater than the maximum possible coupled yaw rate,
fault isolation between i and j gyros can be made.
As described in paragraph 4.4.4, the disadvantages in computa-
tional efficiency and packaging incurred for a reduced cone angle
outweigh the minor fault isolation improvement achieved for a
remote failure mode. Therefore the regular octahedron skew
angle will be retained.
4.4.7 Error Detection and Isolation Methods
Since the outputs from the gyros and accelerometers are incre-
mental in nature, angle and velocity increments, respectively,
determination of angular rate and linear acceleration would
require differentiation of these sensed values in the computer.
This processing method is impractical due to amplification of
noise and data quantization which would lead to a high false
alarm rate in the redundancy management.
Integration of parity equations produces the desired smoothing.
Error detection would then be on the basis of angle and velocity.
However, accelerometers and gyros contain a variety of normal-
mode errors, including bias. Integration of these normal bias
errors over a long period of time tends to obscure failure-error
buildups. A simple lag filter washes out the bias errors while
acting as an integrator over short periods of time. Use of a
simple, low-pass digital filter was used on SIRU, [20], [23] , as
part of the TSE (total squared error) FDI (failure detection and
isolation) and is also selected for this study.
A simple means of processing the "integrated" parity equations is
to compare each individually against a predetermined threshold.
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When thresholds are exceeded, a logic truth table such as that
shown in paragraph 4.4.3 is then used to determine the failed
gyro.
Other methods involving a combination of parity equations have
been described in the literature for SDF gyros, such as the TSE
[23], Minimax [22], Maximum Likelihood [25], Kalman-Bucy and
others [26]. These cannot be directly employed for TDF gyros
except conceptually.
In order to view drawbacks of the simple table look-up method,
consider again figure 4-22. This curve may be considered as a
boundary or threshold for error detection for a 3-gyro condition,
using uncombined parity equations. If _o is taken to be the
noise level of the gyro, the error detection limit must be set
well enough above the noise to avoid false alarms and missed
alarms. (NOTE: The curve of figure 4-22 assumes that only one
gyro has an error and is thus incomplete. It is used for illus-
tration only.) Figure 4-24a is a polar plot of figure 4-22.
A 1/sin function is simply a straight line on a polar plot.
Direct use of parity equations in the 4-gyro case, with fault
detection and isolation based on two equations exceeding detec-
tion limits, is equivalent to processing gyro data using three
gyros at a time. Thus the detection threshold versus gyro error
direction for the full four-gyro set may be derived by super-
position of three curves of the form of figure 4-24a, each
rotated by 60 ° from the rest. This superposition process is
illustrated in figure 4-24b.
The inner portion of each of the plots of figure 4-24b represents
the parity equation pair which produces the smallest isolation
error for a given gyro drift and is thus the pair with which the
error is first detected. A composite of the isolation error
which considers this isolation logic is shown in figure 4-24c.
For both the four and three gyro conditions, it is clear that the
isolation threshold is not constant as a function of the angle
of the gyro drift. If the threshold is set at the largest value
allowed by system requirements and this is very close to the
point of the star for four gyros, system errors smaller than
this value produce a failure indication a significant portion of
time. These failure indications might still be arbitrarily
classified as "failure" conditions even though real errors are
smaller than the system error limit, so would not contribute to
false alarm rate.
Real false alarm rate could be reduced, however, by processing
parity equations to achieve a more constant detection level vs
failureangle and make full use of the information contained in
these equations. Note that at the points of the star of figure
4-24c, all three parity equations exceed the threshold but in
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reality only two are being used. Better processing could
achieve either tighter detection limits or reduced false alarm/
missed alarm rates.
When large gyro errors occur, speed of detection is important to
avoid transients in the aircraft flight control system. Due to
the simplicity of the table look-up method which operates on
uncombined parity equations, a high computer iteration rate can
be used for this test. Since a combination of parity equations
is primarily applicable to detection and isolation of small
errors which takes a long time anyway, such processing can be
performed at a low rate with little impact on computer duty
cycle. Thus, inclusion of both methods is desirable. The deri-
vation of parity equation combinations is given in paragraph 5.3
of this report.
Methods have been proposed in the literature [21] for classifying
a gyro drift as either a step or ramp function and then applying
a compensation to the faulty instrument to bring it back to a
useful state. This approach may have application to space
systems where vehicle maneuvers are limited. In an aircraft
system, however, normal turns produce time-varying gyro errors
since scale-factor, g-sensitivity, and axis alignment error
coefficients are exercised. Therefore, this approach is felt to
be inapplicable to the aircraft redundant strapdown system.
Significant errors occur during a turn due to deviation of each
gyro scale factor from its nominal value. For a 3°/sec turn and
i00 ppm scale factor error, there is a gyro drift error of I°/hr
for the duration of the turn. A 180 ° turn lasts 60 seconds and
results in an error buildup of 1 arc minute if the turn rate is
about the gyro sensitive axis. Considering that I00 ppm is a
typical 1-sigma value and near-continuous turning may need to be
provided for, scale factor effects need to be either accommodated
or compensated.
The study program covered by this report includes only a brief
examination of scale factor compensation in paragraph 5.3.
Insufficient time was available for a thorough analysis. This
appears to be worth further study, however, to allow a reduction
of gyro drift detection levels. The effects of other maneuver-
dependent errors must also be considered in determining the
effectiveness of scale-factor compensation, but due to the mag-
nitude of the scale factor effect, compensation appears a promis-
ing technique for improving error detection and isolation
sensitivity.
There is a finite probability that two gyro failures can occur
simultaneously. This is particularly true for small failures
since several minutes of time may be needed to detect and isolate
a given drift. Provisions should be included in FDI algorithms
Iii
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for multiple failure modes where practical. Excessive
computation should be avoided due to the low probability of
occurrence. There exists a dual failure mode condition where
the parity equations remain satisfied (a failure is not detec-
ted). For this situation to occur the two simultaneous failures
need to be equal in amplitude and each be in a specific vector
direction. The joint probability that these events all occur
simultaneously is considerably less than the total system
failure probability and is estimated in paragraph 5.3.
4.4.8 Switchinq Methods
Once an error has been detected and isolated, further action is
required to prevent the erroneous information from affecting
system outputs. The most obvious method is to simply switch out
the gyro from all computations. Consideration should be given
to minimizing switching transients in flight control functions,
however. Weighting schemes such as described in [30] may need
to be considered if transients are troublesome.
Vehicle angular rate and linear acceleration, in body coordi-
nates, are required as outputs. Computer switching from
instrument to instrument could cause very small transients in
these outputs. Error detection levels, however, are set orders
of magnitude smaller than the normal accuracy required of these
outputs. Therefore, switching transients are insignificant.
Attitude, heading, velocity, and position outputs are one or
more integrations away from the instruments. Switching of
instruments thus does not cause transients in these outputs.
The only way in which transients could occur is if switching is
performed directly on these functions or during reinitialization
modes during error recovery. This is discussed in paragraph
4.5.1 relative to the software mechanization. Weighted com-
binations of instrument outputs to eliminate transients therefore
is not needed.
A secondary purpose of combining instrument outputs in a weighted
manner is to reduce system error. Monitoring of parity equations
during normal operation yields some information regarding
relative performance of instruments. Since parity equations are
strongly influenced by noise during these conditions, weighting
factors must be determined from error probabilities. This tech-
nique is of value during very soft failures, near the instrument
noise characteristics, and during soft failure modes during
3-gyro operation. Simplified methods should be used in order to
limit the computer penalties since system performance benefits
derived from this mechanization are subtle.
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Once a gyro has been classified as failed, it should continue
being monitored, but not be involved in output computations. It
could then be reinstated into the computation if required. Thus
false alarms due to noise are less important since use of the
gyro is not lost for the full duration of the flight. Also, a
soft-failed gyro may still be good enough to resolve the 3-gyro
isolation ambiguity in the rare event that it occurs. Further-
more, use of a marginal gyro for monitoring and backup following
a second failure is better than having none at all.
If a gyro failure having a constant direction is detected,
should the entire gyro be switched out of the computation, or
should the data normal to the failure direction be retained 9
A special case of this question is whether or not it is neces-
sary to isolate failures to a specific instrument or is it
sufficient to merely eliminate the bad data. This is of particu-
lar interest when a failure is along one of the 3-gyro isolation
singularities.
Figure 4-25 may be used to illustrate this procedure. Consider
gyro #4 to have previously failed, thus leaving the three edge
parity equations A, B, and C. Assume that the A edge parity
equation is indicating a failure but that B and C are zero. The
failure must be either gyro #i or gyro #2 for this condition to
be true. Therefore gyro #3 is good. The two possible error
vectors which could cause this condition are perpendicular to
edge B for gyro #i or perpendicular to edge C for gyro #2, as
shown. The gyro measurements perpendicular to these possible
error vectors in the measurement planes are parallel to gyro #3.
Thus an unambiguous measurement normal to the known good gyro is
unavailable.
There are some gyro failure modes where one axis exhibits poor
performance but the other axis is still good. An electronics
scale factor shift is an example. This is a sufficiently rare
condition that special software provisions for partial gyro data
retention do not appear warranted. Therefore, when a gyro
exhibits a failure drift, it will be completely switched out of
the output computations.
Since the two accelerometer axes are implemented with two inde-
pendent instruments, failure modes are also independent except
when it involves some common function such as the power supply.
A very minor increase in system reliability could be obtained
by switching out one accelerometer when a failure is indicated.
On a preliminary basis, however, both axes are switched for
software simplicity.
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Figure 4-25. Tetrahedron Illustration of 3-Gyro Ambiguity.
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4.4.9 Failure Coverage
Determination of failure coverage depends strongly upon
definition of a failure. In other words, what output errors
(i sigma, 3 sigma, 6 sigma ) result in a failure condition which
jeopardizes flight safety or proper completion of the flight,
and how long may the errors be present (is time-rmsing appli-
cable) ? The instrument errors which can cause this condition
must then be derived.
Derivation of the definition of an instrument failure is compli-
cated by the fact that system performance requirements include
updates from an external radio aid using some form of combina-
tional filter. Gyro drift requirements are very much a function
of the accuracy of the radio aid and the sophistication of the
filter.
In a redundant system, component error budgeting is influenced
by error detection and isolation requirements relative to the
allowable system errors just prior to switching-out a "failed"
component. Instrument tolerances may need to be tighter for a
redundant system than for a single-string system since failure
detection limits must be set much higher than normal component
tolerances (e.g., 5 sigma) to limit false alarms. This state-
ment is somewhat contrary to the normally accepted fact that
system accuracy is improved slightly over a non-redundant system
by averaging the redundant data. This accuracy improvement only
applies to the zero-failure condition, however. Since system
accuracy must be undegraded after two failures, improved zero-
failure performance is of minor overall benefit.
Use of probabilistic weighting coefficients derived from parity
equations, parity equation combination processing, and scale
factor compensation described in paragraphs 4.4.7 and 4.4.8 can
all tend to offset the degradation of system performance just
prior to switching-out a failed component. Thus these techniques
are very useful in reducing the impact of redundancy management
on the instrument error budget while retaining low false alarm
rate and high failure coverage.
A full analysis considering the interaction between system
performance, redundancy management algorithms and component
error budgets, is beyond the scope of this preliminary design
report. The error budget is determined essentially from single-
string requirements (with a simple filter and some assumed radio
noise model). Error detection and isolation thresholds are set
to be large enough to avoid high false and missed alarm rates,
with little consideration of pre-alarm performance transients.
Means of recovery from these small transients to reduce their
time duration, however, will be included in the computer
mechanization.
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The coverage of the first failure will be essentially unity
since it will be designed to be so. All coordinates have suf-
ficient measurement information for completely unambiguous
"failure" detection and isolation. The coverage of the second
failure must consider the effects of the 3-gyro isolation singu-
larity coupled with the full spectrum of gyro failure modes.
If a large number of redundant strapdown systems were operated
for a long period of time, there would be some distribution of
the aggregate failures between hard failures, detectable by
simple self-test, and soft failures, those needing redundancy
management. The soft failures would also be distributed among
a variety of failure modes, and only a portion of these would be
subject to the 3-gyro isolation singularity. Table 4-2 shows a
hypothetical distribution of system failures. While not based
on real data, it is useful in approximating coverage of the
second failure.
TABLE 4-2. HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM FAILURE DISTRIBUTION
Hard Failures
Soft Failures
Electronics
Accelerometer
Gyro
Variable Direction
Constant Direction
Non-Singular
Singular
Nav.
Accuracy
(%)
90
i0
2
2
6
4
2
1.5
0.5
Flight
Control
Accuracy
(%)
95
5
1
4
2
2
1.98
0.02
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Self-test is commonly felt to be effective for 90-95% of failure
modes. There are many more failure modes producing small accu-
racy degradation of navigation variables than flight control
variables where a few degrees per second may be acceptable.
Thus it is assumed that the split between hard and soft failures
is 90/10 for navigation performance and 95/5 for flight control.
The slightly better MTBF for flight control channel reliability
will be ignored.
Soft failures are distributed between gyros, accelerometers, and
the remaining electronics. The gyros are assigned a major share
since they are generally of more complex design. The gyro
failures are then distributed between those whose vector direc-
tion is constant and those whose vector direction varies with
time. Since a failure mode generally produces an uncontrolled
condition and since many failures are flight-path dependent, it
is assumed that most failures fall into this latter category.
If the gyro failure vector direction varies, the failure is not
subject to the 3-gyro isolation singularity.
Of the remaining constant-direction failures, only a portion of
them fall into the isolation singularity bands. First, there is
some probability density distribution for gyros as a function of
failure angle. Figure 4-26 shows the general form such a dis-
tribution might take, in polar coordinates. Again, real world
data is unavailable for an accurate plot.
Peaks are expected to occur in the failure probability distri-
bution in the vicinity of the gyro input axes since there are a
number of components in the electronics and gyro specifically
related to axes. The integral of probability density over 360 ° ,
excluding the vicinity of input axes, may be called the proba-
bility of a dual axis failure. In general, the probability of a
dual axis failure is expected to be higher than the probability
of an input axis failure since there is a strong interaction
between axes of a TDF gyro.
The probability of a failure along some arbitrary direction, #A,
within a narrow angular band, _, however, is expected to be
lower than the probability of failure along an input axis, since
dual-axis failure modes are distributed among a wide number of
possible directions. This rationale leads to the conclusion that
gyro input axes should not be coincident with any possible
3-gyro isolation singular direction. The exact form of the
probability density distribution is unknown. It is assumed
uniform between input axes for simplicity.
The effective angular width of the 3-gyro isolation singularity
is smaller for large allowable errors (flight control) than for
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small allowable errors. This may be seen with the aid of figure
4-27, a repeat of the noise boundary curve of figure 4-24a.
When error detection limits are set very close to the system
noise level, as would be required to bound navigation errors
(position/velocity), the effective isolation singularity is
fairly broad, as shown in figure 4-27a. For large allowable
errors, orders of magnitude larger than the normal instrument
noise level, the effective singularity becomes quite narrow, as
shown in figure 4-27b.
When this view of effective singularity width is coupled with
the gyro failure probability density distribution previously
described, one can see that the percentage of failures occurring
within the isolation singularities reduces considerably for
large allowable errors, thus increasing coverage. Hypothetical
distributions are shown in table 4-2. No attempt is made to
rigorously quantify these functions since net probability is
well within LaRC requirements.
It may be noted that some additional external data would be
useful in resolving the rare occurrence of the isolation ambi-
guity. Since radio aids are planned in the LaRC scenario, they
could be applied toward further improvement in system relia-
bility. The computer mechanization will be directed toward
allowing this to be done, however its application will not be
used in the reliability calculation.
There is some variation of coverage with time since many of the
terms of the instrument error models are a function of flight
dynamics. This consideration is of particular concern during
ground alignment. System errors due to gyro scale factor and
vibration-dependent errors are much smaller at this time than
when the aircraft is stationary. On the other hand, failure
tolerances on the parity equations can be tightened up during
this condition for better detectability of static errors. Since
inertial instruments are of such high quality compared to
flight-control requirements, errors which would directly affect
flight safety can be adequately detected on the ground. The
remaining, navigation degradation errors would generally be
detected during lift-off.
It is highly desirable to detect errors of this type as early as
possible before takeoff to allow maintenance action. Provision
for accentuating these errors by hardware means shortly after
power is applied to the system should be investigated during the
system design phase.
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4.5 Software Trade-offs
4.5.1 Redundancy Management Software Design
Consideration has been given to a classical approach where all
instrument data are combined in each computer prior to output
processing. The computer mechanization which has been selected,
however, uses instruments in pairs in order to achieve better
overall redundancy management, including radio aid contributions,
and to allow recovery from system error build-ups during the
isolation process. This includes recovery from isolation errors
which may be amplified by the 3-gyro isolation singularities.
The method generally proposed for processing of redundant instru-
ment data following redundancy management, is to combine the
redundant measurements in a least-squares fashion prior to use.
Net accuracy is thus better than a single-string configuration.
Equations for combining gyro or accelerometer data when oriented
in a tetrahedral or octahedral geometry have been derived for 4,
3, and 2 TDF units, and are presented in Appendix F.
With this approach, each of the four computers is solving the
same problem. This is then consistent with fault-tolerant
computer methods. Each processor solves the same problem in
approximate synchronization, each output should thus be identi-
cal, and outputs can be compared bit-by-bit with simple hard-
ware devices for computer fault detection and isolation.
Computer problems can thus be easily isolated.
A major drawback of using combined instrument data in the output
solutions, is that a degraded instrument which escapes detection
or isolation in parity equation processing is combined with good
instruments. The opportunity of resolving the occasional 3-gyro
isolation singularity or detecting performance degradation less
than INS thresholds with radio aid data is thus lost, or at least
considerably complicated. INS degradation would be detected
when compared against radio data, but determination of which
unit is marginal to initiate maintenance action may be extremely
difficult.
In the assumed system mechanization, each computer output is
sent to other avionics elements individually. This implies that
some other avionics system performs a comparison between INS
outputs and radio aid data. Since this involves an arithmetic
process, this further means that the voting between the four
redundant strapdown outputs must utilize arithmetic rather than
simple bit-by-bit comparisons.
In other avionics implementations, voted or weighted combinations
of redundant data could be derived in a using device such as an
actuator or display using modern microprocessor technology.
Therefore, there is no firm requirement for compatibility with
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simple bit-by-bit voters. Such compatibility could be achieved,
however, with a final voting/combining subroutine in each redun-
dant INS computer. Since each computer iteration is synchro-
nized, all computer outputs can be made identical in software
prior to transmission to external voters. For the purposes of
this study, however, it is assumed that external systems contain
arithmetic capability.
Figure 4-28 shows a preferred 4-computer implementation. Each
computer accepts data from one TDF gyro and two accelerometers.
Compensation of various instrument parameters is then performed,
including transformation from the skewed instrument coordinate
system into aircraft body axes. Each computer solves this com-
pensation and transformation for the instruments of only one
channel. Since these are high rate, time-consuming computations,
net computer speed requirements are significantly reduced from
an equal-computer approach.
At this point, each computer receives corrected gyro and
accelerometer data from the other three computers, solves parity
equations and performs associated FDI processing. There would
be only minor savings in splitting parity equations and pro-
cessing between the four computers since they are not complex.
Design equations are then solved which determine a least squares
solution of two TDF gyro rate measurements (4 SDF accelerometers)
in body coordinates. From this point on, the solution is that
of a conventional strapdown INS with quaternion conversion to
the navigation coordinate system followed by conventional iner-
tial navigation equations.
Four separate navigation solutions are thus being performed in
the computer array, each based on a different pair of gyros. All
six possible two-gyro combinations are not needed since radio
data can isolate one marginal instrument with only four. The
six solutions would be desirable for simple detection and isola-
tion of a condition where two gyros degrade simultaneously but
the increase in computer speed needed to perform the additional
solutions does not appear warranted.
The logic selected for determination of which gyro pair is to be
used in each of the four output computations is shown in figure
4-28 in the Design Equation block. The gyro/accelerometers of
a given channel are always used in that channel's design equa-
tions. The second gyro/accelerometer-pair is that from the next
sequential channel satisfying the parity equations. Thus, the
first choice for channel i is gyros 1 and 2. If gyro 2 fails,
gyro 3 is used, if gyro 3 fails 4 is used.
Table 4-3 illustrates the alternate selections for various
failure modes. Note that following two gyro/accelerometer-pair
failures, two computers are operating on the same gyro pair.
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TABLE 4-3. GYROPAIR SELECTION VS FAILURE INDICATION
CHAN 0 1 2 3 4 1/2 I/3 1/4 2/3 2/4 3/4
1 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,2 1,2
2 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3
3 3,4 3,4 3,4 _,4 3,1 3,4 3,4 3,2
4 4,1 4,___224,1 4,1 4,1 4,3 4,2 4,2
1,4 1,3 1,2
2,4 2,3 2,1
3,4 3,1 3,1
4,1 4,1 4,1
This gives a measure of fail-safe error detection capability
with a limited third-fail-op-mode, depending upon self-test
failure isolation efficiency.
Further pair-selection options could be employed. For example,
if gyros 3 and 4 have failed, computers 3 and 4 could also
perform the I, 2 gyro solutions, presumably as backup to compu-
ters 1 and 2. However, since computers 1 and 2 are in series
with gyros 1 and 2 for I/O and compensation, this backup capa-
bility is of no practical value. Gyro/accelerometer-to-computer
I/O would need to be expanded for this modular type of redun-
dancy and, as discussed in paragraph 4.3, is not needed to meet
LaRC reliability requirements. Applications requiring consider-
ably higher reliability may need the added I/O and software
modes.
In the normal, 4-channel or 3-channel modes, degradation of an
instrument affects two channels. The effect is not necessarily
of equal magnitude in each channel since a gyro error may be
averaged with its mate's output in one channel (if the error is
in a direction parallel to the appropriate tetrahedron edge) but
enter more strongly in the other channel since less averaging
applies. The error is visible relative to radio data in each
channel involved so the marginal gyro number can be easily
deduced. It is assumed that the external computer will indicate
the marginal instrument to the INS for use in its redundancy
management and to alert maintenance personnel.
Behavior of position and velocity outputs for operation in the
3-gyro isolation singularities can be obtained by considering
an orthogonal triad with a gyro error along one of the spin axes
(one of the 3-gyro isolation singular directions). One can
deduce that for the previous mechanization consisting of paired
solutions, there will be three outputs of position and velocity.
The correct solution, using two good gyros, is either the
largest or the smallest position/velocity calculation depending
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or, the sign of the error. The computer using both ambiguous
gyros is the exact middle solution. The computer using the
known good gyro and the bad (but non-isolatable) gyro is either
smallest or largest. Since the differences between the middle
solution and either end are identical, no fault isolation can
be made on a self-contained basis. Assuming two perfect gyros,
the middle solution has exactly half the error of the worst
solution since the error of the bad gyro is averaged with the
good gyro. A similar result is expected with three non-
orthogonal gyros. As the direction of the gyro error changes
away from the singular direction the two "bad" solutions approach
each other.
In all cases, radio aid data can be used to determine the bad
gyro, assuming errors are large enough. Therefore, the size of
position or velocity updates may be used to decide which channel
should be used in the final display or steering calculation,
viz., the channel requiring the smallest updates. Averaging of
this decision is probably needed to avoid continuous switching
between channels. During periods of radio aid loss, the last-
selected channel should continue in use since it probably has
the lowest rate-of-change of error. Monitoring of channel
failure indications and errors between channels should continue
in the external computer, however, so that switchover can be
performed rapidly upon detection of a channel failure. The
criteria for such a switchover are not defined at this time.
Rapid detection of errors within the redundant strapdown INS is
needed to avoid large transients in outputs, particularly those
used by the flight control system, and to limit the build-up
of errors which might be retained within the INS and thus affect
the remainder of the flight. From the computer mechanization
diagram of figure 4-28, it can be seen that errors are monitored
and switched prior to their use in the design equations. This
assures that excessive errors are not propagated in the coordi-
nate transformation and navigation solutions. Also parity
equation monitoring is performed at the full strapdown integra-
tion rate of 64 iterations per second, providing error detection
and isolation faster than the output rate of 32 per second.
Reinitialization of a computer can be performed following large
error build-up, based on data from one of the other working
computers. These data consist of quaternions, vehicle velocity
and direction cosines. Other functions may be computed from
these variables once they are available. The conditions for
which initialization would be performed are:
a. following replacement of a bad channel on the ground
so that the flight need not be delayed for a complete
gyrocompass alignment, or
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b. following a gyro or accelerometer performance recovery,
to correct for the error build-ups which occurred
during temporarily poor operation.
Another condition for which re-initialization might be considered
is following elimination of any instrument from the inertial
calculation due to errors. Since there is at least one channel
in operation which does not contain errors due to the failure,
the channel which has reconfigured coUld eliminate the quaternion
or navigation errors which accumulated during the detection/
isolation process.
There is some risk to this process, however, since a single
computer failure could cause major errors in two channels if the
failure occurred during the brief period of time between data
sampling for parity equations and data sampling for reinitiali-
zation. Using parity and initialization data from the same
iteration may eliminate the extremely low probability of a dual-
channel failure mode. The decision of whether to employ this
form of reinitialization is deferred until the final design
phase since many hardware details must first be established.
4.5.2 Radio Aid Updates
Assumptions have been made regarding radio aid information,
accuracy, and filter characteristics. These assumptions are:
a. Radio aid produces geodetic position information with
no geometric dilution, as with Loran C, and with no
correlation to INS heading errors, as with airborne
radar.
b. Radio aid data does not include direct position rate
information (GPS is not considered).
c. Radio aid bias errors have been removed by some means,
such as additional states in the filter.
d. Radio aid position error consists of 122m rms white
noise and 61m, 20 second correlation time, correlated
noise, per axis, no correlation between axes.
e. The combinational filter generates updates of position
and velocity only, with fixed gains.
f. INS position and radio aid position coordinates are
differenced in the external computer, the weighted
differences are sent back to the INS for correction of
indicated position and velocity.
Updates of this type are best applied to the INS in a manner
which does not cause pumping of Schuler and 24-hour oscillations
due to radio noise. Therefore, updates are accumulated in
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separate integrators for combination with inertial measurements
in an open loop fashion.
From simulation data presented in paragraph 5.2, it appears that
update of inertially derived attitude and heading (in addition
to position and velocity) is highly desirable. With large gyro
drifts of a lower cost system, error build-up during turns and
radio aid outages is excessive due to attitude and heading
errors. Control of these functions via the radio aid informa-
tion and a more sophisticated filter would probably make such
a lower cost INS applicable to the VTOL mission. Use of time-
variable gains of a Kalman approach is also beneficial if the
update rate of the radio aid is variable due to atmospheric or
terrain conditions.
4.5.3 Instrument Compensation
Instrument compensation can be classified into two major cate-
gories: (i) static and (2) dynamic.
Static compensation proposed for implementation in the INM
include the following terms:
a. Gyro scale factor.
b. Gyro torquer axis misalignment.
c. Gyro spin-axis misalignment.
d. Gyro g-sensitive biases.
e. Gyro biases.
f. Gyro scale factor temperature sensitivity.
g. Gyro g-sensitive bias temperature sensitivity.
h. Gyro bias temperature sensitivity.
i. Accelerometer scale factor.
j. Accelerometer bias.
k. Accelerometer input axis misalignment.
i. Accelerometer scale factor temperature sensitivity.
m. Accelerometer bias temperature sensitivity.
The only dynamic compensation required to meet accuracy in the
assumed vibration environment consists of the inertia compensa-
tion. The dominant remaining error term then becomes that due
to the gyro loop rectification. This term can be reduced by
software compensation at the cost of additional hardware to
enter gyro pick-offs into the computer. Furthermore, this error
term is small for most applications since it is a multi-axis
error phenomenon, requiring coherency for error rectification.
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It was therefore concluded not to include this term until the
environment can be better identified. Adequate computer duty
cycle is available for this compensation if it is required.
4.6 Hardware Packaginq Options.
The packaging approach selected for the redundant strapdown INS
is to divide the total system into four, identical units. This
configuration results in a low system cost to the airlines when
compared with alternative methods due to reduced spares costs.
The trade-off discussion leading to this conclusion is presented
in this section.
The lowest unit acquisition cost for a redundant strapdown INS
would probably result if all system components are packaged into
a single unit. This approach results in minimum structure,
connectors, etc. Other factors, however, also influence the
packaging design. For example, spare units must be provided at
all airports serviced by the VTOL, or if there are more airports
than VTOL's, which might be the case in low traffic areas of the
country, carrying spares on the VTOL would be more cost effec-
tive. With single unit packaging, therefore, this means that
real avionics cost could be up to double the basic system
acquisition cost.
Other packaging arrangements are illustrated in figure 4-29.
It should be pointed out that the digital rebalance electronics
must be located with the inertial instruments so they are in the
same thermal environment and can thus be calibrated simultane-
ously, and to avoid noise pick-up from inter-unit wiring. For
convenience, a module consisting of a gyro, 2 axes of acceler-
ometer, and their associated digital rebalance electronics is
called an Inertial Measurement Module or IMM.
OPTION A
A two-unit configuration (e.g., figure 4-29A) has the advantages
that the total cost of units in the repair pipeline is reduced.
For a single-unit configuration, when a component fails it (and
all the remaining good parts) is sent to some repair depot.
This process may take a significant length of time, during which
the good components are not in use. The two-unit approach
leaves at least a portion of the good components in the air-
craft. As with any capital investment, including the aircraft
itself, the highest utilization rate results in the lowest
overall cost.
A slightly higher packaging cost results with the two-unit
approach. There are added connectors, interfacing hardware, and
total sheet-metal structure. Furthermore, both units need to be
kept as spares either at the airport or on-board. Thus, cost of
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spares outside of those in the repair pipeline is not reduced
from the single-chassis approach. An additional disadvantage is
in the area of fault isolation by means of self-test. An IMM
failure could cause an apparent power supply or computer fail-
ure. Thus, there may be a significant number of cases where the
wrong unit is replaced. Resolving this by having a power supply
within each unit adds to net unit cost.
Some of the above disadvantages can be alleviated by having two
identical units, each containing two IMM's, two computers and
two power supplies. This approach is similar to Option C of
figure 4-29, and will be discussed in connection with _t.
OPTION B
The 5-unit approach of figure 4-29B further lowers the cost of
the replaceable unit. In addition, if the 4 IMM's can be made
identical and interchangeable, the production savings in this
commonality will tend to offset the cost of an increased number
of chasses. Also, perhaps most importantly, total cost of
spares can be reduced and dispatch delays can be minimized by
replacement of the faulty IMM with the other three still in
operation.
The fault isolation problems of having a power supply (including
the crystal oscillator, countdowns, etc.) in another unit also
apply to this configuration. Again, separate power supplies in
each unit increases net cost. In addition, particular care must
be exercised in the transfer of data from the IMM to the compu-
ter. It may be desirable to have some of the IMM/computer
interface circuitry in the IMM unit to avoid timing problems and
loss of data. This could lead to further fault-isolation
difficulties.
OPTION C
A further extension of the concept introduced by Option B is
shown in figure 4-29C. An IMM, a computer, and a power supply
are all contained within a single unit. Four units, preferably
identical, are interconnected to form the redundant strapdown
system. Some means must be devised to rotate the axes of the
IMM's during installation to achieve the desired coordinate
system.
The advantages of this packaging configuration are:
• If the four modules are identical and interchangeable,
only one need be maintained as a spare in many air-
ports. This is a function of the amount of traffic
through the airport and unit failure rate. In hhe
limiting case of on-board spares, only a single unit
is required. Program cost is approximately 1.25/2.00
or 62.5% of the single-unit packaging cost.
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• Net hardware in the spares pipeline is only 25% of that
in the single-unit design.
• A nearly complete function is contained within a unit
simplifying fault isolation. (The single-unit design
has the advantage, however, in essentially eliminating
the need for self-contained fault isolation capability
to subsystems except for redundancy management.)
• Self-contained fault isolation separating computer
failures from IMM failures is not needed.
• A unit may be replaced with the other three running,
potentially reducing dispatch delays due to pre-flight
failures.
• The added amount of hardware for four chasses tends to
be offset by the cost savings of higher quantity pur-
chases of identical chasses.
• Other users may only need fail-op or simplex. Simple
deletion of one or two channels achieve the desired
configuration.
A quantitative trade-off of the above considerations is presented
in Appendix C. In summary, total cost of ownership is reduced
by more than 12 million dollars over a 10-year period (200 air-
craft), from a single-unit package, by applying the above
4-module packaging approach.
If the above concept is extended into 8-modules by separating
each computer into a unit, the power supply and fault isolation
aspects become difficult and more costly. Flightline or on-
board spare requirements are not reduced, only repair pipeline
unit costs are improved. This net minor improvement, however,
is not felt worth the added complications.
Many of the above benefits can be achieved by having 2 IMM's,
2 computers, and 2 power supplies in one module, with a total
system composed of 2 such modules. The full savings of spares
cost cannot be achieved as effectively as with the 4-module
method, however.
IMM AXIS ORIENTATION
The packaging arrangement of Option C promises significant
program cost savings, provided that all four modules can be made
identical and interchangeable. Also, since a physical rotation
is involved and module-to-module alignments must be held to
approximately I0 arc seconds, the practicality of the approach
must be demonstrated. Such a simple practical implementation
was found and is described in paragraph 6.2.10 of this report.
The remainder of this section describes other implementations
which were considered.
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The geometry of a tetrahedron may be illustrated by means of a
cube, as shown in figure 4-30A. Cleariy, the sides of the
tetrahedron connecting the four corners of the cube are equal
since each of the diagonals of the cube faces are equal.
The gyro spin axes may now be placed in a tetrahedral configu-
ration by placing a vector from the geometric center of the cube
to each of the four corners of the tetrahedron, as shown in
figure 4-30B. The orientation of each of the two gyro input
axes will be discussed later.
Figure 4-31 shows how one gyro spin axis may be moved from one
of the tetrahedral axes to another by means of 180 ° rotations
about two axes 90 ° apart. This is convenient from a packaging
point of view since electronics boxes are usually rectangular in
shape. Rotation of the cube containing a single gyro spin axis
180 ° about the dashed horizontal line of figure 4-31 (i) results
in an orientation of the spin axis along another of the tetra-
hedral axes (2). Rotation of the cube 180 ° about a vertical
axis lines up the spin axis in the third tetrahedral axis (3).
Rotation 180 ° again about the horizontal axis places the spin
axis in the fourth orientation (4), completing the tetrahedron.
One manner of implementing an electronic chassis design is
illustrated in figure 4-32. The chassis is made symmetrical
about the vertical and horizontal axes to allow the above
rotations. The inertial instruments are installed in the center.
The connectors need not have symmetry about the horizontal axis
since the aircraft or installation rack connectors can be 180 °
apart between positions. The four instrument packages would
need to be compliant relative to the electronics portion of each
chassis to provide some self-aligning as the four units are
clamped together. This general method appears impractical,
however, due to the tight requirements on alignment repeatability
(i0 arc seconds). Errors build up from one end of the stack to
the other, and clamping over that great a distance, e.g. i0
inches, produces uneven pressures resulting in unpredictable
alignment. An additional disadvantage is that a single unit
cannot be replaced without disturbing the other three. There-
fore, the ground alignment process must be discontinued during
the maintenance activity.
A method of achieving the desired tetrahedral orientation is
through four 90 ° rotations. A spin reversal of the gyro for two
of the orientations can be used to exactly produce the tetra-
hedron. If the spin reversal is not done, the orientation is
identical to the semioctahedral geometry described earlier.
The manner in which the tetrahedron can be produced with 90 °
rotations about a single axis is illustrated in figure 4.33.
Positions (2) and (4) with spin direction reversals from the
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Figure 4-31. Successive 180 ° Rotation of the Cube
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nominal condition are identical to positions (3) and (4) of
figure 4-31. The packaging simplifications are clear from the
conceptual drawing in figure 4-34. The four instrument blocks
are not allowed to rotate relative to the electronics but
contain sufficient compliance to allow being drawn or pushed
against a common alignment block. This alignment block is of
relatively small size and high rigidity and thus repeatable
alignments will be achieved.
A preliminary packaging design which requires separate actions
for connector and block engagements is given in paragraph 6.2.10
of this report. Further investigation is warranted to devise a
single-action locking mechanism for improved maintainability.
Factory calibration equipment restrictions also indicate that it
is desirable to have block engagement on the end of the unit
rather than on the side. Several similar units can then be
installed side-by-side on the rate table used for factory cali-
bration for more efficient utilization of this high cost item.
Gyro and accelerometer input axis orientations are easily
maintained through the 90 ° rotations for the geometry selected
in figure 4-19. Maximum avoidance of all potential 3-gyro
isolation singularities is also provided.
The geometry recommended in the preliminary CR-132419 report
was to orient three gyros orthogonally with the fourth bisecting
the orthogonal triad. The inherent asymmetry of this approach
does not allow the simplified packaging arrangement of the
tetrahedron or semioctahedron. It thus produces clear cost-of-
ownership disadvantages and is not recommended for use.
4.7 Redundant Strapdown INS Trade-Off Summary
The redundant strapdown INS design features resulting from the
trade-off study described in this report are summarized below:
• The total redundant strapdown INS comprises four
identical plug-in modules for low cost-of-ownership.
• Module-level redundancy (printed-circuit card, circuit
element, CPU, etc.) is not employed except in the case
of instruments, to achieve minimum system cost. Proba-
bility of complete system failure through both fail-op
levels is significantly lower than LaRC requirements.
• Hardware failure detection and isolation (FDI) is not
used (software only), except for a small amount in
computer synchronization logic. The final vote is
assumed to be in external hardware.
• The system consists of 4 TDF tuned-gimbal gyros and 8
SDF accelerometers oriented in a regular semioctahedral
geometry, with 4 GP digital computers. This results in
137
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r
a low cost packaging approach and uniform redundancy
management with very straightforward software
processing.
Gyro and accelerometer data of each module are input to
only the computer of that module. Compensation for
predictable errors is applied in only that computer for
minimum I/O and computer duty cycle penalty.
The probability of recovery from some second failures
is less than unity due to information limits of 3 TDF
gyros. These failures are always detectable, thus
resulting in a fail-safe condition. Furthermore,
recovery probability is sufficiently high to meet the
system reliability specification, and approaches unity
on outputs to the flight control system.
Gyro input axes are oriented away from 3-gyro failure
isolation singularities resulting from these informa-
tion limits to improve recovery probability.
The mechanization of the computer ensemble is struc-
tured to allow aid to self-contained FDI from eternal
radio updates and to allow complete recovery from
extended operation in 3-gyro isolation singularities
when the failed gyro is finally isolated.
Parity equations are formed by comparison of gyro
measurements at the edges of a semioctahedron.
Processing of parity equations consists of a low pass
filter.
Fault isolation consists of a computer table look-up
process. Further processing of filtered gyro parity
equations including compensation for normal scale factor
deviations and computation of error probabilities is
recommended to reduce system errors just prior to
redundancy management switching. Incorporation of these
refinements will be done at a later date following
further analysis, simulation and/or testing.
Instruments which are indicated as failed will simply
be switched out of the computation. Weighted combi-
nations for output transient suppression are not needed.
Instruments switched out of computations due to soft
failure detection continue to be monitored and if only
marginally bad will be re-used for a third fail-op
level or to resolve ambiguous second failures.
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All four computers will do the same FDI processing.
A computer always uses its attached instruments in its
output computations. The choice of the second instru-
ment depends upon redundancy management decisions.
Reinitialization of one computer to another is per-
formed following replacement of a bad channel before
flight. Consideration will be given in the future to
reinitialization following any failure switching, or a
computer error transient. The impact of a failure mode
within or near a 3-gyro isolation singularity is thus
considerably reduced.
Tighter error detection limits will be used during
ground operation to reduce the probability of take-off
with failed or marginal instruments.
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V. SYSTEMANALYSES
The analytical results presented in this section indicate the
following performance.
TWOCHANNELPERFORMANCEPREDICTIONS
Predicted Performance** Requirement
i •
2.
3.
Position Error: 56 + 41t* meters CEP
Velocity: 0.50 m/sec cev
Attitude:
a. Verticality (Pitch and
Roll): 0.3 + 1.4t _-n (i0)
b. Heading: 5.8 + 7.5t mTn (i0)
0.49 m/sec cev
0.1 ° rms
0.2 ° rms
*t is in hours
**with radio updates
As discussed in paragraph 4.5.3, 'Instrument Compensation', the
errors encountered in strapdown inertial navigation systems may
be categorized into two general classifications, (i) dynamic
errors and (2) static errors.
Dynamic errors are those produced as a result of the vibration
environment. Paragraph 5.1 contains the results of this analysis.
The assumed environment encountered includes wide band noise plus
a sinusoidal resonance. The results of the dynamic analysis are
in terms of equivalent instrument biases• These biases are then
introduced into the strapdown simulation program together with
the static errors (instrument frequency independent errors).
Figure 5-1 illustrates this methodology.
The final results were obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation of
the strapdown inertial navigation system operating in a closed
path trajectory over a 1.2 hour period, with open loop velocity
and position updating. Paragraph 5.2 presents the results of
this simulation and a description of the simulator.
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The system reliability calculation results in the following
probability of system failure:
Full System
Accuracy
Outputs to Flight
Control System*
Channel
MTBF (Hr)
2000
4000
2O0O
4000
Flight Time
0.5 Hr
4.6 x i0 -I0
1.3 x l0 -I0
-ii
4.7 x I0
4.5 x 10 -12
1.0 Hr
-9
1.8 x i0
5.2 x i0 -I0
-i0
3.8 x i0
-ii
3.6xi0
-6
It is well within the i0 failure probability requirement for a
0.5 hour flight. Very conservative assumptions have been used
in calculating system reliability. Furthermore, use of radio
and update data can improve system reliability by resolving the
3-gyro isolation ambiguity, but this capability is not included
in the failure probability determination.
5.1 Dynamic Error Analysis
The dynamic errors have been evaluated for a strapdown navigation
system while operating in a helicopter-type of environment. The
resulting errors on a per channel basis, are summarized in
table 5-1. For a combined sinusoidal and random environment, the
resulting dynamic biases are 1 ug and .02°/hr/channel.
The total bias/channel is made up of errors due to gyro loop,
accelerometer loop, and system type dynamic errors. A separate
analysis was performed for both an assumed sinusoidal and random
vibration environment. The detailed breakdown of all the error
sources considered, and their resulting contribution to the total
error, are shown in tables 5-2 and 5-3, (sinusoidal and random
environments respectively). Each table shows the individual
error source, the coefficient used, the vibration motion and the
resulting maximum error. For errors dependent upon multiaxis
motion, the error was reduced by .3 to account for phase correla-
tion probability.
The environments used in this analysis are summarized in table
5-4. These were based on review of available data, primarily
reference [i0]. The total environment is considered to be made
of an overall random spectrum with some discrete frequencies
of vibration.
The dynamic errors are computed for the dry-tuned instrument
rebalance loops as described in paragraph 6.2.1.
*Attitude rates and accelerations in body coordinates.
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The errors as shown in tables 5-2 and 5-3 are generated with
the following assumptions:
a. All error sources are excited simultaneously.
b. The environments exist at the same levels at all times
on all axes.
c. The phasing of the vibrations are always such as to
maximize the resulting error.
d. The random and sinusoidal environments exist
simultaneously.
e. The environments used are worse case levels from
test data.
f. The total error is reduced by 50% for time weighting of
their existence during flight.
g. All errors are assumed to be independent and thus
RSS'd for a total error.
h. A computer utilizing a partial fifth order algorithm
at a 64 Hz iteration rate.
i. Only pseudo coning correction included in the software
compensation.
The errors shown in table 5-2 for the sinusoidal environment of
table 5-4 are computed as follows:
Error = (Error Coefficient)fi X (Vibration)fi
X(Computer Attenuation)f i
The error coefficients are shown in figures 5-5 through 5-14 for
those which are frequency dependent. The error coefficients
shown on table 5-2 are obtained from these figures at the
frequency (fi) of the input vibration. A brief description of
system dynamic errors is shown in figure 5-26. The computer
attenuation for system errors based on a 64 Hz, fifth order
algorithm is shown in figure 5-27.
The errors shown in table 5-3 for the random vibration envi-
ronment of table 5-4 are computed as follows:
Error = _Error Coefficient) X (Power Spectral Density)
X (Computer Attenuation)df
The coefficients are shown in figures 5-5 through -14 for those
which are frequency dependent. Before arriving at the final
144
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error, an analysis was performed to estimate the dynamic errors
as a function of vibration bandwidth for a normalized random
environment. The normalized environments are shown in figure 5-2.
The resulting RMS values as a function of bandwidth are shown in
figures 5-3 and -4 for the linear and angular spectra respectively.
The resulting integrated error coefficient vs vibration bandwidth
are shown in figures 5-15 and -25. If new vibrations of differ-
ent bandwidths or levels are used, the resulting errors can be
quickly determined.
5.1.1 Computation Errors
The quaternion integration routine proposed is a partial fifth
order algorithm. The truncation error for this order algorithm
will introduce negligible quaternion drift for input angular
rates above several hundred degrees per second.
Figure 5-28 illustrates the error related to the use of finite
digital word lengths. A plot of word length versus equivalent
quaternion drift in degrees per hour illustrates the propor-
tionate relationship of equivalent drift to computer iteration
rate. Note for a 32 Hz quaternion computation rate with a 32
bit word length introduces an equivalent drift rate of .0016 deg/hr
in the worst case.
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5.2 Error Simulation of Radio-Strapdown Naviqator
5.2.1 Introduction
An error simulation of a radio-inertial (strapdown) navigator
traversing a 1.2 hour closed trajectory was performed using a
digital computer program developed under Litton's IRAD program
76G-ID(B). The simulation does not as yet take into account
the instrument redundancy concepts incorporated in the Langley
study, but models instead a simple orthogonal triad configura-
tion. Results are thus conservative, applying essentially to
performance of one airborne computer output without averaging the
four computer outputs.
The inertial error budgets (two are simulated for tradeoff
purposes) are each composed of 45 error sources and the radio
error budget of four error sources (two per axis). The radio
and inertial position data is used to estimate the errors in
both position and velocity via a simple open loop constant gain
estimator. No error estimates of heading and attitude were
made.
Paragraphs 5.2.2, 3 and 4 present the error models and budgets
simulated. Paragraph 5.2.5 displays and discusses the simulated
updating concept. Details of the trajectory are presented in
paragraph 5.2.6. A brief discussion of the simulation program
is contained in paragraph 5.2.7. Paragraphs 5.2.8 and 5.2.9
present and discuss both the free-inertial and the radio-inertial
error profiles for the two inertial error budgets simulated.
Finally paragraph 5.2.10 relates the results to the Langley
specification.
5.2.2 Strapdown Inertial Error Model
The inertial error model incorporated into the simulation program
is based on a navigator consisting of an orthogonal instrument
set (gyros and accelerometers) affixed to the aircraftj and
computing in a local level frame. The local level computation
frame is a wander azimuth frame whose wander angle _ is given by
= - k sin
(5.2-1)
See figure 5-29.
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\
A) COMPUTATION FRAME
X = GEODETIC LONGITUDE
= GEODETIC LATITUDE
X
B) INSTRUMENT FRAME
Figure 5-29. Coordinate Frames
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The error dynamics are summarized (not derived herein) in equa-
tions 5.2-2 to 5.2-20, where the symbols are defined as follows
(all components are in the computation frame):
_X, y, Z
V
X, y, Z
R
x,y
6e
X, y, Z
Components of earth rate
Components of transport rate of computation frame
Components of inertial angular rate of computation frame
Components of transport rate plus earth rate
Components of vehicle velocity relative to earth
Radii of curvature
Components of specific force
Transport rate error
Computation frame attitude errors
Instrument frame attitude errors
6V
X, y, Z
5h
Velocity errors
Altitude error
¢
x, y, z
Alignment, updating, etc controls
Components of composite gyro drift
Components of composite accelerometer bias
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w = p +_
:: x X
w : p +_
Y Y Y
W = p +R
z z z
(5.2-2)
(5.2-3)
{5.2-4)
x x
(5.2-5)
u = 0 +Lq
Y Y Y
(5.2-6)
+Z_
_tz = Pz z
(5.2-?)
8_ - -_v /i_ +(v -/Rz) 6h
x ",' y y y
(5.2-8)
8p = 6V /R - (V /R z) 6h
y x ._ x x
(5.2-9)
60 = 0 (5.2-10)
_'w • 1
• i
8_) = 6p - _ 8e + p 8e
8@
y y z x x
z z x y y
X }" Z Z V
= 6P + f.;AO _ o 60Cy v z x x z
q
_'z + _ ,_,e -_. 50
" 6 p z :: 7 / x
+ T
y cx
+
z cy
l- "
M CZ
-_ 6 +_ _ +- -¢
y z z y =x
- _ _ + _.x¢z +_ - e
z x py
- w :, + _ 6 + - - ¢
x y y x pz
X
Y
z
(5.2-].1)
(5.2-].2)
(5.2-13)
(5.2-14)
(5.2-15)
(5.2-16)
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- A 4' - A _y - p.y6V + p. 6V - V 6p + V 6py z . z z y z y y
- z(v n +Vnz) 6o + zn v 6e + zn v 60 +yy x x y y x z z vx
V
X
(5.2-17)
6_ +V
= A ¢ A ¢ __ 6V. +_3V
- __ _ 7. X Z Z X
TABLE 5-5. LANGLEY ERROR BUDGETS
ERROR SOURCE NO. 005 NO. 004
X GYRO81AS DEG HR 1.4000£-02 1.0000E-01
Y BYRO BIAS DEG HR 1 4000E--02 1,0000E-01
Z GYROBIAS OEGHR 1.4000E-02 1,O000E-01
X ACCBIAS MICRO G 6.S000E 01 65000E 01
¥ ACCBIAS MICRO G 6.5000E 01 6,5000E 01
Z ACC BIAS MICRO G 6.5000£ 01 6.5000E 01
X GYROMISALIGNMENT(WY) - MICRORADIANS 7.5000£ 01 75000E OI
X GYROMISALIGNMENX(-WZt MICRORAOIANS 75000E 01 7SO00E 0l
Y GYROMISALIGNMENT( WZ! - MICRO RADIANS 7.S000E 01 7.5000E 01
Y GYROM!SALIGNMENT(-WX) MICRORADIANS 7.5000E 01 7.5000E 01
Z GYROMISALIGNMENT(WX) -MICRO RADIANS 7,5000E 01 75000E 01
Z GYRO MISALIGNMENT(-WY) - MICRO RADIANS 7.5000£ 01 7.5000E 01
X ACC MISALIGNMENTI AY)-MICRORADIANS 7.5000£ 01 7.5000E 01
X ACC MISALIGNMENT(-AZ)- MICRO RADIANS 7.5000E 01 7.5000E Ol
Y ACC MISALIGNMENT( AZ)- MICRO RADIANS ?.5000E 01 7.5000E 01
Y ACC MISALIGNMENT(-AXI MICRO RAOIANS 7.5000E 01 7.5000E 01
Z ACC MISALIGNMENT( AXI - MICRORADIANS 7.5000E 01 7.5000E 01
2' ACC MISALIGNMENTI-AY) - MICRORADIANS 75000E 01 75000E 01
X GYRO G DRIFT(-AX)-OEGIHR/G 1.0000E-02 1 O000E-02
X GYRO G DRIFT (-AY)-DEGIHRIG 1,0000E-02 1 O000E-02
Y GYRO G DRIFT (-AYI-DEGIHR/G 1 nnanl:_ n') I nnnn," n'_
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Figure 5-30. Simulated Updating Concept
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The inertially derived latitude (#) is first corrected with the
present estimate of its error (6_), yielding the best estimate of
present latitude for display purposes. A similar procedure is
used to obtain the best estimate of north velocity
A
(V N = V N - 6V N) for display purposes.
At an update time (every aT), the best estimate of present lati-
tude is compared with the r@dio indicated latitude, forming the
observable difference (= a(_ - #R))- The observable difference
multiplied by the constant gains K v and K x form the incremental
error estimates for velocity and position respectively. These
incremental estimates are added to the existing error estimates
thus forming new (updated) error estimates. Note that between
updates the velocity error estimate remains constant, but the
position error estimate is changed by the time integral of the
velocity error estimate.
5.2.6 Simulated Trajectory
A plan view of the simulated trajectory is shown in figure 5-31.
It consists of three take-offs and three landings around a closed
loop, simulating an intracity airbus. The total time of the flight
is 1.2 hours.
Each take-off consists of a turning climb during which the air-
craft changes heading by 180 ° . The landing patterns at stations
two and three are similar and consist of a descent followed by a
turning descent during which the aircraft changes heading by 270 ° .
The landing at station one differs from that at two and three
in that the heading change is 225 ° .
Each of the maneuvers (climb, descent, turn) is performed bv
pitching and/or rolling the aircraft. Since the strapdown instru-
ments are attached to the aircraft body, they will, of course,
experience a change in geographic direction just as the aircraft
body does. Thus, for example, when taking off after ground
alignment, the accelerometer biases rotate 180 ° due to the change
in aircraft heading.
Figures 5-32, -33 and -34 show detailed plan views of the first,
second and third stations respectively. In each case the plot is
made with the station at the origin.
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Figure 5-32. First Station Detail
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Figure 5-33. Second Station Detail
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5.2.7 Simulation Proqram
The basic program used for the strapdown radio-inertial error
simulations is Litton's MOD6DF. It is written entirely in
FORTRAN and has been compiled on many computer systems including
the IBM 7094, 7040, 360 and 370 series.
Since the inception of the program, Litton has expanded it
(principally in size) to accommodate the ever increasing demand
for more complex simulations. Because of its modular structure
it is adaptable to numerous different types of simulations (air-
craft, ship, missile and jeep dynamics, Kalman filters, navigation
error dynamics, etc.).
The simplified structure of the computer program is illustrated
in figure 5-35. As shown, the physical system being simulated
consists of a group of modules or "black boxes". Typically, these
represent computer functions, sensors, and the vehicle frame and
its external environment. After the usual executive functions
have been performed, including input of data, the actual mission
trajectory simulation begins. Using a fourth-order Runge-Kutta
integration algorithm, the trajectory progresses at each point
in time by processing the differential equations in each module
to advance the solution one step At in time.
The integration is automatic and unaffected by modifications in
old modules or the inclusion of new module subroutines, even
though these contain new variables to be integrated. Similarly,
random noise sources can be called automatically at each step of
the integration. If so desired, it is possible to replace the
Runge-Kutta integration algorithm with a simpler integration
algorithm. This in fact is done when simulating Kalman filter
covariance matrix propagation.
At the end of the mission trajectory simulated, post-processing
of data can occur (such as statistical processing), as well as
computations required in automatically setting up the next run
of a series of runs. Extensive RMSing, RSSing and plotting
programs augment the MOD6DF program.
The various concepts and modules required for the strapdown
inertial error simulation were developed under Litton's IRAD
program 76G-ID(B). The specific application to the Langley study
particularized the error values and the updating concept.
The procedure used to perform the simulations contained herein
consisted of four principal computer job steps. Selection of
four job steps economizes on the computer time required for the
simulations. The four job steps are
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EXECUTIVE PROGRAMS
(INPUT OF DATA,
CALL SUBROUTINE,ETC.)
_ BEGIN FLIGHT
SUBROUTINES FOR CONTROL
_ DURING RUN (PRINTOUT, ETC.) DESCRIPTIONOF PHYSICAL SYSTEM
BEINGSIMULATED MODULES)
INTEGRATION / AIRFRAME AND
LOOP + COMPUTERS EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
I r ..... _ F---_-I
I I"-I r'-"l I J I-"-i U
_I LJ i,.,--i t ........ i!. l i I--'1 II
L_ _._.l._J L__ ,.""__J
ARIES
END OF FLIGHT
POSTPROCESSINGOF DATA
SENSORS
I" ..... "1
I
L-t_ I
, n _
I I
L_ J
SET-UP OF NEW RUN
Figure 5-35. Simplified Structure of the MOD6DF Program
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a. Trajectory variables' generation and storage
b. Strapdown free inertial error response generation and
storage
c. Radio and inertial updated error responses generation
and storage
d. RSSing and storage of radio and inertial updated error
responses
Additional job steps are used to obtain the desired graphical
outputs.
The first job step is concerned with only trajectory generation.
The aircraft is commanded in pitch, roll and thrust to traverse
the desired flight profile. During this portion of the simula-
tion all the trajectory variables required for the strapdown free
inertial error response generation job step are stored as a data
set. These data include, for example, components of specific
force and angular rate in both the body and navigation coordinate
systems. In addition the transformation matrix relating the
body and navigation coordinate systems is also stored. This
seemingly redundant storage of data avoids the necessity of per-
forming some transformations during the second job step, thus
saving computer time.
During the second job step the computer program reads the stored
trajectory data and propagates specified error sources through
the strapdown free inertial error dynamics. Specifically, for
the simulations performed herein, all 45 inertial error sources
were propagated simultaneously through the dynamics, twenty times,
being randomly selected for each run (twenty Monte Carlos). These
results were RMS'd to give the final RMS response of the system
(free inertial). In addition the longitude (6A cos #), latitude
(6¢), east velocity (6V E) and north velocity (6VN), error time
histories for each Monte Carlo were stored. These data form the
input for the third job step.
The third job step propagates the stored 6_ cos ¢, 6 ¢ , 6V E and
6v N through the updating model (20 Monte Carlos) forming the RMS
response and also generates the RMS updated response of 20 Monte
Carlos of the radio error. These data are stored and finally
RSS'd to give the radio-inertial RMS response for twenty Monte
Carlos.
The generation of separate updated responses for the radio and
inertial error provided comparative data for the rational selec-
tion of the gains used in the updating scheme.
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5.2.8 Performance of Inertial Budqet _5
The inertial error budget given in table 5-5 (005) was used to
obtain the results presented in this section. Figures 5-36 to
5-40 summarize the free inertial error responses and figures 5-41
to 5-46 summarize the radio-inertial residual error responses.
Since the error estimation and updating process is performed open
loop and involves only position and velocity, the heading, pitch
and roll error responses (figures 5-38, -39 and -40) are invariant
to the updating.
The gains used for the updating were "tuned" for Error Budget #5
and are
= 3.24 x 10 -2 m/m
-- 3.65 x 10 -4 m/sec/m
K
X
K
Y
The updating occurred every 5 seconds starting at 605 seconds
except for three periods where the loss of updating for sixty
seconds was simulated. These periods are shown in table 5-6.
(5.2-30)
(5.2-31)
TABLE 5-6. UPDATE LOSS PERIODS
SEC HOURS
1920 - 1980
2900 - 2960
4140 - 4200
0.533 - 0.550
0.806 - 0.822
1.150 - 1.167
These periods occur just prior to landing and are meant to simu-
late the possible loss of the radio signal by shadowing effects
due to the low altitude of the vehicle.
The characteristics of the RMS free inertial responses are highly
sensitive to the particular aircraft maneuvering. This is ob-
vious in the velocity, heading, pitch and roll responses (fig-
ures 5-36, -38, -39 and -40). Each time the aircraft changes
heading the velocity error is seen to abruptly change slope
principally due to the geographic rotation of the gyro and
accelerometer biases. Table 7 summarizes the free inertial
performance for Budget #5.
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Figure 5-38. Heading Error (Budget #5)
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Figure 5-39. Pitch Error (Budget #5)
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Figure 5-42. Radio-Inertial North Position Error
Residual (Budget #5)
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Figure 5-43. Radio-Inertial CEP Residual (Budget #5)
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Figure 5-44. Radio-Inertial East Velocity
Residual (Budget #5)
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Error Residual (Budget #5)
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Figure 5-46. Radio-Inertial CEV Residual
(Budget #5)
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TABLE 5-7. FREE INERTIAL SUMMARY
PERFORMANCE (BUDGET #5)
Position
Velocity
Heading
Pitch
Roll
5.6 Km/hr CEP
2.7 m/sec CEV
6 min + 8 min/hr RMS
0.4 min + 1 min/hr RMS
0.2 min + 1 min/hr RMS
Utilization of the radio information to estimate the position
and velocity error considerably improves the error profiles.
The position error (figures 5-41, -42, and -43) indicates about
a 73 m error CEP with a small (43 m/hr) increasing slope. The
three update outage periods coincide with the 270 ° turns before
landing and can be identified by 30 m (approximately) error
spikes in the curves. If updating had continued these spikes
would have been considerably reduced in size because of the tight
coupling to the radio position.
The velocity error (figures 5-44, -45, -46) indicates a CEV of
approximately 0.53 m/sec (somewhat lower at the beginning of the
flight). Since the update outages coincide with the 270 ° turns
before landing it is not clear from the data presented whether
the spikes seen at these times are due primarily to the existing
attitude and heading errors or the outage itself. Simulation
analysis on Error Budget #4 indicates that little improvement in
the velocity performance is obtained by eliminating the outages
and therefore the spikes are primarily due to attitude and heading
errors. It is concluded therefore that the same is true for
Error Budget #5.
5.2.9 Performance of Inertial Budqet #4
The inertial error budget given in table 5-4 (004) was used to
obtain the results presented in this section. Figures 5-47 to
5-51 summarize the free inertial error responses and figures 5-52
to 5-57 summarize the radio-inertial residual error responses.
As mentioned in paragraph 5.2.8, the heading, pitch and roll
error responses (figures 5-49, -50, and -51) are invariant to the
updating.
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The gains used for the updating were "tuned" for Error Budget #4
and are
K = 4.25 x 10 -2 m/m (5.2-32)
X
K = 6.31 x i0 -4 m/sec/m (5.2-33)
V
The updating times for this simulation are exactly the same as
those used for Error Budget #5, inclusive of the loss of up-
dating (see paragraph 5.2.8, table 5-6).
Compared to Error Budget #5, the free inertial error responses
for Error Budget #4 are considerably larger. The large varia-
tions of the velocity, pitch and roll error responses make it
difficult to characterize the free inertial performance as was
done for Error Budget #5 (see table 5-7). Because of the large
gyro drifts the heading error incurred at alignment (due to
equivalent east gyro drift rate) remains the heading error for
the entire flight for all practical purposes. From the CEP plot
(figure 5-47) the free inertial performance can be characterized
as 14.8 km/hr CEP.
As for Error Budget #5 the radio updating improves the error pro-
files. The position errors (figures 5-52, -53, and -54) indicate
about an 82 m CEP with a small (_43 m/hr) increasing slope. Com-
pared to Error Budget #5 the responses are considerably less
smooth. The various large spikes occurring can be correlated
with the heading changes of the aircraft. An additional simula-
tion made (but not included herein) shows that the spikes
occurring when the aircraft turns and simultaneously experiences
an update outage are considerably reduced if the updating had
continued. This is because of the tight coupling to the radio
position.
The velocity error (figures 5-55, -56, and -57) indicates a CEV
of approximately 0.8 m/sec. As for position the various large
spikes can be correlated with the heading changes of the air-
craft. Eliminating the update outages changes the performance
very little during these periods. Thus the velocity performance
is practically independent of the outages simulated. The spikes
can be related to the heading error at the time of the turn.
For example, the 90 ° turn at 0.28 hours requires a velocity
change of
AVE = 69 m/sec
8V N = 0 m/sec
(5.2-34)
(5.2-35)
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therefore it would be expected that the east velocity error would
not be affected and that the north velocity error would increase
by the heading error (40 m_n) times the east velocity change, that
is 0.7 m/sec. From figure 5-55 and -56 it is seen that this is
what happened.
One important consideration relative to the observed velocity
error spikes is the time required to recover from them especially
at the time of landing. From the graphs it is estimated that
the recovery time is one to two minutes.
5.2.10 Conclusions
The Langley velocity error specification is
1.03 m/sec radial 95%
or in terms of 50% radial (CEV)
0.49 m/sec CEV
Error Budget #5 is estimated to be slightly above the specifica-
tion. However it is observed that the performance from initial
takeoff to the first landing is within specification. Since the
simulation did not take advantage of the time period on the
ground to realign, it is anticipated that such a procedure would
improve the overall performance to that seen in the first air-
borne period. As mentioned previously, the velocity performance
is highly uncorrelated to the update outage. Therefore further
improvement in performance requires a somewhat more sophisticated
error estimator. In particular it is anticipated that including
attitude and heading in the error estimator would bring the
velocity well within the specification. Some form of simple
Kalman filter would probably be required.
Error Budget #4 is not within specification. The con_ents for
Budget #5 relative to performance improvement are equally appli-
cable for Error Budget #4. In addition it might be necessary to
incorporate some form of gyro biasing.
5.3 System Reliability
5.3.1 Analytical ApDroach
System reliability is expressed in terms of the probability of
a complete system failure to produce required outputs, for a half-
hour flight duration. The failure probability calculation is
based upon the selected system mechanization, and predicted
component failure rates. The predicted failure rate and hardware
MTBF are derived in Appendix G and are based on a preliminary list
of electronic components for the redundant strapdown INS.
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The definition of a failure depends upon the manner in which
system outputs are used. Two levels of system performance
"failure" are defined, one relative to navigation data failures
and the other relative to flight control system failures. The
former requirement is generally less stringent since other naviga-
tion data such as radio aids, ground radar, or visual sighting
are generally available. Reliability requirements for the latter,
however, are very stringent since aircraft safety is affected.
To facilitate discussions of system reliability we define differ-
ent levels of gyro drift (D) failure as follows:
Hard Failure - The channel of the gyro is non-functional.
The failure may be detected and isolated to a
channel by self-contained self test.
GF3 - The gyro has drift rate exceeding the require-
ment DH for attitude rate reference.
GF2 - The gyro failure has drift rate less than GF3
but exceeding the requirement Dmin for navi-gation.
GF1 - Gyro drift rate less than Dmin but more than
three times the specified gyro drift rate.
Considering the total population of failures which might occur
over a long period of time, there will be a distribution of
failures into these various categories. Since precise data are
lacking on this distribution, a set of assumptions has been made,
as shown in figure 5-58.
The assumptions of Dmi n = l°/hr and D H = l°/sec are preliminary,
as described in paragraph 4.4.9. An angular threshold for large
drift errors of 1 arc minute is also assumed. These detection
levels cannot be used during aircraft maneuvering since normal
scale factor and misalignment tolerances can produce errors of
this magnitude for short periods of time. The means of account-
ing for these effects, such as maneuver-dependent limits or
dynamic compensation, have not been defined at this time.
A higher probability has been assigned to the region of small
drifts since there are many more mechanisms contributing to
slight performance degradations.
It is further assumed that the vector angle of a failure drift
is constant and that the angle of a failure has a uniform pro-
bability density over 360 °. This is also a very conservative
assumption since the angle will vary in many cases due to erratic
performance or aircraft maneuvering. In either case, the 3-
gyro isolation ambiguity will be avoided if the failure occurs
as a second failure. To be conservative, the increase of prob-
ability density in the area of gyro input axes is ignored.
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PROBABILITY
DENSITY
DMIN
1.0
DH
5O%
GYRO FAILURE LEVEL:!-- GF 2 =
DMAX H
50%
3.6 X 103 DEGREES/HOUR
GF3
3.6 X 105
• 50% OF GYRO FAILURES ARE DETECTED BY SELF-TEST.
• DISTRIBUTION OF GYRO FAILURES WITH AMPLITUDES IS SHOWN ABOVE.
• DISTRIBUTION OF SOFT GYRO FAILURES WITH ANGLE IS UNIFORM AND INDEPENDENT
OF AMPLITUDE
• EXTERNAL AVIONICS CAN DETECT, ISOLATE, AND RECONFIGURE FROM TWO INURs I/O
FAI LURES WITH UNITY COVERAGE
• HARDWARE FDI OF INURs SOFTWARE INTERRUPT HAS UNITY COVERAGE FOR TWO
FAILURES
• THE INTER-COMPUTER I/O DOES NOT HAVE MULTI-CHANNEL FAILURE MODES
Figure 5-58. Assumptions Used in System Reliability Analysis
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The ultimate use of redundant strapdown INU (INURs) data will
require a final vote on the four channel outputs to be performed
in order to derive a single activity, such as a display of naviga-
tion data, or to drive flight control actuators. The INURs
reliability calculation assumes this final vote is performed with
unity coverage for two failures.
The preliminary design described herein has not included hardware
design such as for the inter-channel data transfer and synchroniza-
tion of the four software executive interrupts. It is assumed
that these hardware designs do not detract from coverage of two
failures.
The reliability diagram for a single channel is illustrated in
figure 5-59. The main failure rates, indicated in failures per
million hours, reflect a channel MTBF of about 4000 hours. The
failure rates in parentheses are for a 2000 hour MTBF, degraded
due to exposure to a more severe environment. A summary of mod-
ule failure rates, extracted from Appendix G, is shown in fig-
ure 5-60.
The system failure probability is calculated for each of the
failure rates and for two failure detection levels, D H and Dmi n,
representing flight control and navigation degradation, respec-
tively. The failure detection amplitude determines the probability
that a given second soft gyro failure results in failure-isolation
ambiguity and complete system failure. In practice, this con-
dition can be remedied by reference to radio updates, or by pilot
intervention, however, these possibilities are not assumed for
the failure probability calculation.
Several system architectures have been assumed for trade-off
purposes. They are:
a. Flexible IMM-to-computer I/O (a computer can receive all
sensor data with all other computers in a failed con-
dition) with full accelerometer selection flexibility
(the alternate I/O path shown in figure 5-59).
b. Same as above but with both accelerometers of a channel
rejected if one fails.
c. IMM data input to only one computer (cross-channel com-
parison after computer processing of figure 5-59 only)
and inflexible accelerometer processing.
Option c is the selected mechanization. Options a and b are
included for trade-off purposes, and may be applicable to
missions with longer flight duration.
Paragraph 5.3.2 describes the flight control failure probabilities
(sensor-related), and 5.3.3 describes navigation failure prob-
abilities for the various mechanizations, MTBF's, and flight
duration.
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ALTERNATIVE
I/O
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CHANNEL
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Figure 5-59. Single-Channel Reliability Diagram
An advanced method of FDI has been formulated using the parity
equations derived in Appendix B. This algorithm would be used
in conjunction with the simple table look-up approach for improved
FDI sensitivity and for reduced INS error buildup just prior to
redundancy management reconfiguration. Further work is required
to consider effects of normal scale factor error, etc. Present
work on the advanced FDI method is presented in Appendix I and is
summarized in paragraph 5.3.4.
5.3.2 Probability of Flight Control System Output Failure
The attitude rate measurement functions of the redundant strap-
down INS are regarded as failed if an attitude rate measurement
has an error with a magnitude DH, where DH = l.°/sec. To mini-
mize the probability of attitude rate failure the software should
select gyro pair channels (in the event of three failures includ-
ing GF 2 type, or two gyro failures including a GF 2 type with an
ambiguity) so as to accept as valid any GF 2 failed gyros. Use
of SDF accelerometers precludes accelerometer FDI ambiguity so
it is assumed that coverage of these failures is unity.
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The probability* of system failure with full IMaM-to-computer I/O
flexibility is:
g3 g3
i,,-,(-'), 'J I ' 'Jl+ + cl-f I' IH +(l-f_ 4 f4+cl Ix3 (* x3_g3 | g3 g3 " PA3 y3} P P " fc) + "
where, for fully flexible accelerometer logic,
(1)
4
:4_fn )4-
n=2
n
(2)
H =
6
(6_fn )6-n
_xn/ a(l fa
n=4
(3)
8
:8hfn )8-
J = _\n/ a 11 -q
n=6
n (4)
g3 \3/g3 t_ -f )+ I_-f Y3+ g3 \2/ g3 g3 P A3 (n)
fp, fc, and fa are the power supply, computer (and I/O) , and
accelerometer fail_re probabilities based on their )., from fig-
ure 5-59, times i0 , times flight duration; fg3 is the probability
of gyro failure drift greater than DH including the failure versus
i n-k
*Using binomial distribution (nk ) P q
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amplitude distribution of figure 5-58, and approximately 0.5
times the gyro k of figure 5-59, times 10 6 , times flight duration.
Y3 is the portion of gyro failures with amplitude greater than
D H and not detected by self-test which are subject to failure
isolation ambiguity. That is, from figure 5-58, Y3 _ 0.25.
PA3 is the probability that a given soft second gyro failure
falls into a fault-isolation ambiguity. Assuming a uniform
distribution of failure angles over 360 ° , and a DmaxH of
3.6 x 105°/hr,
D
/_ axH dD F 4a
PA3 = JD_F (Dmax H _ DH) C = --N
D H
1.26 oN
(Dmax H - DH 1
in (DmaxH/DH)
(6)
where ON is the noise level. For aN = 0.1°/hr,
= 1.26 (0.i) 4.6
PA3 0.36 x 106 = 1.6 x 10 -6
If two gyro failures occur simultaneously, and are of comparable
amplitudes with certain failure directions, FDI ambiguity may
occur. (Described in Appendix J.) The probability of simul-
taneous failures during a 0.5 hour mission is a function of the
time to detect errors greater than D H. If the detection level
is set to 1 _, time to detect an error of l°/second is 1/60 sec-
ond. Probability of simultaneous failures in a half-hour flight
is then 10 -5 . The probability of two gyro failures not detectable
by self-test being greater than D H is (0.5 x fg3) 2 = 2 x 10 -10 •
Of such cases, from Appendix J, only the small fraction
in (DmaxH/DH)
Dmin = 10 -6 (7)
2_ D
max H
cause failure. The combination of these three probabilities
is 10 -21 which is negligible.
If accelerometers are rejected in pairs instead of a fully-
flexible choice, the following terms apply:
G = 1 - (i - f )
a
4 (8)
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H [l fa,2]n- - (1 - f )a
n=2
6-2n
(9)
J 4(n_l[1,l_a_2n= - - (i - fa )
n=3
8-2n
(i0)
If IMM-to-computer I/O is made inflexible, that is a computer
can only read other channel data through their computer, and
inflexible accelerometer selection is assumed system failure
probabibity becomes:
4
PF = fpc 14)f3 I)f2+ 3 pc (1 - fpc ) + 4 22 pc (I - fpc )
i_22 <l_f)_ll-g_)2
4
+ (i) fpc (i - fpc) 3 fg3 g3
23 (i - f Y3+ (11 fg3 g3 PA3
[_ )33 <g3 3 g3 2 i - PA3
+ (i - fpc) 4 IX3 + (i - X3) J ]
(II)
where fg3, X_, and Y3 are as previously defined, G, H, and J are
those defini£ions for inflexible accelerometer selection, equa-
tions (8), (9), and (i0), and
fpc = [i - (i - fp) (I - fc) ]
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The terms of equations (i) and (ll) represent the various system
failure modes. Thus, the first term applies to four power
supply failures during the flight. The second term indicates
three power supply (or computer, for equation (ii)) failures.
The third term is for two power supply failures plus an addi-
tional failure such as a gyro.
Evaluation of equation (i) with and without flexible accelerometer
selection and equation (ii) without flexible accelerometer
selection for the two system MTBF's and for different flight
durations leads to system failure probabilities shown in
table 5-8.
TABLE 5-8. FLIGHT CONTROLOUTPUTFAILURE
PROBABILITY VERSUSARCHITECTURE,
FLIGHT TIME, AND CHANNELMTBF
ARCHITECTURE
FULL FLEXIBILITY
INFLEXIBLE ACCELS.
INFLEXIBLE I/O
FLIGHT
TIME (HR)
0.5
1.0
8.0
0.5
1.0
8.0
0.5
1.0
8.0
MTBF
4000 HR 2000 HR
-13i.I X 10
-138.7 x i0
-i0
4.4xi0
4.1 x i0 -13
3.3 x 10 -12
-9
1.7 x i0
4.5 x 10 -12
3.6 x l0 -ll
-8
1.9 X 10
1.3 x 10 -12
-ii
1.0 x 10
-9
5.1 X I0
-12
3.5 x i0
-ll
2.8 x 10
-8
1.5 x i0
-ii
4.7 X i0
3.8 x 10 -10
1.9 X 10 -7
The following conclusions may then be drawn:
a. All architectures meet the required 10 -6 failure
probability for 0.5 hour flights.
b. Full flexibility in computer instrument selection leads
to about 1/40 of the failure probability of the most
inflexible architecture.
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c. Rejecting accelerometers in pairs results in about
4 times the failure probability of the full flexibility
method.
d. If channel MTBF is halved, failure probability increases
by about a factor of 10.
e. Applications of long flight durations would probably
require the more flexible architecture.
5.3.3 Probability of Navigation Output Failure
The probability of system failure for navigation outputs has the
same form as equation (i) except that the full distribution of
gyro failures with amplitude applies. The equation then becomes:
() 1 : (')' "* I p p c g 1 It g,
(12)
where fD' fc, and f9 are as previously defined and G, H, and J
are defined in equations (2), (3), and (4), or (8), (9), and
(i0), depending on accelerometer rejection logic, y is essentially
equal to Y3 (0.25), for the assumed distribution, and,
X = f4 + 14)g 3 f3g (i- fg)+ (4)f22 g (i- fg )2 PA y (13)
Evaluation of PA primarily involves the failure distribution,
from figure 5-58, from 1 to 20°/hr. Using these values in
equation (6) for Dmi n and Dma x, respectively, yields
PA = 0.0195.
The average time to detect errors under 20°/hr is 30 seconds (for
a minimum drift of l°/hr and a detection level of 1 arc minute).
The probability of two simultaneous failures in a 0.5 hour flight
is 30/1800 = 0.0167. The probability of two GF 2 failures not
detectable by self-test is (0.25 x fg)2 = 2 x 10-10. Of such
cases only the fraction, from equation (7), 0.025, apply. The
net probability, 0.0167 x 2 x 0.025 x 10 -10 = 10-13, is
insignificant.
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The equation for probability of navigation output failure with
the inflexible architecture, similar to equation (ii) , is:
PF = f4 + (43) f3 (i - fpc pc pc ) + (_) f2pc (i - fpc)2
3) (i - f )2+ 1 fg g PA Y
+
+ (i- fpc)4 [X + (i - X) J]
(14)
Using the previously defined values of G, H, and J (equations (8) ,
(9), and (i0)), and X (equation (13)), f_c and computed values of
y and PA, equation (14) may be evaluated for the two values of
MTBF, as shown in table 5-9.
TABLE 5-9. NAVIGATION OUTPUT FAILURE PROBABILITY
VERSUS FLIGHT TIME AND CHANNEL MTBF,
INFLEXIBLE ARCHITECTURE
FLIGHT TIME
0.5
1.0
8.0
4000 HR
-I0
1.3x10
-I0
5.2 x i0
-8
3.3 x i0
MTBF
2000 HR
-i0
4.6 x i0
-9
1.8 x i0
-7
1.2 x I0
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The improvement to be gained by using the more flexible I/O and
accelerometer selection architecture is not as great for naviga-
tion output reliability. It can be shown to be less than a
factor of 3. The reason this occurs is that the probability of
isolation ambiguity is much more significant for the smaller
gyro drifts needed for navigation than for flight control failure
detection levels.
5.3.4 Summary of Study Results in Advanced Techniques for
Failure Detection and Isolatio n
The navigation system will fail if errors in craft rate exceed
l.°/hr during flights where craft rates of >10.°/sec = 3.6 x 104°/hr
can occur. Failure detection and isolation techniques based on
comparison of gyro torquer outputs should correspond to the same
directions to within a fraction of l°/hr/3.6 x 104_/hr _ 0.3 x 10 -4
tad = 6. se_-c. For this reason, directions in which angular rate
is sensed by more than one gyro are important for comparative
testing. For the tetrahedral array the sensing planes of only two
gyros intersect in the same direction. Each intersection is at
an edge ef the tetrahedron defining a test direction along the
edge for a comparison of components of observed angular rate
obtained by resolution of the two torquer outputs of each gyro.
Each difference of angular rate components Trs of gyro r and
gyros along the commonly sensed direction of a tetrahedron
edge, is a member of the set of six edge test observations,
TI2, TI3, TI4, T23, T24, T34
which comprise the primary information of angular rate outputs of
the gyros. The computation and smoothing of Trs quantities is
described in Appendix B. The analysis of Appendix I evolves
advanced techniques for failure detection and isolation. The
study first seeks an answer to the question of what test functions
Fg of contemporaneous Trs ,
F (T 1 T 1 T 2 T34)g 2' TI3' 4' 3' T24' g = 1,2,3,4
give a measure of whether gyro g has failed? More general func-
tions could involve past and present Trs but here the dependence
on past Trs is limited to previous decisions regarding gyro fail-
ure based on past Trs magnitudes. Say gyro _ was previously
isolated as failed. Then the new question is, what functions
Fq(g) not involving the failed gyro _, where for example _ = 4,
a_d we have
Fg (4) = Fg (TI2 , TI3, T23 ) g = 1,2,3
give a measure of whether gyro g has failed?
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To facilitate the generation of gyro failure isolation functions
Fg for the four gyro case and Fg(g) for the three gyro case, we
directly implement a definition of failure of a gyro according
to total drift rate in the sensing plane, a failed gyro corres-
ponding to
2D D > £g g
where 6 is a test drift rate level. Derived functions may be
directly used or, as in the three gyro case, an equivalent form
of the functions is shown to involve simplified testing.
A second criterion to facilitate the generation of test functions
is the assumption that only one gyro has failed in the test period.
In the three gyro case this criterion is not a limitation since
two gyro failures means certain navigation system failure. In
the four gyro case, once deriving the implied functions Fg, it is
necessary to provide special secondary procedures for the infre-
quent situation of two gyros failing within the test smoothing
time (see Appendix J). The frequency and provision for such
cases are analyzed in another section.
In the four gyro case it is shown in Appendix I-i that if a single
gyro g failed with drift rate DF_ then functions Fg [g = i...4]
given by (6a), (6b) take on the 9alues, in the absence of noise,
2 g
Fg DF_ • 6 g
where
m
6g = I i if g = g
g 0 otherwise
Gyro failure detection and isolation is given by failure of the
test F < £2 [g = 1...4].
g
An equivalent form of F [g = 1...4] defined by (6a) , (6b),
Appendix I is g
2 _Fo _ _(g);
Fg = _ _
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where
- 2 2 2 _ T2 + )2F(1) = T23 + T24 + T34 + (T23 4 T34
-- 2 2 2
F(2) = TI3 + T14 + T34 + (TI4 + T34 - T13)2
-- 22 2 2 _ T2 )2F(3) = T 1 + TI4 + T24 + (TI2 + TI4 4
-- 2 2 2
F(4) = TI2 + TI3 + T23 + (TI2 - TI3 + T23)2
2 2 2 2 2 2
Fo = TI2 + TI3 + TI4 + T23 + T24 + T34
In this algebraic form the calculation of test functions for
four gyros make functions F(g) available for:
a. Special procedures for detection and provision for two
effectively simultaneous failures
b. Failure detection and isolation in the three gyro case.
2
For four gyros the test F < c can be made equivalently by tests
g
3 2
F(g) > Fo - _ 6 g = i...4
as indicated in the preliminary FORTRAN list of the advanced
failure detection and isolation program listed in Appendix I-5.
The statistical properties of the four gyro test procedure in the
presence of gyro noise are analyzed in some detail in Appendix I.
The fractional variation from gyro noise of F if gyro g failed
is g
F / o N_ 2 2
Fg average /_ r 1 + r , r = D_g
so for noise o N = 0.1°/hr and DFg = DF_i_ = l.°/hr the i_ varia-
tion of Fg from noise for the mlnlmum rallure rate is 11.6%. If
none of the gyros failed, the effect of gyro noises in producing
outputs of Fg is to produce lo output of -.63% to +1.63% of that
of a minimally failed gyro at i. °/hr. An exact probability
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distribution* for F_ from noise is derived from which the false
alarm probability P_A for test level e2 is shown to be
5PFA = -- - e7
_3 6
5
Four Gyro Case
For noise level o N = .l°/hr and test level _ = .5°/hr
-7
P = 2 x 10
FA
for which the fraction fFA of false alarms to actual failures is
PFA -4
fFA - • (MTBF) = .5 x i0
s
Four Gyro Case
for mean time before failure MTBF = 3000 hr, test smoothing time
_s = 60.0 sec. The probability of non-detection is a more
involved calculation and necessarily uses approximations good
for the range of test levels considered. Assuming a relatively
flat distribution of failure drift rates with minimum value
DFmin, the probability of non-detection at the recommended failure
test level 62 , with e = (6 N + DFmin ) /2 is
DFL PND
a
N
ii 10 -24
9 10 -13
8 10 -6
7
-5
3 x i0
A modified Rayleigh distribution.
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Techniques were evolved for evaluation of the probability dis-
tribution of relevant classes of test functions. Probability
distribution is requisite to determine probability of rare events
such as false alarm and non-detection.
The three-gyro case was analyzed to obtain test functions based
on the same criteria of failure definition and single failure at
a time, obtaining failure detection and isolation functions for
gyro g where gyro g has previously failed,
2
F < c
g
where
Three Gyro Case
_ 2 [_(_) -2k T 2
Fg 3 rs ] r _ s / g _ g
where F(g) is defined for the four gyro case above.
It is shown k > o should be as high as tolerable for the gyro
noise level,
3 2 2
K -__ £ D F /o N
min
for test decision purposes, despite the fact that other smaller K
makes F a better estimate D 2 when the other gyros are drifting.
g g
The tests for Fg < t 2 to determine validity of each gyro g other
than gyro _ are equivalent to failure tests,
2 3 2
Test #g T > (F(g)- u )/2K
rs
Three Gyro Case
r _ s _ g _ g
such that if only Test #g fails then gyro g has failed. In the
event two of the three tests fail we have the ambiguous case in
which the direction of the failure drift is near normal to a test
direction. The Test #g is incorporated in the preliminary
FORTRAN list of the advanced failure detection and isolation pro-
gram listed in Appendix I-5, in the test of S(L) - Trs 2 against
TL - (F(g) -3/2 62)/2K. In the ambiguous case where two of the
three tests fail, it is known that one gyro g whose test passed
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is good. To find which gyro failed, gyro r or gyro s, the
statistic
A = (Trg 2 - Tsg2)
is analyzed for probability distribution given gyro r failed or
gyros failed in the presence of gyro noise. From these probabil-
ity distributions are derived the probability that gyro r failed,
PFr(A). Then the reliability of the decision of which gyro failed
is calculable in terms of edge test observations. Operational
requirements determine the use of decision reliability, for example
if below a prescribed level of certainty to signal to the pilot a
system failure. In Appendix I-5 a particular utilization of the
probability of correct decision, extracted from a stored table is
considered, namely, the assignment of gyro validity
Vr = PF (A)
r
for weighting of navigation channel estimates or according to level
for logical validity.
It is proposed that improved navigation accuracy with four valid
gyros be obtained by weighting channels according to drift level
estimates of the gyros of each channel. Soft failures GF 1 which
markedly degrade navigation of a channel using such gyros would be
downgraded in a weighting of channel estimates of a variable X,
4
A i=I
× =
4
i=I
where
_i = [2Fo
m
- F(r) -F(s) + C]
-I
Channel i uses
gyro r, gyros
the functions F o, F(r) and F(s) being available from the gyro fail-
ure detection and isolation program. The case of three gyros and
ambiguous two gyros are of interest for weighted navigation, for
example, using Channel i uses
2 -i
• = [Trs + C] gyro r, gyro s
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VI. PRELIMINARY SYSTEMDESIGN
6.1 System Block Diagrams
A simplified system block diagram is shown in figure 6-1. The
complete redundant strapdown INS is composed of four identical
channels. Each channel of the INS consists of the following
elements:
a. An Inertial Measurement Module (IMM) containing the
basic inertial sensing devices, one TDF tuned gimbal
gyro and two axes of accelerationmeasurement, with their
associated electronics.
b. A computer which performs redundancy management, instru-
ment compensations, coordinate transformations, and the
inertial navigation computations.
c. External I/O which interfaces the computer with other
aircraft equipment. Note that there is no self-contained
voting in the system between the computers and these out-
puts. The external equipment must perform some voting
between channels (in addition to using validity informa-
tion provided by each channel) in determining the final
navigation variable to be used.
d. Inter-computer I/O which is used to transfer gyro and
accelerometer measurement data from one channel to all
others for use in redundancy management, and for deriva-
tion of the full 3-dimensional rate and acceleration
inputs.
e. A power supply used to drive all elements in a channel.
Note that there is no cross-feeding of power between
channels. This results in a simple, low-cost power
supply design with a negligible decrease in system
reliability over a modularly redundant power supply
configuration.
A more detailed block diagram for one of the four Inertial Naviga-
tion Modules (INM) is shown in figure 6-2. The equipment shown
is packaged in its own chassis and four of these chasses installed
into a common mount comprise the complete redundant strapdown INS.
The entire system will have a weight of 28 kg and a power consump-
tion of 540 watts.
6.2 Hardware Design
6.2.1 G-6 Gyro and Loop Dynamics
The G-6 gyro, figure 6-3, consists of only five major subassem-
blies, resulting in a simple, low-cost design. The subassemblies
are: the gyro case, bearing assembly capsule, torquer coils,
•Prececfngpageblank
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Figure 6-3. Photograph of Litton G-6 Strapdown INS Gyroscope
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pickoffs, and the rotor with its tuned suspension. The torquer,
pickoff, and bearing subassemblies are mounted in the case con-
taining the spin motor stator. The replaceable bearing assembly
contains the prealigned shaft and bearing assembly. The motor
hysteresis ring is mounted on one end, and the rotor and suspen-
sion are mounted on the other. End covers, when soldered in place,
provide an hermetic seal for the gyro. All five major subassem-
blies are interchangeable with other like subassemblies.
The Suspension System
The function of the suspension system is to provide translational
support for the rotor in such a way that the effective torsional
coupling between the rotor and the gyro case about any axis that
is perpendicular to the rotor spin axis is zero. The suspension
system in a tuned gyro is analogous to that of a universal joint
and in its simplest form consists of an inertia element (the gim-
hal) and the torsional elements (the flexures). Typically, four
cross-leaf flexures are used. Two of these flexures connect the
gimbal to the shaft, forming one torsion axis of rotor and gim-
bal freedom relative to the shaft. The remaining two flexures,
whose axis of torsion is orthogonal to that established by the
first two flexures, connect the rotor to the gimbal and thus form
the second axis of rotor freedom. When such a suspension system
and the rotor are run at a speed corresponding to the tuned fre-
quency, the dynamically induced spring rate due to the gimbal
motion is equal to the physical spring rate of the flexures and
the resultant spring rate coupling the rotor to the shaft is zero.
This condition is attained by the adjustment of the moments of
inertia of the gimbal such that the tuned frequency is equal to
the frequency of the synchronous motor speed.
Through careful selection of the ratio of rotor to gimbal iner-
tias and gyro operating spin speed, Litton has eliminated the need
for complex tuning techniques and procedures often used in this
class of instruments. This new approach not only significantly
reduces gyro cost but also inherently enhances performance.
Reduced long-term mass shifts (spin axis mass unbalance) and
thermal instability of mass shifts are obtained. There are no
adjustment weights on the rotor assembly. All balancing is done
at the subassembly level by a static balance procedure in which
unbalances are measured and appropriate material is removed.
Gyro tuning is also adjusted at this subassembly level.
References [31], [32], and [33] provide a description of the
operation and errors caused by the tuned suspension system.
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Torquers and Pickoffs
The function of the pickoffs and torquers is to control the atti-
tude of the rotor relative to the gyro case. When an input rate
is applied to the gyro case, the case fixed pickoffs sense the
change of rotor attitude relative to the case and cause the
rebalance loop to provide current to the torquers in such a sense
as to reduce this change to zero. In an ideal strapdown gyro the
torquer maintains the spin axis of the rotor aligned with the
shaft spin axis and thus the rotor has the same angular velocities
as the case about the input axes. The torquers are designed such
that the currents through their coils are directly proportional
to the moment outputs and thus the torquer current is a direct
measure of the input rate to the gyro.
The gyro torquer is a permanent magnet of the voice coil type and
is capable of exerting moments on the rotor about two nominally
orthogonal axes that are perpendicular to the rotor spin axis.
The torquer consists of two elements; one element consists of
permanent magnets attached to the rotor and thus spinning with
the rotor, and the other is the torquer coil assembly fixed to
the gyro case. The permanent magnets are radially magnetized
and, when assembled on the rotor, establish a radially oriented
magnetic field across the airgap containing the conductors of the
torquer coils.
The high-permeability rotor provides the return path for the mag-
netic flux. There are two diametrically opposite torquer coils
per axis connected in series in such a way that the moments pro-
duced by the individual coils are additive. The average torque
produced by the coils is proportional to the product of the effec-
tive field density, the ampere turns, the effective circumferen-
tial length of the conductors and the radius of the airgap.
The pickoff used is a high frequency variable reluctance type.
There are two diametrically opposite E cores per axis, each
carrying a primary and a secondary winding. The reluctance path
associated with each core consists mainly of the airgap that
separates the E core from the flux return path mounted on the
rotor. Thus, the field set up by the primary winding and linking
the secondary winding is mainly a function of the airgap length.
The voltages induced in the secondary windings of the two diamet-
rically opposite cores are connected in series-opposition. The
overall pickoff output is thus only sensitive to the angular
motions of the rotor relative to the case about the pickoff axis.
Summary of Capture Loop Technique
Pulse rebalance torquing with binary duty cycle modulation has
been selected by Litton for capturing the sensitive elements of
the inertial instruments (accelerometer and gyro). Pulse-torquing
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has significant advantages in terms of higher accuracy, less
complexity, higher reliability, and lower cost than other methods
considered. Other important advantages of pulse torquing are (I)
elimination of torquer nonlinearity, (2) constant torquer power
dissipation, and (3) elimination of linear power amplifiers.
Each axis of the G-6 gyro is captured using a simple single-axis
loop, i.e., the X pickoff drives the Y torquer, and the Y pickoff
drives the X torquer. A major disadvantage in using a dual-axis
approach (i.e., what is recommended in reference [3] where each
torquer is controlled by both pickoffs) is the rectification
effect from high current directed into the torquers at harmonics
of the spin speed. The dual-axis loop has relatively high gain
at frequencies above the bandwidth of the gyro and readily couples
the everpresent harmonic noise from a pickoff into the torquers.
This effect is compounded by the fact that the noise from both
pickoffs is directed into each torquer at high gain levels (with
considerably more circuitry required).
The single-axis capture loop (using a pure lag network with a
notch at spin speed) attains essentially the same bandwidth as
the dual-axis but reduces the torquer noise by two or more orders
of magnitude. In so doing, (i) the dynamic range is not degraded,
(2) torquer rectification effects become negligible, (3) the gyro
bias is insensitive to gain variations, and (4) much shorter
periods of time are required to ascertain drift rate since the
data channel is not dithered by noise. All this is gained simply,
more reliably, and at lower cost.
The predicted performance of single-axis control using pulse
torquing techniques has been verified by tests of the G-6 gyro.
Gyro Capture Loop Groundrules
In order to obtain superior performance from the strapdown system,
any significant errors generated at the gyro outputs and in subse-
quent computer processing must be minimized or compensated. With
this in mind, certain ground-rules have evolved from the tests
and studies of various capture loops for dry two-degree-of-freedom
gyros. These investigations have contributed to optimizing the
significant parameters affecting the quality of the gyro output.
Listed below are some of the critical factors which have been
considered in the design. These factors are especially relevant
with regard to realizing the advantages of pulse-torquing.
ao The noise level of the capture-loop signals which are
directed into the pulse-torquing networks should be low.
More specifically, both the noncoherent and spin-speed
coherent "noise" levels of the signal which controls the
pulse widths should be less than that required to switch
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from one discrete pulse-width level to the next. This
requirement of course, is a function of various factors
including bandwidth, pulse repetition frequency, and the
pulse modulation frequency.
b. The closed-loop dynamic behavior (bandwidth, relative
stability, etc.) must meet conditions which are compati-
ble with the gyro characteristics as well as with the
computer processing techniques. For instance, errors
associated with pickoff excursions, even if compensated,
should be minimized by insuring that the bandwidth is as
high as possible without unduly exceeding the computer
processing rate. Too high a bandwidth may torque the gyros
unnecessarily at frequencies which will not be processed
fast enough by the computer, and consequently the error
compensation by the computer would become ineffective.
c. The pulse-torquing resolution should be fine enough such
that initial alignment can be accomplished within the
desired period of time.
d. Asynchronous pulse-torquing is essential to eliminate any
shutdown unrepeatability which may occur as a function
of the rotor synch position. If the pulsing is syn-
chronous with the wheel speed, the torquing pulses act
upon the same portions of the rotor for each rotor revo-
lution. If the gyro is shut down and restarted, the
rotor may synch in a new position relative to the pulse
modulation frequency, and the torquing pulses would then
act upon different portions of the rotor; to negate this
effect, the pulsing is applied asynchronously relative
to the rotor speed.
Gyro Capture-Loop Des i@n
The basic equations for the G-6 strapdown gyro are presented in
Appendix D. Using these equations the general technique for
studying the capture-loops was developed and the above ground
rules were then incorporated as constraints.
The equations in Appendix D do not assume the simplifications
made for the gyro model in reference [3]. Those simplifying
approximations which were made (i) show nutation occurring at
twice the spin speed which is misleading, (2) will indicate that
no open-loop resonance will occur for rate inputs at this assumed
nutation frequency, which again is misleading, and (3) do not
involve the physical parameters of the gyro to facilitate studying
the effects of parameter variations.
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The equations in Appendix D allow for the real values of moment
of inertia and for the effective angular momentums H and Hc which
result from the rigorous derivation of the equations of motion for
dry tuned gyros as developed in reference [31]. The equations also
reduce to the standard equations applicable to TDF floated gyros,
in which case H = Hc(Fm_ _),_ + % D equals the flotation fluid
damping, and KD equals the pigtail spring rate.
To capture the rotor, torques MaX and May are applied as a func-
tion of the pickoff signals @X and By. Generally torque can be
applied about either axis (or both) from each pickoff. Therefore
torque about X and Y are functions of @X and By. The matrix in
equation (3) in Appendix D can be modified to include the torquing
function. To examine the capture loop behavior, the off-tuning
condition, damping and time-constant effect can be neglected,
i.e., let T _,D = 0 and AN = 0. Then from (3) in Appendix D,
v csI{x}
 -[HcS+ Is>] As2 + ey(Sl
nput
riving |
unctionsJ
(i)
where
FD(S) is the "direct-axis" gain and compensation and
Fc(S) is the "cross-axis" gain and compensation
Definitions of other terms are given in table 6-1.
The characteristic equation determined from the determinant of
the matrix on the left hand side of (i) is useful in assessing the
stability and behavior of the closed-loop. There are a number of
ways of analyzing this equation. Assuming that the,gain and com-
pensation are the same (symmetric) for both axes (F D = F D and
F C = FC) , the characteristic equation is:
IAS2 + FD(S)] 2 + [HcS + Fc(S)] 2 = 0
Note that this expression is in the form of:
p2(S) + Q2(S) = [p(s)- jQ(S)] [p(s) + jQ(S)] = 0 (2)
247
403314
A
C
D
F C
F D
FDC
F
m
G D , G C
H
H C
J
K
K D
Kp
K T
Max,May
MaXY
Mex,Mey
N
S
eX,@ Y
0Xy
_D, CC
%
rT
CX'¢y
TABLE 6-1. GYRO NOMENCLATURE
Rotor transverse moment of inertia
Rotor polar moment of inertia
Rotor damping relative to case
"Cross-axis" capture loop compensation
"Direct-axis" capture loop compensation
Composite complex compensation, FDC = F D - jF C
Figure of merit
Amplitude of pickoff error response
Angular momentum associated with rotor and case
rates relative to inertial space (0 x = by = 0)
Angular momentum associated with rotor rates
relative to the gyro case (¢X = CY = 0)
Complex notation for
Capture-loop gain factor
Gyro in-phase spring rate
Pickoff scale factor
Torquer scale factor
Torques applied to rotor (from torquer)
Vector form of applied rotor torque,
MaX Y = MaX + JMay
Disturbance or error torques
Rotor spin speed
Laplace variable
Angular displacements of the rotor relative to
the case (pickoff angles)
Vector form of gyro pickoff signal, 0Xy = _X + jSy
Phase of pickoff error response
Gyro dynamic time constant
Torquer electrical time constant
Angular displacements of the case relative to
inertial space
Vector form of case input, _XY = CX + JCY
Radian frequency
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and the roots of such an equation can be found from either factor
of equation (2). Any complex root in one factor will have its
complex conjugate in the other factor. With P(S) = AS 2 + FD(S)
and Q(S) = HcS + Fc(S), and by arbitrary choice of a factor in
(2).
P(S)- jQ(S) = [AS2 + FD(S)] - j [HcS + Fc(S) ] (3)
To find the roots of this factor as a function of the gains (by
root-locus techniques, for example) the form is:
FD(S) - JFc(S)
AS 2 - JHcS
= -i = 1/180 ° (4)
A new variable _Dc(S) can be defined which represents a complex
gain element.
FDc(S) = FD(S) - JFc(S) (5)
substituting (5) into (4)
FDC (S )
AS(S - JHc/A)
= 1/180 ° (6)
m
By trying various compensations, FDc(S), a suitable closed loop
response can be devel___oped. FD(S) can then be determined from
the real parts of FDc(S), and Fc(S) from the imaginary parts of
FDC (S ).
Another powerful mathematical technique* for examining stability
from the set of equations represented by (i) generates a transfer
function in complex form (vector form) for which the real parts
of the transfer function characterize the behavior of the rotor
about the X-axis, and the imaginary portion characterizes the
behavior about the Y-axis. By adding the first equation in (i)
to j times the second equation gives
[ As2 + FD(S)] [8 x
*See Ref. [34]
(S) + jSy (s)] + [HcS + Fc(S)][Sy(S)- J0x(S) ]
= (summation of driving terms) (7)
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By defining a new variable (in vector form) as follows:
8xy(S) = [Sx(S) + j@y(S)]
and substituting into the left hand side of (7) yields:
or,
i ÷
Note that the term in brackets is the same as in (3) and indeed
represents the characteristic determinant. This can then be put
in the same form as (5) and (6).
The importance of this analysis is that the input-output relation-
ships can now be determined by solving for 8xy(S) for any input
condition desired and noting that 0x(S) and 0y(S) can be obtained
separately (resolved) into the real parts and the imaginary parts
of @Xy(S). The resolved outputs can also be determined from:
8Xy + @XY 8XY- @XY
OX = 2 and 8y = 2j
where 8Xy = (8 X - jSy), the complex conjugate of 8Xy.
Input driving functions for (7) will also be in the form of
_xy(S) or _Xy(S), where any symbol in the form of fXY is defined
aN :
fXY = fx + J fY and fXY = fx - J fY (8)
Note also that the feedback torques MaX and May are (in vector
form), dropping the Laplace operator S,
MaX ¥ = MaX + JMay = -FDc 8Xy
= -(F D - JFc) (8 x + jSy)
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and that :
_Max = FD ex + FC 8y
-May = FD 8y - FC 8X
(Real parts)
(Imaginary parts)
(9)
or in matrix form:
Mayj FC F
The sign of the feedback was chosen with some forethought with
regard to stability, and this resulted in the form _DC(S) instead
of FDC(S). The signs of the feedback, of course, could be
arbitrary, but the stability of the closed loop would reflect the
choice as a positive or negative feedback. The stability analysis
would reveal the desired choice, however.
A block diagram of the captured gyro is shown in figure 6-4.
This block diagram represents equations (i) and (2) from Appen-
dix D, with equation (9) above substituted for Max and May.
Using this block diagram the optimum compensation can be deter-
mined. Certain characteristics of the compensation are essential
if the basic ground rules are to be met, for instance, it is
desirable to include integral gain in the capture loop (type I
servo) to insure a negligible hang-off error for constant input
rates. A notch at the gyro spin speed is also desirable. The
"noise" signal which may be generated at spin speed is charac-
teristic to all tuned rotor gyros and is nominally minimized by
mechanical adjustments on the gyro rotor. However, to allow for
greater freedom in the mechanical adjustment a notch is provided
to reject this signal.
With these factors in mind the characteristic equation for the
dynamic behavior can be developed. From equation (6):
_DC (s)
AS (S - JHc/A)
= 1 /180 ° (6)
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where:
F--_c(S) = FD(S) -JFc(S)
Hc/A is the nutation frequency n
FD(S) is the gain and compensation for direct-axis
torquing, i.e., X pickoff driving the X-torquer,
and Y-pickoff driving the Y-torquer
Fc(S) is the gain and compensation for cross-axis
torquing
From basic principles of gyrodynamics, torques which act on the
rotor at low frequencies cause gyroscopic precession on an axis
at riqht angles to the applied torque vector, but at the higher
frequencies (near and beyond the nutation frequency) the gyro
rotor acts more like a pure inertia and the rotor tends to dis-
place about the same axis as the torque vector. This character-
istic suggests using a pure gain for the cross-axis compensation
Fc(S) and a lead term for the direct-axis compensation FD(S).
This approach is indeed optimum for capturing the gyro rotor to
obtain high bandwidth, but generally uses more components to
mechanize than the normal capture loops which Litton uses for
rebalance. The standard capture loop is mechanized with only the
"gyroscopic" cross-torquing function Fc(S) and the loop essen-
tially meets all the requirements desired. If extremely high
bandwidth is found to be advantageous, then the direct-axis
torquing function FD(S) can easily be included but caution is
advised since the torquer noise will be high.
After examining the capture-loop compensation suggested in ref-
erence [3] which incorporated direct-axis capture, it has been
concluded that the network was synthesized solely for its control
characteristics without any concern for noise considerations.
A plot of the frequency response in reference [3] shows gains
which are more than two orders of magnitude higher at the har-
monics of spin speed than at the lower, controlled frequencies.
The generation of relatively high output signals at these fre-
quencies probably explains why the test data in reference [3]
shows rotor excursions which are more than three times the theor-
etical value (12 mrad/rad/sec peak values instead of approximately
4 mrad/rad/sec) since the gain was probably limited to values
much less than that desired.
This shows the importance of rolling-off lead networks at as low
a frequency as possible after they have served their purpose, or
noise will become a very serious problem.
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Dual-axis Capture-Loop Compensation
The optimum dual-axis capture loop compensation is shown below.
The gains are rolled-off as soon as possible after the required
lead near the nutation frequency (for the direct-axis). The
gain beyond the notch is only slightly higher at its peak than
at midband (but orders of magnitude lower beyond the notch than
the gain suggested in reference [3]) . Let:
w
FDc(S) _ K (S 2 + N2)(S - jN) (i0)
(S + 5N)2(S 2 + 2_ NS + N 2)
then
FD(S) =
KS (S2 + N 2)
(S + 5N)2(S 2 + 2_ NS + N2)
and
Fc(S) KN (S 2 + N 2)
(S + 5N)2(S 2 + 2_ NS + N 2)
Note that the direct-compensation has no gain at DC and acts as a
lead term at higher frequencies. The cross-compensation is effec-
tive at DC but rolls off at higher frequencies. The electronic
circuitry for realizing this compensation is shown in figure 6-5.
The frequency responses for these compensations are shown in
figure 6-6 with _ = 0.3.
Equation (i0) is substituted into equation (6) and a root-locus
plot is drawn. The optimum closed-loop gain is selected and the
gain factor K is determined.
Closed Loop Frequency Res_nse
Using the gain and compensation determined by the root-locus the
closed-loop frequency responses can be evaluated for the pickoff
error signals 8x and 8y and the rebalance torque Max and May as
a function of input angular rates _x and Sy. A computer program
was developed which solves the block diagram shown in figure 6-4.
The values of FD(S) and Fc(S) above were used; in addition inte-
gral gain was included, with lead recovery at 60 rad/sec. Plots
of these responses are shown in figures 6-7 and 6-8.
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Single-Axis Capture-Loop Compensation
The recommended method of capture is to implement only the cross-
axis compensation Fc(S). The reasons for this conclusion have
been previously stated. Since a notch is used at the spin-speed,
the bandwidth of the gyro is certainly limited to less than spin-
speed using either capture loop approach. The bandwidth obtained
in either case is also more than adequate for the system.
The following compensation is found to be optimum for single-axis
capture :
Fc(S ) -
S
2
_ K [(S/N) + i] (S + 55) , FD(S) = 0
_S/2N) + i] 3 _S/N)2 + (2< S/N)+ i]
This compensation is characterized by a twin-T notch at spin speed
N, three lags at twice the spin speed, a low-Q bandpass at spin
speed (4 = 0.03), and integral gain with lead recovery at about
9 Hz. The frequency response for the compensation itself is
shown in figure 6-9. It can be seen that there is a high rejec-
tion of signals beyond the bandwidth since this compensation con-
sists primarily of lag networks. It is important that the phase
of the torque at nutation be more than 90 Q lagging behind the
pickoff to guarantee damping at this frequency. Tests using this
circuit show extremely low noise for such a high bandwidth.
Frequency response plots for the pickoff error signal and rebal-
ance torque are shown in figures 6-10 to 6-13.
6.2.2 G_ro Rebalance Loop Electronics
The basic design approach to rebalance the inertial strapdown
sensors is through pulse duration modulation, a well known tech-
nique which provides direct digital output while still maintaining
superior linearity and environmental capability. The basic block
diagram of a loop is shown in figure 6-14. Functionally, vehicle
angular motion produces a signal out of the gyro pickoff. This
signal is amplified, demodulated, filtered and then compared with
a sawtooth signal to produce a time modulated rebalance current
through the gyro torquer to balance the input motion. This loop
is basically a servo system which nulls the pickoff. The gyro
torquer is electrically part of an "H" bridge arrangement. A
constant current source, which is driven from a precision voltage
reference, is switched by control signals from the voltage to
pulse converter. Figure 6-15 shows a representation of the bridge
arrangement. A higher voltage is switched into the bridge during
large angular rates of the vehicle.
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The operation of the loop can be understood with the aid of fig-
ure 6-16. Input vehicle motions generate an error signal which
is summed with a sawtooth waveform of a basic 2K Hz period called
the limit cycle frequency. At the start of each limit cycle, the
torquer current is positive until the error signal is equal to
the sawtooth. The torquer current is then switched (by switching
the torquer) to remain in the opposite direction until the end of
the limit cycle. At time T, the bridge is again switched to a
positive direction until another comparison is made during the
second limit cycle. The net result is a current waveform whose
average value is equivalent to that required to null the pickoff.
Average current is therefore synchronous with the crossover time.
The master clock data pulses are synchronous with the limit cycle
frequency. Since the bridge is permitted to be switched only at
an integral number of clock pulses, the number of clock pulses
between the start of the limit cycle and the time the bridge is
switched is an extremely accurate measurement of average rebal-
ance torque. The clock pulses (409.6 K Hz) and converter control
signal are then fed to a counter in the serial data section to
provide the equivalent incremental change in angle (Aes) in digi-
tal form to the computer. For a 2.048 K Hz limit cycle with a
409.6 K Hz data pulse rate, zero pulses per limit cycle repre-
sents full negative input rate, 200 pulses per limit cycle repre-
sents full positive input rate.
The electrical design success is predicated upon having an
extremely accurate and stable rebalance current. Therefore all
circuits associated with this function are considered critical.
In general, all circuits employ state-of-the-art solid-state
monolithic integrated circuits to the extent that available com-
ponetns are capable of performing the required task. Where per-
formance requirements are beyond the capability of monol_thic
circuits, hybrids are employed. Discrete components are used
where the ultimate in performance demands their use. All circuits
are designed to meet the most stringent applicable specifications.
The input (front-end) section of each pulse-rebalance loop employs
presently existing, well-proven, production hybrid circuits. The
H-switch uses FET technology to minimize current imbalance between
the two switched output current directions and to minimize leakage
and base-drive-current contamination at the torquer coil. This
coil is RC tuned to cause the winding to appear as a purely resis-
tive load to the current switch, preventing switching transients
from appearing at the current source.
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6.2.3 A-1000 Accelerometer and Loop Dynamics
Description
The A-1000 accelerometer, figure 6-17 is a flexure-supported,
pendulous, torque-to-balance instrument characterized by sim-
plicity, small size, and high precision. Its design has a
demonstrated capability of withstanding a wide range of operational
environments. Key design features are:
a. Extremely simple, small, and lightweight.
b. Low threshold, providing excellent gyrocompass
performance.
c. Single metalization pattern forming capacitive pickoff
plates, circuitry, and flexure.
d. Minimal thermal lag.
Excellent rapid reaction and extremely low temperature sensitivity
is achieved by a combination of mechanical design and electrical
compensation.
Principle of Operation
The sensitive element of the accelerometer is a disc supported by
flexures which permit rotation about a diameter. The disc is
made pendulous by the addition of a weight which displaces the
center of gravity in the plane of the disc and normal to the
hinge axis. Accelerations perpendicular to the plane of the disc
result in rotation about the hinge axis. This rotation is sensed
by the capacitive pickoff which produces a phase-sensitive signal
proportional to the angular displacement. This output is ampli-
fied and is compared with a ramp which pulse-width-modulates the
error signal in digital increments. This signal is used to control
the timing of the current switches which produce precise amplitude
current pulses whose timing is related to the loop error signal
and drive the accelerometer torquer coil. The current in the
torquer magnet produces a torque equal and opposite to the accel-
eration induced torque.
A-1000 Loop Dynamics
A block diagram representing the dynamics of the A-1000 is shown
in figure 6-18. This model includes (a) the back EMF generated
by the torquer, (b) the circuit placed in parallel with the
torquer for optimizing the pulse-torqued wave-shape, and (c) the
resonance and anti-resonance (node) of the suspension.
By using standard servo techniques the optimum gain and phase was
determined. A computer was programmed to determine the frequency
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responses for this configuration. Figure 6-19, shows the pickoff
excursion (proof mass rotation relative to the case) for applied
accelerations.
Figure 6-20 relates the frequency response for acceleration
inputs. For a pulse-torquedsystem this is determined by noting
the output Vo (to the pulse-torquing network) for acceleration
inputs Z o. Definitions of the various terms are given in
table 6.2 •
6.2.4 Accelerometer Rebalance Electronics
The accelerometer rebalance electronics are virtually identical to
that of the gyro. Loop gain and compensation and torquer current
levels are different, however. The accelerometer circuit imple-
mentation is simpler since a less sophisticated transfer function
is needed, and dual-mode current level is not required.
Table 6-3 gives pertinent information on the accelerometer digital
rebalance loop.
6.2.5 IMM/Computer Interface
The IMM/Computer interface functions as a pulse accumulator for
the two gyro and two accelerometer data channels. Parallel pulse
data from the accelerometers and gyros is counted at a 409.6 KHz
clock rate. Data is gathered for a period of 7. 8125 msec. At
the completion of each data gathering period an interrupt is gen-
erated to the computer which functions as a real-time clock
(128 Hz) and cues the system software to retrieve the accumulated
pulse data from this channel and all other channels.
Accumulation of pulse data is performed with a "micro-processor"
up-down counter as illustrated in figure 6-21.
Pulse data are sampled each data clock time; a data level of "i"
causes the counter to count up while a data level of "0" causes
it to count down. For the gyro signals, a Hi-Mode discrete is
sampled which applies a scale factor to the accumulated pulses.
Pulses are accumulated for one data gathering period and the
resultant count is stored for computer readout. The counters are
zeroed at the start of each data gathering period and the process
is repeated.
In addition to the four accumulated gyro and accelerometer data
channels, a self-test channel will be implemented to help detect
any faults. This channel will always count up at each clock time.
This function, when accessed by the computer at the end of a data
gathering period, will always yield the same value when the system
is functioning properly.
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TABLE 6-2. ACCELEROMETER NOMENCLATURE
B
G
JOA,JIA,JPA
Kf
Kp
K T
K@
L
m, n, q, C
OA, IA, PA
P
R
Y
o
_b
w
_A
_b
_L
w
0
_t
Damping about output axis
Gain of servo compensation
Moments of inertia of sensitive element about
OA, IA and PA respectively
Torquer back-emf coefficient
Pickoff scale factor
Torquer scale factor
Torsional spring rate of suspension
Torquer inductance
Coefficients for impedance function Zp for
tuning circuit across torquer coil
Output axis, input axis, and pendulous axis
Pendul os i ty
Torquer resistance
Equivalent DC admittance for pulse-torquing
Damping factors of structural frequencies
Damping factor for _b
Damping factor for _i
Lead recovery frequency for integral gain
Demodulator roll-off frequency
Complex-lag natural frequency
Lead frequency
Mechanical node frequency
Open-loop pendulous oscillation frequency
Structural resonant frequency
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TABLE 6-3,.
PARAMETER
SENSORLOOPOPERATIONALPARAMETERS
ACCELEROMETER
Maximum range
Usable range
Pulse repetition rate
Pulse weight (scale factor)
Pulse width
Pulse modulation frequency
Sensor stops
Torquer current
12 g's
Ii g's
409.6 KHz
-45.88 x I0
ft/sec)/pulse
2.5 _sec
4.096 KHz
±3 mr
20 ma
m/sec (0.00193
A RAMwithin the microprocessor is used as a memory device. This
memory is partitioned into two sectors, a "count-memory" and a
storage memory. During a data-gathering period, one sector
accumulates counts from the accelerometers and gyros while the
other sector stores the data from the previous data gathering
period. After completion of a data gathering period the two
sectors change functions and the first sector becomes available
for computer readout. The storage memory sector is zeroed as it
transitions to a "count-memory" sector. Management of the RAM
memory functions is done within the control logic function of
the microprocessor.
In addition, the IMM/Computer interface will be capable of trans-
ferring factory derived instrument constants from local PROMs
within the IMM to the software. Temperature sensor data (from
A/D converters) will also utilize this interface. Data paths
for all these variables may be routed through the same "micro-
processor" up-down counter.
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6.2.6 Computer Description
The computer for the redundant strapdown INS will be assumed to
have an architecture similar to the Litton 4516 family of com-
puters. In production since the early '70's, this family of
microprogrammable Central Processing Units has been used exten-
sively in various system configurations, notably B-I RFS/ECMs,
AGM-86A (SCAD), LN-33 (F-5E), MPU (CP-I149 for DD-963), TEREC
(RF-4), and ECU (DD-963).
Designed to economically satisfy a wide range of applications,
the 4516 architecture employs a microprogrammable control struc-
ture that provides design flexibility and growth to an extended
instruction set through the reprogramming of PROMs within its
control structure. The 4516 is a 16-bit, fully parallel general
purpose digital computer. Its basic instruction length is 16 bits
but a full complement of 32 bit instructions is also included,
permitting a powerful selection of addressing modes. Arithmetic
processing includes provisions for both single (16-bit) and
double (32-bit) precision arithmetic as well as a complete set
of logical operations.
Maximum size of storage addressable by the 4516 family is 65,536
words. The dominant mode of addressing is relative through the
use of base/index registers. However, all four modes of address-
ing are provided; direct, indirect, relative and immediate.
The computer proposed for the strapdown INS will be mechanized
utilizing LSI circuits, solid state Random Access memories (RAMS)
for temporary storage of dynamic system variables, non-volatile
solid-state Read-Only-Memories (ROMs) for microprogram control
and instruction memories. The RAM power will be battery-supported
for storage of system variables that need to be retained after
power has been turned off.
Various hardware implementation approaches utilizing microprocessor
LSI circuits from the semiconductor industry are applicable.
Companies active in this field include Fairchild, Intel, Advanced
Micro Devices, Texas Instruments, American Microsystems, Inc. ,
and National Semiconductor. All of the currently available micro-
processor designs, with the exception of the AMD AM2901 which
utilizes a low-power Schottky TTL process are somewhat marginal
for the strapdown problem.
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COMPUTER PROCESSING UNIT (CPU)
The following description is an example of the type of micro-
processors that are currently available in the semiconductor
marketplace. AMD's AM2900 microprocessor system consists of a
family of bipolar LSI building blocks that can be configured in
numerous system configurations. Figure 6-22 is a functional
block diagram of a typical central processor unit (CPU) using
microprogrammed high-speed bipolar microprocessor circuits.
The heart of the system is the AM2901 bipolar microprocessor
(figure 6-23). This four-bit element consists of a 16-word by
four-bit two-port random access memory, a high speed arithmetic
and logic unit and associated shifting, decoding and multiplexing
circuitry. Four such chips are used to form the data path portion
of the CPU. All machine level data operations (i.e., add, sub-
tract, multiply, divide, etc.) are performed utilizing these
chips.
Control of the CPU is performed primarily with the microprogrammed
PROM memory and the microcode sequencer which is used to control
the microstep operations within each instruction cycle. The
microprogrammed memory contains 256 28-bit words and is provided
by seven 256 x 4 bit PROMS. (For production machines, it may be
more cost effective to replace this part with a comparable ROM.)
The A/B address registers control the data sources of the Random
Access Memory (RAM) within the microprocessor. This RAM con-
tains the program counters (old and new values), the base register,
the general registers (9), the accumulators, and the stack and
Z registers as required by the 4516 architecture. Data in any
of the 16 words of the RAM can be read from the A-port of the
RAM as controlled by the 4-bit, A-address field. Likewise, data
in any of the 16 words of the RAM as defined by the four-bit
B-address field can be simultaneously read from the B-port of the
RAM. (See figure 6-23.)
When enabled by the RAM write enable signal, new data is written
into the 16-bit word defined by the B-address field. The RAM
data input field is driven by a three-input multiplexer which
allows shifting of the ALU output if desired.
The ALU can perform any of three binary arithmetic or five logical
operations on the two inputs (R, S) of the ALU. The R-field is
driven from a two-input multiplexer, while the S field is driven
from a three-input multiplexer. Both multiplexers have an inhibit
capability in which no data is passed. This multiplexer scheme
gives the capability of selecting a large number of source
operand pairs together with the eight possible operations to yield
a very powerful microprocessor. The output of the ALU is con-
trolled by microcode bits which route the ALU function to either
//
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Figure 6-23. 4-Bit Bipolar Microprocessor Slice
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the output register, the Q register, or the RAM. In combination
with the input multiplexers of the RAM and Q register, this
microcode enables the processor to perform the necessary micro-
steps of more complicated functions such as multiply and divide.
AMD also provides a look-ahead carry generator (AM2902) chip
which provides the capability of multi-level look-ahead operation
for high speed arithmetic operation over large word lengths (i.e.
larger than four-bits). This chip has a typical propagation
delay of approximately six nsec.
The AM2918 Quad D-type flip-flop register provides additional
flexibility in system configurations. It is used in typical
designs as the address register, the instruction register, the
status register, and the data output register. Both three-state
and standard totem-pole outputs are provided for interfacing with
data buses or for internal registers.
Thus the entire central processing unit for a complex 16-bit
machine can be implemented using this family of LSI components
in conjunction with some standard SSI circuitry for clock and
control.
A summary of the 4516 General Characteristics is given in
table 6-4.
The LC-4516 instruction set consists of 49 instructions. These
are grouped into nine load and store, 9 logic and arithmetic,
8 transfer, and 23 register-to-register, I/O, and control. The
main features of each of these four groups are as follows:
Load and Store (9 total)
• 16, 32-bit lengths
Logic and Arithmetic (9 total)
• 16 and 32-bit fixed-point add/subtract
• 16 and 32 bit fixed point multiply
• Overflow and fault detection
• High-speed multiply and divide
• Double-add-of-carry for 64-bit summing
Transfer (8 total)
• Minus, zero, register test conditionals
• Automatic PC save and return
• Increment-test-transfers
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TABLE 6-4. 4516 GENERALCHARACTERISTICS
Word Lengths
Instruction Type
Computation Process
Data Format
Input-Output
Addressing Range
Addressing Modes
16 or 32 bits (data word)
16 bits (instruction word)
Single-address, single instruction,
indexable
Parallel
Fixed-point, fractional
binary 2's complement
Programmable I/O
Direct Memory Access
External Interrupt System
65,536 words
Direct Address
Relative Addressing
Indirect
Base Addressing
Indexing
Literal
Register-Register
Number of Instructions 49
Register-to-Register, Shift, and I/O (23 total)
• Compare register-to-register
• Copy/exchange register-to-register
• Add/Sub register-to-register
• Single/double-length shifts
• Complements
• Input/output to/from accumulator
• Double-length normalization
• Interrupt mask control
• Hardware/software reset/restart
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Utilizing microprocessing chips with the assumed speed
characteristics, the instruction speeds of table 6-5 are
achievable.
TABLE 6-5. TYPICAL INSTRUCTION TIMES
Microprocessor Cycle Time
Memory Cycle Time
Memory Access Time
Load/Store
Add/Subtract/Logical (16 bits)
Double Precision Add/Sub (32 bits)
Multiply
Double Precision Multiply
Divide
Transfers
100 nsec
600 nsec
200 nsec
1.4 usec
1.4 usec
2.2 usec
3.2 usec
ii.0 usec
3.4 usec
1.0 usec
MEMORY SYSTEM
The memory requirements for the system are as follows:
MEMORY TYPE NO. WORDS (16-bit)
Random Access Memory (RAM)
Read Only Memory (ROM)
1024
8192
In addition, there is a microprogram control store memory require-
ment which is considered a part of the Control Processing Unit.
Random Access Memory (RAM)
The RAM memory chosen for this application is a high-speed
CMOS-SOS static storage device which is organized as 1024
words x 4-bit with an access time of 200 nsec and a cycle time
of 300 nsec. The chip uses DC stable (static) circuitry and
requires no clocks or refreshing to operate. Data are read out
nondestructively and are compatible with TTL circuits in all
respects. While devices of this storage capacity are not yet
available, it is assumed that they will be so by the time the
redundant strapdown INS begins its final design phase.
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Each RAM memory interfaces with the other three computers in the
system via memory ports as shown in figure 6-2. Also, the
microprocessor is tentatively organized as a 3 bus system: an
address bus, a data input bus and a data output bus. These
internal busses communicate with all the functional elements
(i.e. the ROMs, the IMM interface, and the external memory con-
troller, etc.) of the individual channel. The port method of
intercomputer interfacing provides read-only capability for the
other channels in the redundant system. Priority control logic
in the memory unit assures that multiple requests can be effec-
tively serviced and that a failed channel cannot swamp out or
nullify any other channel. A battery is also provided, normally
in a charge mode, for data non-volatility.
Read-Only Memory (ROM)
The ROM for each channel is mechanized with LSI chips contained
in 24 pin dual-in-line packages that have 16K memory elements/
chip organized in a 2048 words x 8 bits/word configuration. The
ROM memory requires only eight mask-programmable LSI chips.
Instructions and constants are permanently stored in the devices
by use of a special metallization pattern supplied to the vendor.
The ROM memory elements feature advanced Schottky processing,
low power dissipation (0.5w) and fast access time (200 nsec).
Cycle time is 600 nsec. The LSI chips are organized in a 4 x 2
matrix to form an 8192 word x 16-bit memory. The output is tri-
state and similar outputs of each column are connected together.
All devices except the pair selected are placed in the high
impedance state thus giving the output the characteristics of a
TTL totem pole output.
6.2.7 Input/Output System Description
Communication with the external aircraft system will be repli-
cated in all four channels. It has been designated to be all-
digital, serial and in the format defined in ARINC 575. It is
assumed that the output transmission system of each channel will
be directed at another avionics subsystem that can accept the
four outputs and perform its own voting and fault-masking
routines. In addition, each channel will accept inputs from
three separate transmission systems. This is consistent with the
concept that failure in any element of one channel will cause the
failure of that channel but not the failure of another channel.
The ARINC 575 digital message format consists of a serial trans-
mission scheme in which data, word synchronization and clock are
transmitted over a single pair of wires at a frequency of
ii ± _[_ KHz. Each word consists of 32 bits with a minimum of
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four bit lengths (91 +42/-14 usec) of blanks (zero voltage)
between words. The data word can be either in a binary coded
decimal (BCD) data format or a fractional two's complement binary(BNR) format. In either case the eight Least Significant Bits
(LSB's) of the word contain address/label information while the
rest of the word (24 bits) contains the data and a two-bit coded
designation matrix indicating sign and validity information. In
the case of binary data, the Most Significant Bit (MSB) is used
for odd parity checking. Details of the transmission scheme are
found in ARINC 575.
Three receivers will be provided in each channel. One receiver
will provide altitude information, and the second receiver will
provide initial position and mode information from an avionics
display unit. This input will be used only at system start up or
infrequently in flight for mode changes. The third receiver is
provided for interfacing with another avionics subsystem in
order to provide position and velocity up-date information.
6.2.8 Power Supply and Support Electronics
The remainder of electronics needed to complete a redundant
strapdown INS is shown in block diagram form in figure 6-24.
Primary aircraft power is converted to DC which is used to derive
the various voltages needed by the electronic components. It is
also used to charge the battery which provides the backup power
in the event of aircraft power interruptions.
Mode sequencing circuits are used to initiate gyro spin power
when power supply voltages are stabilized and close gyro and
accelerometer digital rebalance loops when gyro motors are up to
speed.
Self-test circuits monitor critical gyro, accelerometer, and
power supply signals. When a failure is detected, the computer
is sent an interrupt so it can perform its shutdown subroutine,
and a failure indication is provided to other aircraft avionics.
A variety of frequency references are provided by the crystal
oscillator and countdown circuitry for such things as instrument
pickoff excitation, gyro spin power, digital rebalance loop con-
trol, I/O circuit counting and timing, computer clock, the soft-
ware executive interrupt, and a computer-read time word used in
the solution of the equations to compensate for computational
time delays. A watch-dog timer is also incorporated, reset
periodically by software. If a problem develops and software
cannot reset the timer, self-test circuits are activated to
indicate a computer failure. This timer is run off a separate
oscillator to be able to detect main crystal oscillator failures.
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The software executive interrupt pulses between the four com-
puters are synchronized with the included logic circuitry.
Since a minimum IMM/computer I/O implementation is achieved with
computer interrupts derived by count-down from gyro/accelerometer
marker pulses, synchronization at this level is also desirable.
Circuit design of this element is also subject to the fail-op/
fail-op requirement. Failure modes which cause loss of interrupt
pulses or non-synchronization of more than one channel must be
avoided.
6.2.9 Self-Test
The self-test requirements for the redundant strapdown INS are
reduced from those of a single-string system. Voting methods
provide very effective, high-coverage failure detection and
isolation for both fail-op levels.
Self-test goals are:
To prevent chain-type failure modes which could lead
to extensive equipment or aircraft damage.
To provide a high level of capability of detecting
failures of each gyro to reduce the probability of a
failure occurring within the 3-gyro isolation
singularities.
To contribute to making the third failure a fail-safe
condition, that is, to indicate to the aircraft flight
crew that a failure has occurred.
To provide information to maintenance personnel for use
in determining the failed module for repair.
Because of the high effectiveness of redundancy management, a
minimum amount of circuitry should be used for self-test, except
for that needed to protect the equipment against self-destruction.
The main self-test features providing this protection are in the
power supply. Over-voltage, under-voltage, and over-current
detectors sense potentially destructive conditions and shut down
channel power. An interrupt is sent to the computer which then
executes a shut-down subroutine, as shown in the system block
diagram of figure 6-2.
Gyro self-tests consist of loop closure monitors which detect
uncontrolled pickoff excursions, a high rate mode timer which
indicates a failure if a gyro axis is in the high rate mode for
an unreasonable length of time, and a wheel pickoff monitor which
detects differences between actual and synchronous spin speed.
Accelerometer self-test consists of a pickoff monitor to detect
loop closure problems. Temperature sensors amplifiers detect
open and short circuit conditions.
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The digital subsystem has a variety of simple test provisions.
IMM/computer I/O has a separate self-test input channel, other
digital I/O has simple wrap-around provisions and parity tests
as applicable, the computer cycle is checked with the watch-dog
timer, the instrument PROMwould have test words and parity bits.
The A/D converter has a separate, constant DC reference channel.
A computer software subroutine provides assistance to hardware
provisions by means of wrap-around comparisons, comparison of
reference or test inputs to expected values, and reasonable-
ness tests on temperature and other measurement data. Software
memory and op-code tests are also performed.
Mode/BITE logic assembles hardware self-test results into a word
available for input into the computer during a power supply shut-
down interrupt. Software self-test and redundancy management
results are also available in non-volatile memory for subsequent
review by maintenance personnel during repair. Failure of either
type actuates a failure indicator, visible from the front of the
unit.
6.2.10 Packaqing Design
General Concept
Estimates were made of electronics needed to implement one com-
plete channel of the redundant strapdown INS. From the numbers
of printed circuit boards and power supply components, a pre-
liminary packaging design was conceived, shown in figure 6-25.
One channel of the redundant strapdown INS, consisting of one
gyro, two accelerometers, supporting electronics, a computer with
I/O, and a power supply is expected to fit within the dimensions
of 0.36 m x 0.ii m x 0.19 m, and weigh approximately 5.9 Kg.
Cam-lock handles are used to engage the rear-mounting connector
and lock the unit in place.
A mechanism is required to withdraw the instrument block to allow
the unit to slide freely into or out of a holding chassis/mount
during maintenance. For this purpose, the instrument block is
attached to the chassis by means of a pivoted lever. The pivot,
shown in figure 6-25, is fixed to the chassis.
During insertion or removal, the return spring causes the instru-
ment block to be held so the alignment feet are kept within the
unit. When the unit is locked in place, the engagement lever is
depressed by external means, causing motion of the instrument
block, in the direction shown in figure 6-25. The alignment feet
then protrude from the side of the unit to engage a precision
alignment block for precise registration between gyros and to
the aircraft.
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Figure 6-26 shows one of the Inertial Navigation Modules (INM)
installed into a common chassis/mount. The orientations of the
other three INM's are rotated 90 ° from each other to provide the
required gyro axis skewing. An actuator assembly on the front
of the chassis/mount is used to depress the engagement lever
within each INM following installation. The INM instrument block
is then pressed against a central alignment block in the center
of the chassis/mount assembly.
The actuator assembly and alignment block are more clearly shown
in figure 6-27. The 90 ° rotation of the INM rectangular shape
leaves a hollow core in the chassis mount. This area is then
available for installation of the actuator assembly and alignment
block. Figure 6-27 also shows a view of instrument blocks in the
withdrawn and depressed conditions.
Figure 6-28 shows the G-6 gyro and A-I000 accelerometers with
the remainder of the instrument block. A printed circuit card
would also be attached containing critical portions of the
rebalance loops. Thus these components would thermally track
the instruments, avoiding the need for separate calibration.
The size of the entire fail-op/fail-op redundant INS is expected
to be 0.33 m x 0.33 m x 0.36 m. Weight would be under 28 Kg.
Elaborate measures were not taken for size reduction since low-
cost is a major system design requirement.
Instrument Alignment Mechanism
Alignment from gyro-to-gyro is required to be better than 20 arc
seconds, including long term effects of handling by maintenance
personnel. The baseline design was selected to provide proximity
between instruments thus minimizing bending between modules due
to temperature gradients or g-loading.
Alignment repeatability requirements will dictate the final
design of the alignment mechanism. Forces on the block stemming
from the actuator must be analyzed with regard to potential
friction forces which might prevent proper seating of the instru-
ment block alignment feet onto the chassis/mount block. Wear
effects and thermal gradient susceptibility need consideration
in the selection of material and finishes. In addition, pres-
sures produced by the mechanism would need to be analyzed under
vibration conditions to avoid angular block-to-block motions
which could produce system errors.
Alignment of the instruments relative to the aircraft is much
less critical. Six arc minute alignment accuracy can be achieved
using normal bore-sight and installation techniques.
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Thermal Design
Power dissipation within each INM is expected to be under 135
watts. New ARINC 600 cooling provisions need review for the
unique installation requirements of the redundant, skewed-sensor
INS.
The preliminary packaging design included provision for the draw-
ing of cabin air through openings in the front of each INM.
Some sealing of the face of the INM against the chassis/mount is
needed to avoid air pressure losses. Since ARINC cooling has
such a low pressure drop, highly effective sealing is not
needed.
The cooling air flow directly impinges electronic components and
the cover of the instrument block. It then exits at the rear of
the chassis mount, which forms a plenum between units for even
pressure and flow distribution. While impingement cooling is
undesirable due to potential contamination, it is very effective.
Installation of filters on the front of each INM, as used on
present commercial INS, would prevent some of the internal
contamination. Other methods should be reviewed in the final
design for optimum balance between maximum component temperature
(and thus reliability), contamination and unit cost.
Structural Design
Sufficient structural rigidity must be provided to avoid self-
destruction or damage during the normal and emergency shock and
vibration incurred during flight and handling. The preliminary
design has not included analysis for these factors. However,
the general concepts and size are expected to apply for the
required environment.
Special Test Equipment Constraints
The equipment used in the factory for calibration of an INM
includes a high-cost, computer-controlled rate table. In order
to defray cost of this item, it is essential that it be fully
occupied, day and night. It is thus also essential that the
capability of calibrating more than one INM at a time be
provided.
The volume and form available on this table is limited. It
appears on a preliminary basis that 3 INM's can be installed on
the table side-by-side. There is no room, however, to include
mounting hardware between units for the side-engagement of the
instrument block. It would be preferable to provide instrument
block engagement at the rear or connector end of the INM if
possible. This will require further analysis during the final
design phase.
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6.3 Software Design
The major divisions of software are:
a. Instrument Compensation
b. FDI - Design Equation
c. Coordinate Conversion
d. Navigation
These major divisions have been further divided into smaller
blocks of software to increase computational throughput. Fig-
ure 6-29 illustrates the minor software blocks and denotes the
repetition rates.
The INM software has been organized to enable interchangeability
of computers. Only the plug-in instrument calibration coeffi-
cient programmable read-only memory (PROM) would be a unique
circuit. Since the software in each INM is interchangeable,
some means of identifying the particular position in the semi-
octahedron is necessary. This is accomplished by hard-wire
programming of the system interconnection harness. The system
harness is wired into a computer input discrete word. Upon power
turn-on the computer program pre-alignment routine will initialize
pointers to enable branching to the section of software pertinent
to the individual INM.
6.3.1 Computational Considerations
Assuming that a 16-bit diqital computer is utilized for this
application, a standard set of double precision instructions is
required. In addition, a hardware double precision (32 x 32)
multiply is very useful.
A computer throughput of 198,000 instructions per second is
required to perform the redundant strapdown INS problem with a
double precision multiply instruction along with the instruction
mix of table 6-6. If this DMPY instruction were not available,
approximately 460,000 instructions per second are required with
the instruction mix of table 6-6, using normal programming tech-
niques. These throughput estimates are based on actual LN-50
coding.
Applying this same instruction mix to a state-of-the-art computer
in table 6-7, results in a duty cycle estimate (the ratio of the
strapdown throughput requirement to the computer throughput
capability) of 60 percent. Note that if a double precision multi-
ply instruction were not available, the computer would be quite
marginal in this application. However, with this instruction,
approximately 132,000 spare instructions/second are available
for other computations, assuming the same instruction mix.
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TABLE 6-6. INSTRUCTION MIX FOR REDUNDANTSTRAPDOWNINS
Type
Percentages With
Double-Multiply
Instruction
Percentages Without
Double-Multiply
Instruction
Load/Store 11.9 20.3
D-Load/Store 31.8 18.2
Copy 5.5 7.4
Exchange 4.2 1.6
D-Shift 9.1 14.0
Add/Sub 10.5 9.4
D-Add/Sub 13.1 10.4
Multiply 6.4 10.2
D-Multiply 5.5 --
Divide 0.6 0.2
Transfer 1.4 8.3
6.3.2 Equation Summary
The following paragraphs summarize the equations of the flight
software. The coordinate frames and a glossary are included.
Preliminary computer software flow charts are presented in
Appendix H.
6.3.2.1 Instrument Compensation
Figure 6-30 illustrates the compensation computations per single
channel.
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
The gyros are compensated for the following terms:
Scale factor linearity
Scale factor temperature sensitivity
Sensitive axes misalignment
Inertia dynamic compensation
Mass unbalance drift
Mass unbalance temperature sensitivity
Bias
Bias temperature sensitivity
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TABLE 6-7. DUTY CYCLE ESTIMATE FOR
A STATE OF THE ART 16-BIT COMPUTER
Hardware D-Multiply
Ex. Time Ex. Time/Type Mix(_sec) Ins.
Load/Store 1.4 X 0.119 = 0.1904
D-Load/Store 2.2 0.318 0.7632
Copy 1.4 0.055 0.088
Exchange 1.4 0.042 0.0672
D-Shift 2.2 0.091 9.4368
Add/Sub 1.4 0.105 0.168
D-Add/Sub 2.2 0.131 0.3144
Multiply 3.2 0.064 0.2688
D-Multiply ii.0 0.055 0.66
Divide 3.4 0.006 0.0216
Transfer 1.0 0.014 0.0504
Nsec/avg instr
Throughput = 330,164 instr/sec
198,000
Duty Cycle = 330,164 = 60.0%
Software
D-Multiply
Ex. Time/
Mix
Ins.
0.203 0.3248
0.182 0.4368
0.074 0.1184
0.016 0.0256
0.140 0.672
0.094 0.1504
0.104 0.2496
0.102 0.4284
m
0.002 0.0072
0.083 0.2988
3.0288 2.712
368,732 instr/sec
460r000
= 125%
368,732
The accelerometers are compensated for the following terms:
a. Scale factor
b. Scale factor temperature sensitivity
c. Sensitive axes misalignment
d. Bias
e. Bias temperature sensitivity
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Equations 1 to 18 describe the compensation equations. Equa-
tion 19 provides the components necessary for axis misalignment
correction. Equation 20 transforms the 2-axis instrument out-
puts to the body frame. Reference table 6-12 for a definition
of symbols.
GYRO SCALE FACTOR
sex i 1
At
5 ÷ ++ ,AeGx] , Sg n_eGx)+ GX] + SGX2
At
+ 1 + SGX_.__2" A eG , Sgn(AOGx )
At
NORMAL MODE ( 1 )
HIGH RATE MODE
SGy = GYI + , A •
At
At
" Sgn(L_SGy )
NORMAL MODE ( 2 )
[ GY 1 SGy 2
Eq
At
HIGH RATE MODE
NOTE:
Sg n(A_gC.._() = 1 1
)sg.CaeGX) o if_@GX is negative.
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GYRO COMPENSATION
SCALED GYRO RATES
(3)
TORQUER AXIS TRANSFORmaTION
()TX = 6GXX" _ OX + 6GXY" _ Oy
0Ty = 6GYX "_ _X + 6GyY ._ 0y (4)
INERTIA COMPENSATION
/JIX = -IG (A _gTY OTy n-1 )
01y = IG (_0TX n - AOTyn-] ) (5)
SPIN-AXIS ALIGNMENT
OpX =AOIX - "YGX " ,% OS n-1
Ll Opy = _' Oly + "YGY " Zi OS n-1 (6)
MX
G SENSITIVE DRIFTS
=m OPx ÷ _xx "_ Vcx ÷ _xY . z_Vcy ÷ MXZ. a Vsn-_
=z_Oey + _ktx"Z_Vcx + _,y ._Vcy + _z "Avsn- (v)
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GYROCOMPENSATION
NON-G SENSITIVE BIASES
zs Ocx -zXOMx+ _x" _xt
,, Ocy:"o_ + By• "
ACCELE ROMETER COMPENSATION
SCALED INCREMENTAL VELOCITIES
AV X = SAX . AVAx
AVy = SAy . AVAy
(8)
(9)
AXIS ALIGNMENT
&VTx = 6AX x , AV x + 6AX Y
AVTy = 6Ay X • AV x + 6Ay Y
n-i
_Vy + 6AX Z • AV S
_.Vy + 6Ay z , AVsn 1 (i0)
BIAS
A Vcx = AVT'x + ABX -_t
AVcy = AVTy + ABy , _I: (ii)
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INSTRUMENTTEMPERATURECOMPENSATION
BX
By
MXX
Myy
+ +SGX1 = SGXO
SGYI = SGY0
G_zee
DSGX = SGTX0 + SGTXI(TGX) + SGTX2(TGX) 2
DSGY = SGTY0 + SGTYI(TGY) + SGTY2( TGY)2
2
= BGTX0 + BGTXI(TGX) + BGTX2(TGX)
2
= BGTY0 + BGTYI(TGY) + BGTY2(TGY)
= MGTX0 + MGTXI(TGX) + MGTX2(TGX) 2
2
= MGTY0 + MGTYI(TGY) + MGTY2(TGY)
+ DSGX, SGXl = SGX0 + DSGX
+ DSGY, SGYI : S_X0 + DSGY
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
SAX
SAy
ABX
ABy
Accel
2
= SATX0 + SATXI(TAX) + SATX2(TAX)
2
= SATY0 + SATYI(TAY) + SATY2(TAY)
= BATX0 + BATXI(TAX) + BATX2( TAX)2
= BATY0 + BATYI(TAY) + BATY2( TAY)2
(17)
(18)
TP_ANS FO Pd_ATION S
Spin Axis Components
A 8 Sn-I = S " (A_-b)n-I
AV S n-i = g . (_b)n-1
(19)
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NOTE:
Body Components
[ i_os_°sln0_:]_A8b = X Y +sin 45 ° -cos 45
cos
[ sin 45 ° -cos 45
Refer to Table 6-8 for definition of(X, Y, S) vectors.
TABLE 6-8. SEMI-OCTAHEDRON UNIT VECTORS
(20)
#1
#2
#3
#4
i
m
S i
1
'4---_ (-1, -1, -i)
i
4----_ (-i, i, -I)
1
,4-'_(-1, .1, ÷i)
1
(-i, -1, 1)4_
i (-2, i i)
q6
m
Yi
1
-0-5( o, i, -i)
1
46 (-2, -i, i)-
1
,,/6 (-2, -I, -i)
1 i)
-_(o, i,
1
46 (-2, i, -i)
1
q2 ( O, -i, i)
1
42 ( o, -I, -i)
EDGE VECTORS
-- 1
el2: q---{(-i, O, i)
- ---i o)
e23: ,4 2 (-i, -i,
-- 1
e34: 4--_ (-I, O, -i)
-- 1 O)
e41: 4---_ (-i, i,
-- i
el3. 42 ( O, i, -i)
-- 1
e24. 42 ( O, i, i)
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6.3.2.2 Failure, Detection and Isolation
Figure 6-31 illustrates the mechanization of the gyro Failure,
Detection and Isolation software. An equivalent set of software
exists for the accelerometers, the differences are in the filter
time constants, detection levels, and scaling.
GYRO PARITY EQUATIONS
Ap n _
g23 =",,2 _@b2 323 -_b3 " e23)
Ap n =_/_ -- -- -_b4g34 _8b3 e34 e34)
A p n = 'Q2 - A@ )g41 _8b4 e41 bl e41
A p n : "_2 _8
g13 bl
I I
el3 - _b3 " el3)
Ap n =
g24 V 2 _@b2 e24 - A.eb4 • e24 )
p n _ pn-1 At pn-.1 +/%,1:' n
gij - gij - "_- " glj gij
i, 3 = i, 2, 3, 4 i _ j
PARITY EQUATIONS ( 21 )
FIRST ORDER FILTER (22)
. . = 1 if IPgijlLgl 3 > 69
LO 1 = (Lgl2 G L941) @ (L912 @ LgI3 ) @ (Lg41 0 LgI3 ) GYRO #1 FAIL (23)
LO 2 = (LgI2 0 LO23 ) • (LoI2 ® Lg24 ) • (Lo23 0 LQ24) GYRO #2 FAIL
Lg 3 = (Lg23 O Lg34 ) • (Lg23 O LQI3 ) • (LQ34 O Lgl3 ) GYRO #3 FAIL
Lg 4 = (LQ34 0 Lg41 ) @ (Lg34 O Lg24 ) • (LQ41 O Lg24 ) GYRO #4 FAIL
NOTE :
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i. @ = LOGICAL 'AND', @ = LOGICAL 'OR'
2. Refer to table 6-10 for definition of e ij vectors
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L
gng
GYRO PARITY EQUATIONS
= U912 O (Lg i O 0.92 ) • L923 e (Lg2 O Lg3)
@ L934 O (Lg3 O Lg4) • Lg41 O (Lg 4 O L9] )
L913 e (L91 0 L93 ) @ Lg24 ® (Lg 2 0 Lg4)
GYRO (24 )
PARITY
EQUATION
ERROR
DISCRETE
ACCEL PARITY EQUATIONS
R
L_ ''_ = He (_:t,] " %2 )a12 ' e12 - AVb2
L i ,'_ = ,_2 _vb2 723 - av"--_,3 e23)a23
Lpn = Q2 (&Vb3a34
m _ D
e34 - AVb4 • e34)
m _ • m
'_ = 4"3 (""'_t,4/'Pa41 " e41 - AVbl e41 )
Ap n = _ (ZTt,:a13 el3 - L_Vb3 " _'13)
/" :'_,:24 = q_ (_b2
m
e24 - _"_'b4 ' e24)
p n = pn-I _t pn-1 +_pn taij axj - r a:j aij
i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 i # j j
|_ . , -z_ ]
a:3
PARITY EQUATIONS (25)
FIRST ORDER FILTER (26)
NOTE: ® = LOGICAL 'AND' O = LOGICAL 'OR'
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ACCEL PARITY EQUATIONS
Lal = (hal 20 La41) • (La] 20 Lal3) $ ( La41 O Lal3)
l.a2 = (L 0 3) • 0 • 0a12 La2 (Lal2 La24) (La23 La24)
La3 = (La23 O La34) • (La23 O Lal3) • (La34 @ Lal3)
La4 = (La34 O La4]) • (La34 O La24) • (La41 O La24)
ACCEL #i FAIL (27)
ACCEL #2 FAIL
ACCEL #3 FAIL
ACCEL #4 FAIL
Lang = L 8 0 Q @ ( @ L ) ACCEL (28)a]2 (Lal La2) La23 La2 a3 PARITY
EQUATION
e o • o( e )
a34 (La3 La4) La41 La4 4al ERROR
DISCRETE
L
al3 ® (Lal ® La3 ) • La24 O (La2 ® La4 )
NOTE: ® = LOGICAL 'AND' _ = LOGICAL 'OR'
6.3.2.3 Design Equations
The design equations combine the outputs of two instruments in a
least square solution to form the total body axes inertial rates.
Equations (29) and (30) summarize the equations in vector form.
The weighting factors are defined in table 6-10. The logic
variables SGI2, SGI3, etc are set to 1 or 0 according to the
logic formulated in table 6-9.
_b = Wl2(_bl + _b2 )SGI2
+ WI3(A8bl + A8b3)SGI3
+ Wl4(A8bl + _8b4)SG14
(29)
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_b = Wl2(_bl + _b2 )SVI2
+ WI3(AVbl + AVb3)SVI3
+ WI4(AVbl + AVb4)SVI4
(30)
Note: Design equations are written for INM-1, similar sets
apply for INM2-4 as indicated in table 6-11.
TABLE 6-9. INSTRUMENT PAIR SELECTION VS FAILURE INDICATION
CHAN
i
2
3
4
0
1,2
2,3
3,4
4,1
FAILURE INDICATION
1 2 3
1,2 1,3 1,2
2,3 2,3 2,4
3,4 3,4 3,4
4,2 4,1 4,1
4
1,2
2,3
3,1
4,1
l&2
1,3
2,3
3,4
4,3
163
1,2
2,4
3,4
4,2
1 _4
1,2
2,3
3,2
4,2
2&3 2&4 3&4
1,4 1,3 1,2
2,4 2,3 2,1
3,4 3,1 3,1
4,1 4,1 4,1
6.3.2.4 Coordinate Converter
Figure 6-32 illustrates the strapdown conversion computations.
The integration algorithm listed under equation set (31),
represents a partial 5th order Taylor series quaternion integra-
tion algorithm. The total quaternion integration procedure is
accomplished at two rates, the body rate integration performed
at 64/sec and the computational frame rate integration at 8/sec.
The velocity transformations, equation (33) performed at 64/sec.
Note that the quaternions are converted to a direction cosine
matrix followed by a matrix multiply to accomplish the velocity
transformation.
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TABLE 6-10. LEAST SQUARESWEIGHTING FACTORS
W12 = [$1 + $2] "1
Wl 3 = [$1+$3 ]-1 = Ei°!]
4 -2 3;]= [R]tS2+SjI = 1/4 -2 4W23 O0
w:,, =[_,÷_,,].1= ,,, o
-2
0
w,, --[s,÷s,,]-,= ,,,, ,'
0
c,J
I NPUT RATE
DEFINITION OF [Sil
SPiN AXiS
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QUATERNION INTEGRATION
ALGORITHM
= Q_/2
GYRO SAMPLES
(n+i/2) At
- f -A8 A = _dt
nat
D
n8 B
{n+l) At/- _dt
(n+l/2) At
DIFFERENCE
APPROXIMATIONS
C
I___!2 I_l4-
= 1 - 2'. + 4---q--!
S ___
--2 --4
1 - 3' + 5:
Qn+l Qn C,S + A0A 3 (31)
Note-. A8---A and A--8B are two samples of A-Sb
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DIRECTION COSINES
_x: Io_l (o_)_
n =2(0_CXy
n (_CXZ = 2- Q
n n n
Q2 - Q3 Q4 )
n n n
Q3 + Q2 " Q4 )
n ( 1 n n nCyx = 2" Q " Q2 + Q3 " Q4)
C nYY = (Q2)2- (QI)2- (Q3)2 + (Q4)2n
C n = n _ n n )YZ 2" (Q2 - Q3 Q1" Q4
n = 2 ( n n n n)Czx " Q1 " Q3 - Q2 Q4 '
on (_ n n n)ZY = 2- Q " Q3 + Q1 Q4
cn = (Q3)2 2 n )2 n 2zz (°_) (°_ +(°_)
COORDINATE CONVERSION
n + 1/2 n n + 1/2 n _y; 1/2 n _Z; 1/2
_VxN =Cxx " _Vxb + CXy " A + CXZ •
n + i/2 cn • AVe; 1/2 C n . A_yb + 1/2 cn A_Z;AVy YX + YY + YZ
_Zn + i/2 = C n V_ + i/2 C n . n + 1/2 C n _Z;ZX " a b + ZY aVyb + ZZ
NAVIGATION VELOCITY SUMMATION
V_x+1/2= Vnx- 1/2 + _Vnx+1/2
_+ _: _- _J_+_vn+_J_
n + 1/2
vnz+I/2 vnzNi/2+ _VzN
(32)
i12
i/2
(34)
(33)
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6.3.2.5 Navigation
Equation (35) represents the integration of the navigation frame
rates, comparable to gyro torquing for a gimbaled platform
inertial navigation system.
The inertial navigation equations are the standard set common to
all Litton inertial navigation systems. The alignment equations
again use a proven technique common to Litton inertial navigation
systems. It consists of two independent 3rd order leveling loops
with Kalman gains. The technique accomplishes simultaneous
leveling and gyrocompassing with a minimum of computations.
Figure 6-33 illustrates the 3rd order Baro-Inertial Vertical
Channel. It is modified to compensate for barometric altimeter
errors.
QUATERNION UPDATE (NAV RATES)
i) l_i 2 = (WXN • WXN + WYN - WYN + WZN WZN)(At N)
2) sl,l : - 4_
31 cl_l = - la_12 En
-_- + _ (E 0 = 0)
4) T1 = (-Q2 " WZN + Q3 " WYN + Q4 " WXN) At N
T2 = (-Q3 " WXN + Q4 " WYN + Q1 " WZN) At N
T3 = (Q4 " WZN - Q1 " WYN + Q2 " WXN) • At N
T4 : (-QI " WXN - Q2 " WYN - Q3 " WZN) • At N
5) Q1 = Q1 + Q1 " C I_I÷ i/2 " TI ÷ i/2 " S I_I" T1
Q2 = Q2 + Q2 C!_1 + _/2 " T2 + 1/2 S I_1 " _2
Q3 : Q3 + Q3 " C I_I÷ i/2 • T3 ÷ i/2 - S I_I"T3
Q4 : Q4 ÷ Q4 " cl_l ÷ 1/2 • T4 ÷ 1/2 - S I_1 • T4
6) E n + 1 = (i - (QI 2 + Q22 + Q32 + Q42)) (35)
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NAVIGATION VELOCITY
Vxn = VXn - 1 + VXN + (VXCR + VXCL) • &t N
VyN = VyN - 1 + VyN + (VYCR + VYCL) • &tN
1
VZN = VzN - + VZN + (VZCR + VZCL) at N (36)
ALIGNMENTEQUATIONS
TPX = TPX - VYA • KT • at N
TPY = TPY + VXA • KT • &tN
WXC= TPX 8
WYC = TPY • 8
TPX = TPX - WXC 6t N
TPY = TPY - WYC • &t N
VXCL = - VXA - KV - GEE • TPY
VYCL = - VYA KV + GEE TPX
BXC = BXC - VYA " KZ • &t N
BYC = BYC + VXA • KZ &t N
NAVIGATION DIRECTION COSINES
(37)
RHOX = - VY • RE2 - VX RE3
RHOY = VX RE1 + VY RE3
WX = WXS + RHOX
WY = WYS + RHOY
WZ = WZS
BII = BII - RHOY B31 - _t N
B21 = B21 + RHOX • B31 - At N
B31 = B31 + (RHOY - BII - RHOX • B21) • At N
BI2 = BI2 - RHOY - B32 - at N
B22 = B22 + RHOX - B32 - _t N
B32 = B32 + (RHOX - BI2 = RHOX • B22) At N (38)
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NAVIGATION RATES
WXN= - (WX + WXC+ BXC)
WYN = - (WY + WYC + BYC)
WZN =- (WZ)
WXC, WYC = 0 : NAV
BXC, BYC = 0 MODE
(39)
MISCELLANEOUS CALCULATIONS
ATTITUDE
PITCH = SIN -I (CZY)
I-CZXl
ROLL = TAN -I _ CZZ I
-CXY
AZIMUTH = TAN (--_-_-)
HEADING =- AZIMUTH- ALPHA
RADII OF CURVATURE
i ( i I cB22  )RE1 = a 1- a " hb f - 1- 3 • (BI2) 2
i I l -(B12)))RE2=a (l-a hb _ (I 3 CB22)2 2
RE3 = 1 . (2 • f - BI2 " B22)
a
CORIOLIS ACCELERATION
VXCR = (2 " WZN • VY) - (2 " WYN - RHOY) VZ
VYCR = (2 • WZN • VX) + (2 " WXN - RHOX) " VZ
AZCR = V X (RHOY + 2RB22) - Vy (RHOX + RBI2)
(40)
(41)
[42)
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POSITION _ALCULATIONS
-i B31
LONGITUDE = Tan BII- B22- BI2 - B21
LATITUDE = Sin -I -(B32)
-i BI2
ALPHA = Tan B22
EARTH RATES
WXS = _(BI2)
Wys = _(B22)
WZS = n(B32)
NAVIGATION DIRECTION COSINE INITIALIZATION
BII = cos(o) cos(h) - sin(k) sin(#) sin(o)
B21 = -cos(k) sin(_) - sin(l) - sin(#)
B31 = sin(k) • cos(_)
B21 = sin(_)
B22 = cos(u)
B32 = sin
cos(_)
cos(_)
where k = Longitude
= Latitude
= Alpha
318
cos(_)
(43)
(44)
(45)
403314
r-
T
0
0
_4
-,4
_J
(D
C
I
0
_4
o_
I
0
u_
319
403314
BARO-INITIAL COMPUTATIONS
HBDOT = (HB - HBO)/DT
HBDOT 2
KTA = (]/TH)/(] + (_T))
KI = 3 (KTA)
2 2 • qO
K2 : 4 (KTA) +
a
3
K3 = 2 (KTA)
K4 = (HBDOT) 2/(EHBDOT 2 + HBDOT 2)
54 = $4 + K4 " HBDOT " DT
DH = (HB - HBO) - $4
HBO = HB
S3 = 53 + K3 DH "DT
Vz = Vz + (S 3 + K2
h = h + (Vz + K]
g = go (i + Beta
DH) " DT
DH) DT
B32 -_)
(46)
6.3.2.6 Coordinate Frames and Glossary
Figures 6-34 and 6-35 illustrate the pertinent coordinate
frames for the preceding equations. Table 6-11 summarizes these
coordinate frames.
Table 6-12 is a glossary of major terms in these equations.
6.3.3 Computer Resource Estimates
With the INM software tasks broken down as illustrated in fig-
ure 6-29, an estimate of memory and computer duty cycle require-
ments using the computer characteristics of table 6-7 has been
made. The results are listed in table 6-13. The estimates of
duty cycle requirements are conservative. Various means of
reducing computation time will be reviewed during the final
design phase of the redundant strapdown INS.
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- _
E13 X'l Vl Y'2
74 ' xl x2 Y2 E--23
Y4 x4 x3
E Y'4 x'3 E31
YB (RT WING)
zB (DOWN)
NOTE: (1) PRIMED AXES- PHYSICAL
TORQUER AXES
(2) UNPRIMED AXES ARE
PRIMED AXES ROTATED ABOUT SPIN
AXES SUCH THAT y-AXIS COINCIDES
WITH OCTAHEDRON EDGE
Figure 6-34. Semi-Octahedral Coordinate Frames
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YE
NORTH
UP, z
EAST
X Ev
EULE R SEQUENCE:
1. ),- EAST LONGITUDE
2. _- NORTH LATITUDE
3. a WANDER ANGLE
ZE
XE' YE' ZE:
X, y, Z
EARTH FIXED FRAME
COMPUTATIONAL FRAME
Figure 6-35. Navigation Frame Relationship
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TABLE 6-11. COORDINATEFRAMES
XB' YB' ZB
x! Yl 'a # S .1 1
xi' Yi' si
x, y, z
XE' YE' ZE
Body Frame: X-forward along airframe
longitudinal axis. Y along right
wing and Z-axis down
Instrument physical axis of the ith
inertial navigation module: the s I
axis is normal to the ith surface
of a semi-octahedron), the x[ and
yi axis lie in the ith surface such
that the bisector of the x i and Yi
axis is perpendicular to the base
of the semi-octahedron.
Instrument axis of ith inertial
navigation module: this axis is
obtained by rotating the physical
axes (x_, YI0 s_) about the -s i
axis through -135 ° to make the Y.l
axes parallel to an outside
semi-octahedral edge
Computational frame: locally
leveled, with y-axis displaced
from geographic north through
azimuth angle '_'. z-axis is up.
Earth fixed frame: XE-Z E plane
coincident with earth's equatorial
plane, Z E axis passing through
Greenwich meridian, x, y, z frame
obtained by rotations through
anglesk and _about YE and X E and finally
through 'e' about z axis.
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TABLE 6-i 2 . GLOSSARY
Symbol Definition
a
ABX' ABy
BATX0, BATXl , BATX2
Beta
BGTXO, BGTXI, BGTX2
Bx, By
BII, B21, B31, BI2,
B22, B32
YGX ' YGY
Cij, i, j = x,y,z
6ZXX: 6AXY' 6AX z
6ZyX, 6AYY, 6AYZ
dGXX' 6GYY' _GYX'
n-I n-I n-I
ASbx, A0by, ASbz
 Ocy
n-1
AO s
6GXY
Earth's equatorial radius, 6378.163 Km
Accelerometer biases
Accelerometer bias temperature
sensitivity coefficients
Gravity constant 0.0517993209 Km/Sec 2
Gyro bias temperature sensitivity
coef f ic lent s
Gyro biases
Earth - Navigation frame direction
cosines
Gyro spin axis misalignment coefficients
Body to navigation frame direction
cosines
Accelerometer misalignment coefficients
Gyro torquer misalignment
Body rates from previous iteration
Compensated gyro rates about
instrument axes
Raw outputs of gyros
Inertial rate about spin axis from
last iteration
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TABLE 6-12. GLOSSARY(cont)
Symbol Definition
4Vax, AVay
AVbx, AVby, AVbz
_V _ aV
xn yn
E HBDOT
f
g, GEE
go
h
I
g
kl, k2, k3, k4
MGTX0 , MGTXl , MGXTX 2
½z
Sax' Say
+ +
SGX 1 , SGX 2
Raw outputs of accelerometers
Incremental body velocities along
body axes
Incremental inertial velocity along
s - axis of accelerometer
Incremental inertial velocities in
navigation frame
Emperically derived constant for baro-
inertial loop
-3
Earth's flattering, 3.3541005459xi0
Vertical componen t of Earth's gravita-
tional field
Equatorial gravity. At equator, sea
level, 9.780270477 Km/sec 2
Inertial altitude
gyro inertial compensation coefficient
Baro-inertial loop gains
Gyro mass inbalance temperature
sensitivity coefficients
Gyro direct and quadrature mass
inbalance coefficients
Earth's rate, 15.041067 °/hr
Accelerometer scale factors
Gyro scale factor, normal mode, for
positive inputs
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TABLE 6-12. GLOSSARY(cont)
Symbol
B
SGX 1 ' SGX Z
++ ++
SGXl' SGX 2
SGX 1 , SGX 2
SGX' SGy
SATX0, SATXl, SATX2
SGTX0, SGTXl, SGTX2
TGX' TAX
V , Vy, Vx z
VXC R' VyC R' VZC R
Def init ion
Gyro scale factor, normal mode, for
negative inputs
Gyro scale factor, high rate for
positive inputs
Gyro scale factor, high rate mode,
for negative inputs
Total gyro scale factor
Accelerometer scale factor temperature
sensitivity coefficients
Gyro scale factor, temperature
sensitivity coefficients.
Normalized relative gyro and accelerometer
temperature input
Ground velocities in navigation frame.
Coriolis acceleration correction
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6.3.4 Future Software Refinements
The flow charts presented in Appendix H include all major pro-
cessing requirements. There are additional functions which would
be considered for the software of a final design. They do not
represent a major impact on duty cycle and word-count.
The details of processing of variables for output to other
avionics and self-test implementations have not been included in
the flow charts, for example. Special formatting and/or filter-
ing requirements need to be determined in consultations with
potential users and would vary with the detailed hardware design
of the redundant strapdown INS. Rough computer estimates have
been included, however.
Gyro/accelerometer selection in design equations is based on only
one alternate rather than the two described in paragraph 4.5.1
of this report. The decision to use the second alternate for
improved fail-safe operation during the third system failure was
reached too late for incorporation into flow charts.
There are various refinements to the redundancy management dis-
cussed in Section IV, not incorporated into flow charts, but
worthy of future consideration. These refinements include:
a. Processing of filtered parity equation outputs, including
compensation of nominal gyro scale factor errors, for
improved FDI sensitivity to performance degradations.
b. Derivation of error probabilities from parity equation
outputs to determine weighting factors for use by exter-
nal equipment in combining the three or four channel
output, for reduction of total system error just prior
to actuation of FDI thresholds.
c. Transfer of the FDI filter lag to a pure integration
following detection (but not isolation) of a drift, for
potential noise reduction and better isolation
sensitivity.
d. Reincorporation of a previously failed but only marginal
gyro to resolve three-gyro isolation ambiguity or
cover a 3rd failure, for improved system reliability.
e. Cross-feed of computer output tables to detect computer
transient errors and reinitialize quaternions and navi-
gation solution, for improved system reliability and
as an aid in fault isolation between the computer and
external I/O.
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f. Reinitialization of those computers using an instrument
which was switched out by redundancy management with
information from a known good computer, to eliminate
errors which needed to accumulate to trip the FDI
mechanism.
g. Monitor of accumulated position and velocity updates
from the external computer and perform redundancy
switching, for elimination of degraded gyros and flag-
ging maintenance personnel. (This could be done by the
external computer, but a self-contained capability may
be preferred.)
h. Storing various data at the time of a redundancy manage-
ment or self-test action, such as self-test results,
vehicle rates, acceleration, velocity, attitude and
some prior time history of parity equations (e.g.,
10 seconds), for use by maintenance personnel in deter-
mination of repair requirements.
The basic navigation function may also be augmented with refine-
ments for improved performance or in-service usability. These
refinements include:
a . An estimate of each of the skewed-gyro biases can be
made, following each ground alignment based on:
(i) a North level bias calculation which assumes
knowledge of latitude to some accuracy, e.g.,
1.85 Km, (since aircraft parking heading is
generally different from alignment to alignment,
all level components of drift gradually get
compensated),
(2) differences between each channel's computation of
aircraft heading during gyrocompassing (aggregate
heading using data from all four channels should
be more accurate than from one channel alone),
(3) the difference in indicated heading from the end of
the previous flight to that resulting from the
following gyrocompass (azimuth drift), assuming
the aircraft had not been moved. (Protection against
movement by means of a reasonableness test would
be needed. Also, normal scale-factor errors con-
taminate this measurement, but it may be sufficiently
accurate over a number of flights.)
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b. The various indications of aircraft pitch and roll may
be averaged to improve accelerometer bias errors.
(Accelerometer bias is a significant contributor to the
velocity error of a strapdown INS, much more so than in
a gimballed INS.)
c. An automatic transfer from align to navigate when
accelerometer outputs cross a threshold is often
included as a protection against operator error.
d. Factory test equipment (FTE) can be simplified by
having a special counting subroutine in the airborne
equipment for use during unit calibration prior to
delivery. A trade-off is needed to compare cost of FTE
counters versus a small amount of additional airborne
computer memory.
e. A back-up, pendulous attitude mode could be added for
use with previously switched degraded accelerometers
or gyros, following a third failure detected and
isolated by self test, for improved pitch/roll
reliability.
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VII. FACTORYTEST EQUIPMENT
7.1 Module Testing
Integration and acceptance testing is performed at the module
level, consistent with the standardization and interchangeability
concept of the four module Redundant Strapdown System. To sup-
port high production rates economically and insure consistency and
thorough testing, all final test is performed on automatic
stations supported by software test programs.
7.1.1 Manufacturing Flow
Figure 7-1 represents the module manufacturing and test flow.
Integration or "Build-Up" is the assembly of assets which have
been tested at lower levels into the module chassis. Electronic
cards have been tested on card testers, harnesses on FACT machines
and instruments on their respective gyro and accelerometer test
stations. The Manufacturing Test Procedure (MTP) is performed in
two parts to accommodate the special requirements of instrument
rate testing and axis alignment calibration. MTP IA provides
a functional test of the module and specifies a six position
"static" calibration. Testing for MTP IB is performed on a Rate
Calibration Station which has angular rate testing capability.
To screen for component and assembly problems, all modules are
run through a multi-cycle hi-lo temperature burn-in. The temper-
ature chambers include vibration equipment and vibration testing
is also performed. To support the modules during this period a
third station, the Burn-In Monitor, is utilized. After burn-in,
the Final Acceptance Test is run.
7.1.2 Test Programs
Build Up Software Pro@ram
The Build Up Program executes on the Load Station. Build Up
begins with inserting subassemblies or groups of subassemblies
into the chassis. First the power supply is inserted and checked
for voltage levels and operation of automatic shutdown safety
features. Next the computer is added. It is initialized and
allowed to execute self-test programs first and when these are
successfully completed to drive the I/O cards. The next to last
assemblies added are the instrument rebalance electronics which
are supplied with dummy loads to insure safe operation prior to
installation of the final subassembly, the instrument block.
This step by step procedure assures incrementally good assets and
inspection of intermediate test points not normally accessible
at the module test connectors.
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The final operation of Build Up is Trim. For the INM this is
primarily setting the frequency characteristics of the instru-
ment loops. A frequency response is made of each loop automati-
cally and the computer then calculates the required trim
resistance to adjust each to the nominal. With this information,
the module is returned to Operations for resistor installation.
Manufacturing Test Procedure (MTP) IA
MTP IA begins when the trimmed module is returned.
consists of:
The test
a. Turn-On Test
• Turn on sequence timing.
• Supply voltage and test point monitor.
• Performance versus time from start-up.
b. Computer Diagnostics
c. Mode Test
• Test of the module operating modes Test, OFF, BITE,
Forced Hi-Rate Mode
d. I/O Tests
• Tests of the Lo Speed and Hi Speed data buses.
• Test of input and output discretes.
e. Instrument loop frequency response
• Verification of the Build Up Trim.
f. Static Calibration
• Six position tests to determine accelerometer align-
ment coefficients, and gyro biases. A skewed hold-
ing fixture is used to align the instrument axes
parallel and at right angles to vertical. Constants
determined here are stored for later insertion into
the module PROM.
Rate Calibration Program, MTP-1B
Rate Calibration is performed on the Rate Calibration Station
which incorporates a precision, automatic rate table. Four units
are tested concurrently and the software is so arranged that a
module may be loaded independent of the test status of the other
modules. Testing consists of introducing CW and CCW rates over
precise angles and measuring the instrument outputs and the
elapsed time. These tests are performed about the gyro input
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axes and include multiple rates in both the hi and io rate range.
Rotations are also performed about other axis to determine axis
misalignments. These data and previous data are then written
into the module PROM.
Burn-In Program
The Burn-In stage of the manufacturing flow is unique in that
modules are operated as a system rather than as independent
modules. Several factors lead to this as the most desirable
implementation. Operation as a System during burn-in maximizes
operation of the modules at minimum support equipment expense.
Moreover, the System level redundancy management and self-test
provides a real time monitor of functional and inertial per-
formance. Most significantly however, is that when operated as
a module in the navigation mode, they can easily be tested across
a vibration environment.
During Burn-In the Burn-In Monitor (BIM) tracks hardware,
initiates background tests in the operational units, executes
I/O and monitors test points while undergoing temperature cycling
and vibration.
Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) IA, IB
ATP IA and IB parallels tests performed in MTP IA and IB; how-
ever, it is an "end to end" test and must be entered at the start
and completed without failure.
7.1.3 Test Equipment
The proposed test equipment is an extension of Litton's LSS-370
family of automatic test equipment. It is derived from almost
a decade of automatic and semi-automatic test equipment. Current
applications include:
CAINS IMU Test Station
LN-31 INU Test Station with multiplex capability
CGATS Platform Test Station.
Figure 7-2 shows the LN-31 INU multiplex station. Fundamental to
the LSS-370 concept is a powerful real time operating system
which controls all user tasks, disc management memory allotment
and task queing. The system provides effective CPU management
and allows concurrent multiple users, or partitions.
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Load Station
The Load Station is configured as shown in figure 7-3 with three
partitions. Rack O controls all three partitions. It houses
the computer complex:
PDP-II-35
Disc
Extended Core Memory
Tape Loader
The operating system controls and communicates with each partition
via a bus system. Also housed in Rack 0 are the common commer-
cial equipment with low utilization, namely the frequency mea-
surement equipment. This is used to measure the instrument loop
frequency characteristics.
Each partition of Racks 1 and 2 behaves identically and indepen-
dently of the other partitions though they share a common master
computer. This multiplex mode is currently in operation in the
LN31 INU Test Station. Both the programmable digital multimeter
(DMM) and scope have access to 300 signal channels via the
scanner; signal routing and measurement are all under software
control.
The operator interface is through the CRT, Keyboard and Printer.
The CRT displays time, test mode, test number, unit under test
(UUT) status and current test results. In the lower 1/3 of the
CRT, operator messages are displayed. Messages are only displayed
when operator action is required and a keyboard response is
needed. The keyboard allows the operator to select, initiate
or terminate a test as well as input data and respond to messages.
A printer provides hard copy of all test_esults and requested
operator transactions.
In addition to the Scan Control and the Scanner, Rack 2 contains
the Rack Control Unit (RCU) and System Interface Unit (SIU) .
The RCU furnishes the digital interface with the computer bus
system, formatting all inputs and deciphering outputs. The RCU
interfaces the commercial equipment including the CRT, DMM, Key-
board, Printer, etc. as well as the unique UUT interface elec-
tronics. The latter are housed in the SIU. Typical of these
devices are the hi and io speed data bus receiver and drivers,
discrete monitors, loads, time interval monitors and input test
stimulus. The SIU uniquely identifies a configuration of the
LSS-370 for a given application.
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Not shown in figure 7-3 are the granite block, work surface and
module indexing fixture provided for each partition. The work
surface provides an inertially stable and leve] reference for
orienting the module in its fixture into all six test positions.
The Rate Calibration Station (RCS) has been configured for pro-
duction testing and therefore to support factory troubleshooting,
a single axis rate table has been provided in the third partition
of the Load Station.
Rate Calibration Station
The RCS is shown in figure 7-4. Rack 0 and 1 are essentially
identical to those of the Load Station with the exception of the
frequency measuring equipment. It is not required here and is
deleted. Rack 2 has a unique SIU designed to interface with the
8 units under test. This interface is restricted to communica-
tion via the low frequency serial bus for transmittal of data and
commands. The RCU of Rack 2 now houses a new complement of inter-
faces to service the multi-module SIU, Data, Display and Record-
ing devices, and two rate tables. Rack 3 contains auxiliary
printers and displays to support test monitoring without inter-
facing with test control displays of Rack i.
High angular rate testing of large packages requires specialized
rate tables. The proposed Rate Table, shown in figure 7-5 has
high angular acceleration, and provides the accuracy and pre-
cision control required for rate testing. Currently Litton is
using a version of the multi-gimbal table shown here. The table
is capable of rates to 1000°/see and test packages to 34 kg
(75 pounds).
Inertial Navigation Modules will be calibrated individually
rather than in a 4-module system. Because of the high cost of
the Rate Table, however, up to 4 modules will be calibrated in
parallel. The orientation of the 4 INM's must be identical
rather than rotated 90 ° from each other as in an aircraft
installation. In order to fit 4 modules on the Rate Table, they
should be mounted side-by-side. Therefore, the instrument block
engagement should be at the rear, connector end of the unit
rather than at the side as indicated in paragraph 6.2.10.
Burn-In Monitor (BIM)
The BIM supports the burn-in of two systems, 8 modules. The BIM
station is configured similar to Racks 0, i, 2, 3 and 4 of the
Calibration Rate Station since both stations handle 8 units on
a limited access basis. The BIM interfaces with an environmental
chamber housing the systems under test. Fixtures within the
chamber orient the systems and provide wrap-around of signals to
allow self monitoring of input and output circuitry.
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E_ GOERZINLA_ND
SYSTEMS DiViSiON
301 ALPHA DRIVE, PITTSBURGH, PA. 15238 s TEl.. 412-782-3516 • TWX 710-664-2082
MOnEL 5_% TWRFE-AMIS AL_tOMATIC TEST STAND
GENERAL
The Model 555 Three-A/(Is AutOmatic Test Stand is a multi-axls fixture deslgned to test inertlal guidance and contzol syst_.
It is fitted with digital position transducer, that allow _h_ test stand _o be operated by a variety of a_tun_tlc con_ro2
dgvices such as a diglta] computer or tape reader.
Motion about all axes is produced by direct drive DC torque motors. Rate control to i, 000 degrees per second about these axes
i| ichievmd by means of 0.1t ripple direct mounted DC tachometers. Three nodes of automat,c digital posltionlaq and readout
are available at _3 arc second accurscy and _.0005 de_ree resolution up to 1,000 degrees per second, at 0.0001 degree rmso-
lutlon to 200 d_reez per second, or a duaJ 0.001 and 0.0001 degree resolution sys_e_ prcv_dinq both 1,000 and 200 deg[ees pex
second maximum speed Jm_ectlon. A Scorsby motion _enerator is also provided.
The mchanlcal s_ructore Of the fist stand is _n the azimuth, rot1, pitch axis configuration. Since sllprings arl provided for
both mtud come,orients and the unit _nder test (t%_) signal and power connec_on_, cuntin_us [otaclon capability is prcvlded.
SPECZP XCAT IOHS
Servo Component1
Azlm_th ........................................... 22 ft-lb torque motor
Roll .............................................. Two Ii ft-lh torque motc_s
Pitch ............................................. ? ft-lb torque motor
All _IS ..........................................
AXiS Imertla, Torque _d Rcceleratlon
Ine_tla ......... (slug- feet squared) ...........
Stall T ot_%le .... (f t-lbs_ ......................
Still Acceleration {r_ians _er Second Squared) --
Ortho_o_allty of Axes ................................
Bearing Wo_le .......................................
Intermictlon of _xes ..................................
Thee POint Mou_%ting
Beoqe .............................................
Rm_oi_tion ........................................
Tro_mion Shaft Deflectlom ............................
Test package
Size ..............................................
W.lght ............................................
ELECTRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
S11prtnqs ............................................
Resi_t&_ce variation .................................
0.1% _achCmetez, 72C-pcle Ind_ctosyn a_8 2-pole rmsolver
Azimuth ROll Pltch
20 ............ 20 ............ 6
C.2 ............ _._ ............ 0.8
3 arc seconds
2 arc seconds
W_thin a sphexe not exceeding 1.0 mm in dimter
2 degrees
_ a_c second
Less than 0.5 arc second
14-inchel by 12-inches _y 20-1nches
75 po_nd|
I00 linls rated at 3 ampso 250 vol_s
I0 mi11_ohms
D-150
_ _KOLK_EO_I_¢0S P 0 _l_lO m
Figure 7-5. Three Axis Automatic Test Stand
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MOD_S OF OpE_ATIO:_/SPECIFICATZONS
Poaltlon Mode
Range
MaXimU_ Readout Speed
Readout Rallc_e
Hlqh _eJol_t/_n
306 degrees
per second
A000.0000 to
B359,gg99 deqteec
Hi h Freed
1.0_0 degrees
_er e_cond
A0O0.0000 to
B359.$995 deq:ees
DUll
'_00 deqrses ''"
per second
AOO0.0000 to
0359.9999 daqreea
1,000 deqrQes
per leco_
A000.000 to
1359.99Sd4gzeee
Accuracy ................................ _l arc lecond
Stabilit_ ................................ _0.$ arc second
Control
_ocal ................................. Front panel 7_decm_e thumbvheel |vitch plum Enter Commumd
puehbutton for each ex_8
Remote ................................ Jtemote digital Input per Report TR-2036
Irate MOde
_nges .................................. Xl, Xl0, XIO0. X1000 deqreel per ascend
_eeolu_ion .............................. 0._t of _11 scale on eech ranqe
Accuracy ................................ 0.It or 0.0001 4eqree per second whLchew*r _s qrse_e: svereged
ov_r 10-_eqree _ntervsls Or lsrgmr
Control
Local ................................. W_ont panel 4-decide thumbvheel |vitch plul Znt_r C_mm_hd
pushbutt_n rot each eXi8
hmote ................................ Itm_otu diq_tal xnpuC per Iteport TR-2036
Scozmby Hods
J_ne Wave Mo_Jo_ ........................ Applied to all throe axes at I ee_ected frequmncy
Ph•se Sh_ f_ ............................. Ad)usteble bet_en exam
Amplitude Central ....................... Provided Independently £o_ each sxlm
F=eq_enc¥ Rang. Ad3ustmen_ .............. 10/1
Amp]ltudm tl_-ge Control vtth
• |0-Turn Potenti_ee_er - .............. _.1 dlKIZOO to 30 d _:Accuracy of F_tlon .................... 0.1 degree from • ct mine yaws
rreq_cy Range ....................... 10 cycles per Ikinu_s to I cycle Per ml_ut, e
JUWIe _nc_)dlnq System
Tr_educez
Fine .................................. ?_0-pole, _2 err second Z_duotosy_%
CouPle ................................ l-ml_m_ rusolver
_J_sol_ze Amgle _ncodSnq SyaLmm
Irate _nge ............................ (0 _o I,D00 4egz_ea per see.rid)
s) Accuracy _nd Stab_lL_y .......... _.0 arc second
b) 9mmtlsation .................... Klgh I_goluClon System - 0.31 arc sacs "-_
High Speed System ...... 1.8 am= secoe_
D_I |ymZem ............ 0,3E _d 3.1 ere second
o) VelociL¥ Error .................. 0.2 arc second per redl_n per second
(When s_led at a_bmultlplos o_ _eferm_:e _requency)
4) O_tput DLspley .................. High beolut_on System - 0.0002 dk_wee to )Sg,JJtJ qzeee
absolute angle
Eigh Speed System ...... 0,0005 44_r_ Z. 359,_95 dmgreee
•bsolute mWle
Duel l_It4111 ............ 0,0001 or 0.001 dog.it tO 35S.9_lS
_: 3S9.999 do_rees absolute m_llle
e} POSI_L0_ Pulse 0u_pu_s .......... (&vsll_la up _o 1,000 4m_rees per _ecom_)
• ulse width ................... 1 usec
|ntervel8 ..................... l-degree intervals
Accuracy ...................... t0.S arc eu©on_. +_+ -0.4 milllaecon_
_) Digital Output ................. Avsll_le for tr_ml_er to m diqt_el &_q_uter. Outputm uirs
trsnlferred to e d_tm bone onrecelpt o_ In a_drellalrld frelle
c(mmmhd per itepor_ TR-20_.
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7.2 G-6 Gyro Test
7.2.1 G-6 Process Flow
A projected G-6 gyro process flow is shown in figure 7-6. This
process flow is then used to determine projected factory test
equipment requirements. The G-6 gyro design is very similar to
the Litton G-1200. Present production test equipment was used as
the basis for this description, with redesigns and modifications
as required to meet the needs of the G-6.
7.2.2 G-6 Test Stations
a. G-6 Final Test Station
List of Tests
Measure pickoff parameters (in, P 0 SF, P O Offset,
etc.)
Measure torquer parameters (SF, axis align)
Measure rotor and flexure parameters (Gand Non-G
sensitive, drift and repeatability, random drift,
resonant frequency etc.)
Measure motor parameters (watts start/run, milli-
watts with torquer-bearing quality, run-up time,
etc.)
Rapid reaction (if any).
Time constant, etc.
Possibly a limited rate table test capability.
Description
Uses a computer data acquisition system (standard module),
and automatic table to collect and reduce data. All
excitations are under computer control. I[SR 33 keyboard
and printer provide the final data printout, and opera-
tor control. Temporary data, operator instructions,
UUT status and test station condition are displayed on
a CRT.
b. Flexure Fre_uenc_ Station
List of Tests
Test for the value of the natural resonant frequency
of the G-6 rotor flexure.
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Description
Contains vibration exciter and photonic displacement
sensor to create a closed loop system with the flexure.
Frequency counter readout and functional electronics
are included.
c. Pickoff Adjustment Station
do
List of Tests
Takes data required to determine dimensional and
magnetic properties of rotor pickoff surfaces.
Measures pickoff assembly parameters.
Provides test verification capability after lapping.
Description
Uses master rotor and master pickoff elements (per-
manently mounted to fixtures). Provides a plotter out-
put to chart the rotor characteristics. Includes PAVM
and PO excitation electronics. Lapping facilities must
be provided to augment this station.
Pretest Station
List of Tests
Cover select.
Component select.
All ATP tests.
Description
Contains a full set of electronics to spin, capture and
temp control (if required) the gyro. Measurement
capabilities include: P O parameters, torquer param-
eters, spin and motor parameters, temperature sensitivity
parameters and are provided through use of a data acqui-
sition system (standard module) and computer. No shake
capability is included. Vacuum backfill capabilities
are included. The station will operate semi-automatically.
The CRT will display manufacturing test procedures for
manual operations. Analog strip chart recording (or
plotter) can be provided as augmenting data.
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e.
f.
g.
Evacuation and Fill Station
List of Tests
• Provide "bakeout".
• Purge.
• Final backfill.
• Seal.
• Leak check.
Description
This station is similar to the G-1200 evacuation and
fill station in system capabilities but different in
design.
Static Rotor Balance Station
List of Tests
• Collect data to determine static values of radial,
mass, etc., rotor unbalance.
• Determine equivalent dynamic values.
• Reduce data and determine position and amounts of
material that must be removed to meet rotor balance
specifications.
Description
This station contains a computer or calculator to col-
lect and reduce data. It controls the test for con-
sistency, provides printout of how much material to
remove, where, and the final static parameter values.
Equivalent dynamic values are also printed. Modules
include the data acquisition system (standard panel),
temperature control (fixture), test cube or auto table,
loop closure electronics and augmenting functional
electronics.
Dynamic Balance Station
List of Tests
• Adjust radial unbalance of motor.
Description
A Schenk dynamic balance machine is used for measurement
and verification after adjustment. The station also con-
tains a spin supply, a mounting fixture, and a control
panel.
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h. Motor Test and Run-In Station
List of Tests
• i00 hour run-in of 18 gyro's simultaneously.
• Data collection of milliwatt meter data for bearing
evaluation throughout run-in.
• Temperature monitor throughout run-in.
• Self logging of elapsed time on each gyro.
Description
This station uses a minicomputer or microprocessor as a
test controller and data organizer. A high speed data
acquisition system (proposed throughout this gear and
is a standard module) is used to scan all 18 gyro posi-
tions for millivolts, temperature, and elapsed time.
This spin supply is a square wave with individually
controllable output stages (18). An historical window
of data (e.g., 30 minutes) is stored in case of power
failure, or in the event a gyro is "seen" as bad. All
data available can be dumped on a KSR 33 (thermal
printer with keyboard). An xy plotter may be included
to yield the effect of a stripchart recorder output for
the last hour of each gyro run-in.
i. Resistance and Continuity
List of Tests
• Resistance test of all circuits.
• Hi-pot insulation resistance tests.
• Intercircuit short test.
Description
This station is similar to the G-1200 Resistance and
Continuity station.
7.3 A-1000 Accelerometer Test
The A-1000 accelerometer is a production design. The redundant
strapdown INS accelerometers will use the test procedures and
equipment currently in use with minor modifications. Descrip-
tions are not supplied as part of this study since the technology
is not new.
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VIII. COSTANALYSIS
8.1 Baseline Cost Estimate
Table 8-1 is an itemized breakdown of the projected cost of the
redundant strapdown INS as described in Sections V and VI, and
tested with Factory Test Equipment similar to that shown in
Section VII.
TABLE 8-I.
ELEMENT
REDUNDANT STRAPDOWN INS PREDICTED
AVERAGE COST, 200 SYSTEMS
COST (1976 $)
GYRO
ACCELEROMETERS (2)
COMPUTER/MEMORY
8LOCK/REBALANCE ELECT.
MODE/IMM I/O
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL I/O
POWER SUPPLY/INTERRUPT
CHASSIS
4,331
3,751
3,697
2,862
1,252
2,246
3,864
2,481
TOTAL, PER CHANNEL 24,484
TOTAL SYSTEM
SYSTEM LESS MOUNT
97.936
95,560
"Cost" is defined as cost to an airline based on 1976 dollars.
Therefore, the estimate of table 8-1 includes not only the average
cost to build 200 INS (800 channels), but also an estimate of
amortized development, production tooling, and test equipment
costs. The amortization schedule also includes delivery of
redundant strapdown INS equipment to other users beyond the
requirements of short-haul VTOL. The total build of systems is
assumed to be similar to the quantity of first-generation, com-
mercial inertial systems, LTN-51, built by Litton to date.
Approximately 14% of the net cost is due to this amortization.
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Cost items generally incurred by airlines but not included in this
total cost estimate are warranty, training and maintenance. These
are somewhat variable, depending upon customer requirements.
8.2 Basis of Estimate
The cost estimate was prepared from an estimated bill of material
of electronic components and the preliminary chassis desiqn shown
inparagraph 6.1.10. Component costs were then estimated from the
current catalog prices of these or similar items. Some limited
extrapolation of prices was needed based on cost trends (not
including inflation) especially in the area of digital circuits.
Material costs are then factored to include line-flow, attrition
and common stores items.
Allocation of components to printed circuit cards was made, from
which assembly and test hours were derived. Cost of assembly
and test labor also included factory allocables such as manu-
facturing engineering, production control, quality assurance,
test equipment maintenance and sustaining design engineering.
The chassis mount costs were spread among the various system
elements, based on the ratio of that element's cost to total
channel cost. System cost excluding the chassis mount is also
shown in table 8-1. Some form of installation provisions would
probably be supplied by the airframe designer in many applications.
An estimate was then made of the total developmental cost of the
redundant strapdown INS including productionizing the design,
environmental and EMI testing, handbooks, software, etc. Cost
of design or modification of test equipment and production tool-
ing was estimated as well as the procurement or build of a suffi-
cient quantity of items needed to support the production rate.
The total sum of development, tooling and test equipment was
then amortized over an assumed number of systems, with the
amortized amount then added to unit production cost. The
amortized amount added to each system element was based on the
ratio of that element's build cost to total channel build cost.
Final element costs include a factor for profit.
8.3 Cost Reduction Prospects
One area of potential System cost reduction is in the use of less
accurate gyros. Use of the Litton G-7 gyro instead of the G-6
could reduce system cost by nearly $3,000. A more sophisticated
filter combining radio and inertial data would be needed, however,
as described in Section 5.2 and paragraph 4.5.2.
Further cost reduction may be obtainable from the advancements
of digital technology. No attempt will be made to quantify such
a reduction, however.
348
403314
APPENDIX A
REDUNDANTSTRAPDOWNINERTIAL
NAVIGATION SYSTEMSPECIFICATION
A-I
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DEVELOPMENTSPECIFICATION
REDUNDANTSTRAPDOWNINERTIAL NAVIGATION UNIT
i. SCOPE
I.i Identification
This specification establishes the design requirements for
a low-cost, twice fail-operational redundant strapdown inertial
navigation unit, using two-degree-of-freedom, tuned-gimbal
gyroscopes.
1.2 Introduction
Improved integration of the various aircraft avionics func-
tions can lead to significant aircraft cost reductions. Sharing
of sensors between navigation and flight control functions, and
sharing of computers by navigation, flight control and air data
functions, tends to produce a low system cost with improved capa-
bility. Modern fly-by-wire aircraft using such a system require
extremely high reliability to achieve sufficient flight safety.
The specified redundant strapdown INS achieves the required reli-
ability. It is initially directed toward short haul VTOL aircraft
but shall be designed to be applicable to the full range of civil
and general aviation. Low cost is a firm design objective.
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 The following documents, of the issue in effect on the date
of invitation for bids or request for proposal, form a part of
this exhibit to the extent specified herein.
SPECI FI CATIONS TI TLE
ARINC 404 Specification, Air Transport Equipment
Cases and Racking
A-2
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SPECIFICATIONS
ARINC 413
ARINC 414
ARINC 571
ARINC 575
RTCA Paper
120-61/DO-108
TITLE
Report, Guidance for Aircraft Electrical
Power Utilization and Transient
Protection
Project Paper, General Guidance for
Equipment and Installation Designers
Characteristic, Inertial Sensor System
(ISS)
Characteristic, Mark 3 Sub-Sonic Air
Data System (Digital) DADS
Environmental Test Procedures, Airborne
Electronic Equipment
3. REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Item Definition
The redundant strapdown inertial navigation unit, hereinafter
referred to as INURs , shall provide multiply redundant sensing of
inertial quantities and redundant output of aircraft states (angu-
lar rates, linear accelerations, attitude, heading, velocities,
position coordinates) to other avionics. Essentially, inertial
sensing devices, gyros and accelerometers, shall be rigidly
mounted to the airframe (strapped down), without intervening gim-
bals. The INURs shall be capable of withstanding any combination
of two failures without degradation of system performance. It
shall also be capable of accepting position and velocity updates
from external avionics.
3.1.I System Diagrams
The complete INURs shall consist of four identical and inter-
changeable channels, as shown in the system block diagram, fig-
ure A-I. Each channel, designated an inertial navigation module
(INM), consists of the following elements.
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CHANNEL No. 1
CHANNELNo. 2
CHANNEL No. 3
CH_NELNo. 4
EXTERNAL J_I/ONO. 3
EXTERNAL_.___I_)NO. 4
Figure A-I. Redundant Strapdown INS
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a,
b.
An Inertial Measurement Module (IMM) with one two-degree-
of-freedom tuned gimbal gyroscope and two axes of accel-
eration measurement with associated electronics to pro-
vide digital outputs.
A general purpose digital computer including low cost,
semiconductor memory.
Co Digital I/O for two-way communication with external
avionics.
d. Digital I/O for read-capability of other INM's.
e o Power supplies, clock generators, and other support
electronics needed for proper INM operation.
The gyro and accelerometers of each INM shall be skewed rela-
tive to INM axes. When the 4 INM's are installed into a common
mount, rotated 90 ° relative to one another, the 4 gyro spin axes
shall be normal to four non-parallel faces of an octahedron.
Fail-operational/fail-operational capability is obtained
since if two complete channels fail, two channels remain and these
are sufficient to derive the required three axes of output data.
Redundancy management shall be contained in the software in each
computer and in external equipment using the INURs data.
Software implementation in the four computers shall be mech-
anized as shown in figure A-2. Software functions shall be as
follows :
a. Read-in gyro data, accelerometer data, and calibration
constants.
b. Compensate measured angular rate and acceleration using
the input calibration constants and known gyro charac-
teristics, and then transform measurements from skewed
axes to aircraft body axes.
C. Solve parity equations which allow extraction of measure-
ment errors from vehicle angular rates and linear accel-
erations, process outputs to detect and isolate failed
instruments. Failure detection and isolation (FDI)
results shall be combined with self-test results to
determine instrument status.
A-5
403314
,.4
<[wZ
u
0
-,-I
_J
N
cO
_J
4J
u_
0
b_
r-
_J
I
O
I
<
_r_
-,--t
A-6
403314
do Combine outputs of two gyros and two pairs of acceler-
ometer outputs in a least-squares solution in the design
equations to derive three axes of acceleration and
angular velocity, in aircraft coordinates. The selection
logic of instruments shall be based on use of the local
channel's instruments plus another channel's inputs,
the next cyclic* channel number satisfying FDI/self-test.
e. Perform integration of angular rate inputs to determine
the transformation from aircraft coordinates to naviga-
tion coordinates, and resolve accelerometer outputs
through this transformation.
f. Solve inertial navigation equations to derive required
outputs and derive inertial rate of the navigation
coordinate system to rotate the aircraft-to-navigation
coordinate transformation.
g. Perform additionalfunctions such as software executive
control, ground gyrocompassing alignment, initialization
and update from a display or external computer, self-test
and cross-fed output table comparisons, redundancy manage-
ment reinitialization, and gyro bias trimming based on
entered latitude and longitude and terminal errors.
In order to avoid time-skew errors, the executives of each
of the four computers shall be driven by an interrupt, and the
four computer interrupts shall be synchronized by fail-op/fail-op
circuitry contained within each INM.
The INURs shall be capable of operation as a fail-op naviga-
tor with installation of only three INMs.
Cyclic is defined as the ordered sequence of channel numbers,
e.g. 1,2,3,4,1,2
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3.1.2 Interface Definitions
Output requirements are as follows:
CATEGORY
Attitude
Attitude
Rate
Body**
Ac ce l-
eration
Naviga-
t ion
Outputs
QUANTITY
Pitch (Eleva-
tion)
Roll
IIeading, true
Pitch Rate
Roll Rate
Yaw Rate
Longitudinal
Accel.
Lateral Accel.
Vertical Accel.
(body)
North Velocity
IEast Velocity
Vertical Vel.
(earth)
Latitude
Longitude
Altitude
RESOLUTION
2w/215
2_/215
2w/215
0.05°/sec
0.05°/sec
0.05°/sec
0.003 m/sec 2
0.003 m/sec 2
0.003 m/sec 2
0.0 3 m/sec
0.03 m/sec
0.03 m/sec
2_/219
2n/219
0.3 m
Other Mode/Status N/A N/A
RANGE B I TS
±_/2" 14
±7 15
+n 15
±4 rad/sec 14
_+4 rad/sec 14
+4 rad/sec 14
+I0 g ii
+i0 g ii
+I0 g ii
_+1686 m/sec 16
±1686 m/sec 16
+1686 m/sec 16
CYCLE
TIME
0.03125
0.03125 I
0.03125
0.03125
0.03125
0.03125
0.03125
0.03125
0.03125
0.125
0.125
0.125
+_/2" 18 0.5
+_ 19 0.5
-305 m to 16 0.5
18.3 km
16 0.03125
*These outputs are generally scaled at +_.
**Installation is assumed to be at the aircraft center of
gravity so lever-arm accelerations are not included.
These outputs shall be provided separately from each INM on
an ARINC 575 formal serial data channel. An additional discrete
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relay closure shall be provided from each INM to indicate normal
INM operation, opening during a failed or off condition.
Three ARINC 575 receivers shall be provided in each INM.
One receiver shall be used to input aircraft barometric altitude
with resolution, range, and cycle time TBD. The second receiver
shall be used to input a system mode word, and position and
velocity updates with resolution, range, and cycle time TBD.
The third receiver shall be for growth purposes.
A discrete input shall be provided to each INM by means of
external jumper wires to identify the channel number to software
for use in skewed-axis to aircraft-axis transformations and
parity equations. Two additional jumper wires shall be monitored
to determine +90 ° installation from the nominal orientation
described in paragraph 3.2.2.1.
3.1.3 Inter-Channel Inter face
The following variables shall be received by each channel
from the other three channels:
Compensated velocity increments (3)
Compensated angular increments (3)
Attitude matrix, e.g., quaternions (4)
Vehicle velocity components (3)
Navigation direction cosines (6)
Inertial altitude
Accumulated velocity updates (2)
Accumulated position updates (2)
Output table (15)
Status
Some variables require transmission of more than one computer
word to obtain sufficient precision. Transmission of all 37 vari-
ables shall be completed in 1/128 second. Transmission of the
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first six variables shall be completed within 50 microseconds
after initiation of transmission. Scaling and resolution are
TBD.
3.1.4 Major Components
The INURs shall consist of four interchangeable line replace-
able INM and one chassis/mount. The chassis/mount shall contain
provisions as follows:
a. A shell to house the four INMs.
b. A central alignment block to register the INM gyros
and accelerometers to each other.
c. Attachment for four aircraft cable connectors, one for
each INM.
d. A latching mechanism to hold each INM into the chassis
mount, provide connector engagement between the INM
connector and the aircraft connector, and lock the INM
instrument block to the central alignment block.
e. Attachment for aircraft cooling methods.
f. A plenum for even distribution of cooling air through
the 4 INM's.
g. Provisions for bolting the INU_^ to the aircraft and pro-
viding for boreslght allgnment of the central alignment
block to the aircraft axes.
3.2 Characteristics
3.2.1 Performance
3.2.1.1 Modes of Operation
The basic operating modes of the INURs are as follows:
OFF All power is removed from the system.
ALIGN Automatic sequencing through the various steps needed
for alignment shall be provided. The align mode is
initiated only on the ground. Automatic transfer to
A-10
403314
ALIGN
(cont) the navigate mode shall occur if aircraft motionis detected via the INS accelerometers.
NAV All outputs shall be provided to full accuracy in
this mode.
ATTITUDE Consideration shall be given to use of a pendulous
attitude mode in flight during certain failure con-
ditions if the end reliability of attitude and
attitude rate outputs can be improved.
These modes are mutually exclusive and, with the exception
of ATTITUDE, are selected from an operator's panel external to the
INURs. The ATTITUDE mode, if provided, shall be selected by
redundancy management software in the event of a third channel
failure.
Other software-controlled operating modes shall be provided.
These are :
UPDATE Accept position and velocity coordinate errors (4)
and correct INURs outputs. Provide growth capabil-
ity for tilt, heading, and gyro bias updates.
Updates will be made asynchronously, with a mini-
mum time duration of 1 second between updates.
RECON-
FIGURE
Based on results of FDI and self-test, change
selection of instrument channel number beinq used
in design equation solution. Reuse of a pre-
viously failed channel shall be provided if it
again satisfies FDI thresholds.
REIN-
ITIALIZE
A computer shall reinitialize its attitude trans-
formation, velocity, and position calculations to
another channel's values following reuse of a
previously failed channel, including one that was
removed and replaced during maintenance. In addi-
tion, consideration shall be given to reinitializa-
tion under the following conditions:
a. Following any channel reconfiguration activated
by FDI provisions.
b. Following detection of a large error in soft-
ware output tables, which may have been caused
by a computer transient.
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3.2. i. 2 Accuracy
The INURs shall have the following output accuracy:
Attitude rate
Body acceleration
Attitude
Heading
Velocity (no
updates)
Position
(no updates)
0.05°/sec, rms, per axis
0.003 m/sec 2, rms, per axis
0.i °, rms, per axis
0.2 ° , rms, VTOL flight profile
TBD °, rms, CTOL* flight profile
3 m/sec/axis, io, VTOL flight profile
TBD ft/sec/axis, io, CTOL flight profile
7.4 km/HR, CEP, VTOL flight profile
TBD NM/HR, CEP, CTOL flight profile
This accuracy shall apply with either 0, 1 or 2 hardware
failures, through the operational environment described. It is
assumed that aircraft installation errors are not included, air-
craft parking coordinates have been entered perfectly, and a full
gyrocompassing alignment has been completed at a latitude of
45 ° prior to first aircraft motion.
3.2.1.3 Ground Alignment Time
The redundant strapdown INU shall complete its self-contained
alignment in less than i0 minutes from system turn-on. No external
inputs shall be required, with the exception of aircraft latitude
and longitude entered within two minutes after system turn-on.
Aircraft motion during alignment shall consist of the model
described in Paragraph 3.2.5.2.3. The alignment time required
applies for a starting ambient temperature greater than 0°C and
less than 50°C and for a latitude less than 70 °
Conventional take-off and landing aircraft.
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3.2.1.4 Redundancy Management
3.2.1.4.1 Redundancy Management Logic
Redundancy management logic shall consist of the following:
a. A computer shall always use the instruments within its
own INM chassis.
b . A computer's output calculations shall be based on only
two channels of instrument data.
C. The second channel used in a given calculation shall be
the next working cyclic channel number.
d. Accelerometer and gyro redundancy management shall be
independent of each other except for major failures
detected by self-test.
e o Detection and isolation of a failure of one axis of a
channel shall cause rejection of both axes of data,
except (a.) supersedes.
f_ An instrument's outputs shall continue to be monitored
following its rejection, but not included in output
calculation, except (a.) supersedes.
g° If a failed instrument returns to working condition as
determined by FDI, it shall be reinstated into output
calculations, based on normal instrument selection logic.
The computer of the same channel number of the reinstated
instrument shall reinitialize to the state of a non-
failed channel.
h. Logic shall be incorporated to detect and isolate two
simultaneous failures within information limits of a
4-gyro skewed array.
i. During the condition of isolation ambiguity, monitoring
shall continue. A status word output shall indicate
presence of a failure and approximate magnitude.
j . Indicated instrument failures shall be placed into 3
categories:
a. HARD - inoperative (self-test)
b. GF 3 -nav and flight control failure
c. GF 2 - nay failure
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k. Instruments with category HARD failures shall never be
reused even if failure condition disappears.
i. Instruments with category GF_ failures should be used
following a third channel failure or to resolve a cate-
gory GF 3 3-gyro isolation ambiguity
3.2.1.4.2 Error Detection/Switching Levels* and Time
The levels which shall be used in the FDI mechanism to
indicate failure of an instrument are given in table A-I. An
instrument error and its integral are shown. The threshold error
is the minimum detectable instrument error. The error integral,
e.g., angle delta or velocity delta, may be used to determine
the time to detect large errors. FDI solution time shall be suf-
ficiently fast that errors greater than these amounts do not
reach system outputs regardless of instrument error amplitude.
TABLE A-I. PRELIMINARY ERROR DETECTION/SWITCIIING
LEVELS PER INSTRUMENT
FLIGHT
FAILURE TYPE GROUND NO TURNS FLIGHT TURNS
NAV FAILURE
Acceleration Threshold
Velocity Delta
Angular Rate Threshold
Angle Delta
NAV/FLT CONTROL FAILURE
Acceleration Threshold
Velocity Delta
Angular Rate Threshold
Angle Delta
0.0 3 m/
sac _
i. 5 m/sec
0.1 °/hr
30 sec
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.001 m/
sec 2
4 m/sec
1 °/hr
60 sec
0.03 m/
sec 2
12 m/sec
l°/sec
1 o
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
0.0 3 m/sec 2
12 m/sec
1 °/sec
1 o
Detection/switching levels indicated in the table are approximate.
Further testing and/or analysis are needed to establish reason-
able levels. Corrective maintenance action will occur if one or
more nav failures is indicated before takeoff.
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3.2.1.4.3 Performance Transients
System error buildups following occurrence of a failure, but
before FDI action, shall be minimized. Performance shall return
to normal following redundancy management actions.
3.2. i. 5 Per formance/Environment
A typical flight profile for the VTOL application consists
of:
a. System turn-on at 20°C, start alignment, passenger
loading/refueling in progress, aircraft subject to
wind gusts, ground power applied to the aircraft.
b. Engine turn-on after five minutes.
c. System advanced to Navigate Mode after 10 minutes, remove
ground power
d. Engage rotors, perform vertical take-off.
e. Climb to 305 m altitude, turn left 90 ° at a turn rate of
3°/see.
f. Accelerate to 103 m/sec and cruise for 6 minutes.
g. Turn left 90 ° then spiral down at turn rates of 3°/sec.
(typical peak turn rate of 30°/sec).
h. Decelerate and perform vertical descent to touchdown.
i. Disengage rotors, unload/reload passengers for
3.5 minutes.
j. Repeat d thru h two additional times, then turn off
system power.
The non-VTOL applications are assumed to have the flight pro-
file as follows:
a*1I Same as above
c.
d. Take-off, climb to 9,000 m altitude, accelerate to
257 m/sec.
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e. Turn left 90 ° at a turn rate of 3°/sec.
f. Cruise for 2 hours with two i0 ° course changes at turn
rates of l°/sec.
The required and desired aircraft operational performance limits
are :
Angular Rates
Angular Acceleration
Linear Accel. (maneuver)
Velocity (max.)
Altitude
Aircraft tilt (parked)
Range of operation
(latitude)
3.2. i. 6 Power
CIVIL OR GENERAL
VTOL AV IAT ION
4 rad/sec 4 rad/sec
50 rad/sec 2 50 rad/sec 2
±3 g +3 g
154 m/sec 1029 m/sec
3048 m 18,300 m
+5 ° ±5 °
+70 o Worldwide
The aircraft power supply characteristics, utilization and
general guidance, are given in ARINC 413. The redundant strap-
down INU shall be designed to use II5V AC single phase power, per
MIL-STD-704, Category B. A separate input shall be utilized for
each redundant power supply.
Capability of operation from an external battery, equivalent
to Sonotone P/N CA-51N, shall be provided with each redundant
power supply. In addition, each supply shall contain a battery
charger, as required by ARINC 561. The redundant strapdownn INS
shall also have the capability of operating from redundant standby
computer DC buses for backup power, as defined in ARINC 571, para-
graph 2.4.5.1, in lieu of the battery.
Maximum average power drawn by each INM during flight condi-
tions shall be under 150 watts. The chassis/mount shall require
no power.
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3.2.1.7 Cooling
Cooling air having the characteristics of ARINC 404 may be
utilized if required. Maximum cooling air flow shall be 14 kg/
hour/100 watts. Cooling air attachment method, if other than that
specified in ARINC 404, shall be TBD.
3.2.1.8 Operational Service Life
The redundant strapdown INS shall be capable of operation for
at least 3,000 hours, preferably 5,000 hours, without additional
lubrication, adjustment or replacement of components (per ARINC
414). Scheduled calibrations required to be performed during
Level 2 maintenance, shall be minimized.
3.2.1.9 Built-In Self-Test
Minimum self-contained self-test features shall be incorporated
within each INM:
To prevent chain-type failure modes which could lead
to extensive equipment or aircraft damage.
To provide a high level of capability of detecting
failures of each gyro to reduce the probability of a
failure occurring within the 3-gyro isolation
singularities.
To contribute to making the third failure a fail-safe
condition, that is, to indicate to the aircraft flight
crew that a failure has occurred.
To provide information to maintenance personnel for use
in determining the failed module for repair.
3.2.2 Physical Characteristics
3.2.2.1 Inertial Measurement Skewed Axis Geometry
Figure A-3 shows the nominal orientation of the accelerometer
and gyro input axes, and gyro spin axes relative to aircraft axes.
The angles between axes shall be as determined by the faces of
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Figure A-3. Inertial Measurement Axis Geometry (Nominal)
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half of a regular octahedron. The two orthogonal gyro/accelerometer
input axes shall be oriented symmetrically relative to the outside
edge of the octahedron.
Normal orientation of the octahedron relative to aircraft
axes is shown in figure A-3. Some applications may require
installation into the aircraft with the INURs rotated ±90 ° about
z B from the nominal. Means of computing the outputs in either
rotated installation shall be provided by means of jumper wires
on the INM connectors.
3.2.2.2 Dimensions
The maximum INURs dimensions are shown in figure A-4. These
dimensions do not include protrusions such as handles, latching
mechanisms, connectors, or boresight adjustment provisions. They
do include the holding chassis/mount.
3.2.2.3 Weight
The weight of the INURs shall not exceed 32 kg.
of each INM shall not exceed 7 kg.
The weight
3.2.2.4 Alignment Repeatability
The angular alignment between the instrument blocks of
adjacent INM's shall be 90 ° +30 arc seconds (3 sigma). This
alignment shall be maintained following repeated insertions of each
INM, and through the environments specified in paragraph 3.2.5.
Removal and replacement of one INM shall not disturb the alignment
of the remaining three.
The angular alignment between the alignment block and air-
craft axes shall be capable of being boresighted to, and maintain-
ing through the environments of paragraph 3.2.5, an accuracy of
±12 arc minutes in pitch, roll, and yaw.
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O._m
INM NO. 1
INM NO. 4
I NM NO. 3
INM NO. 2
0.36 m
0.36 m
A-20
Figure A-4. INURs Installation Dimensions
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3.2.2.5 Packaging of Redundant Elements
The four INM's shall each be packaged into a separate
housing. The chassis mount shall provide EMI, thermal, and as
much mechanical shielding between INM's as practical within
weight and size limitations, to reduce the probability of multi-
ple INM failures due to a single cause. There shall be no elec-
trical interconnection between INMs within the confines of the
INURs envelope.
It is assumed that the aircraft designer will locate the INURs
away from the path of rotating machinery such as engines or APUs
which might shed debris during certain failure modes.
3.2.3 Reliability
The probability of failure of the INURs during a 0.5 hour
flight, assuming no failures are present at takeoff, shall be
-9
less than 10 , including effects of self-contained FDI coverage.*
A failure is said to occur when undetected or unisolated gyro or
accelerometer errors exceed the navigation performance detection
levels given in table I of paragraph 3.2.1.4.2. Coverage of FDI
capability external to the INURs shall be assumed to be unity
for both fail-op levels.
The probability of failure of the attitude rate and accelera-
tion outputs of the INURs during a 1.0 hour flight, assuming no
-I0
failures are present at takeoff, shall be less than 5 x i0 ,
including effects of self-contained FDI coverage. A failure is
said to occur when undetected or unisolated gyro or accelerometer
errors exceed the flight control system performance detection
levels given in table I of paragraph 3.2.1.4.2. Coverage of FDI
capability external to the INURs shall be assumed to be unity for
both fail-op levels.
Coverage is defined as the probability of recovery from a given
failure.
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Provisions for reliability improvement by use of external
radio aid update information to resolve the rare 3-gyro isolation
ambiguity shall be included. Increased coverage from this means
shall not be included in the previous INURs reliability
calculations.
The mature in-service MTBF of each INM shall be greater than
3000 hours.
3.2.4 Maintainability
3.2.4.1 Maintainability Design
Plug-in assembly construction shall be used to the greatest
extent practical. All modules bearing the same part number shall
be interchangeable. As a goal, electronic modules shall not
require adjustment or recalibration after replacement. Care
should be exercised in locating and mounting of modules and com-
ponents for ease of accessibility.
Each aircraft-replaceable unit shall have a failure indicator,
visible from the front panel which indicates that one or more of
the internal modules has failed. This indication shall be present
with or without power applied to the system and shall only be
reset after repair.
Highly reliable self-test shall be included, consistent with
redundancy management requirements. All self-test provisions
shall be continuous and automatic, with no pilot-initiated tests.
Sufficient unit test points shall be included to allow fault
isolation to the module level using factory or field test equipment.
Module test points shall be provided to allow fault isolation to
the failed component without probing.
3.2.4.2 Maintainability Specification
The time to remove and replace an INM in the aircraft,
assuming adequate accessibility, shall be less than one minute,
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including mechanical alignment registration as defined in para-
graph 3.2.2.4. Normal functioning of the other three INMs shall
not be disturbed during this process.
3.2.4.3 Adjustments
Manually-activated on-aircraft adjustments, alignments or
calibrations shall not be required by the INURs. Adjustment,
alignment, or calibration devices shall not be accessible during
normal, on-aircraft handling. The INURs shall require no periodic
maintenance.
Automatic self-biasing methods using entered ramp position
coordinates (accurate to ±2 kin), gyrocompassing alignment pro-
cedures, and terminal position and velocity indications shall be
used to the extent practical to maintain system performance
within required bounds over long periods of time.
3.2.5 Environmental Conditions
The redundant strapdown INS shall be designed in accordance
with ARINC 414 except as modified herein, and be capable of being
tested in accordance with RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-108, with condi-
tions modified to be consistent with this specification.
3.2.5.1 Ambient Temperature
Normal ambient temperature: 30°C
Maximum continuous operation: 50°C
Short term (30 min) overtemp: 71°C
Low operating temp: -15°C
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3.2.5.2 Vibration
3.2.5.2. i General
The INURs shall be capable of operation during vibration as
specified by RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-108, Category A. This vibra-
tion level consists of a constant total excursion of 0.76 mm from
i0 to 55 cps with a maximum of 5 g, and of 5 g from 55 to 500 cps.
3.2.5.2.2 Performance Vibration
The angular and linear vibrations present during flight to be
used for performance estimates are shown in table A-II. These
shall be considered 3 sigma environments, present during 50 per-
cent of the flight, with a phase correlation between axes of 0.3.
TABLE A-II. MAXIMUM PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENT
SINUSOIDAL RANDOM
Linear
Angular
Linear/angular
0.3 grms @28 Hz
1.0 deg/sec @15 I1z
rms
0.i grms-deg/SeCrms @15 Hz
0.00045 (grms)2/Hz
0-200 Hz (0.3 grms )
0.033 (deg/sec
rms
Hz
0-30 Hz (i.0 deg/
sec )
rms
0.0033 (grms-deg/
see )/Hz
rms
0-30 Hz (0.1 grms-
deg/sec )
rms
)2/
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3.2.5.2.3 Motion During Ground Alignment
Coning motion of the vehicle shall be assumed to occur during
ground alignment with a cone whole-angle of four arc minutes, at
a frequency between 1 and 4.5 Hz. Sudden pitch or roll rotations
of 0.5 ° shall also be assumed. Motion of the aircraft due to
wind gusts shall be assumed to be a first-order Markov process
with a standard deviation of 4 _n with a correlation time of
20 seconds.
3.2.5.3 Shock
Operational :
3.3
6 g with a time duration of at least 10 milli-
sec., in accordance with the procedure of
RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-I08.
Crash Safety: 15 g with a time duration of at least 10 milli-
sec. , in each direction.
Design and Construction
3.3.1 Electromagnetic Interference
The redundant strapdown INS shall meet the conducted and
radiated susceptibility and emission requirements of ARINC 413,
and the test requirements of RTCA Paper 120-61/DO-108, for Cate-
gory A equipment. Grounding and shielding practices shall be used
in accordance with ARINC 413.
3.3.2 Humidity
The redundant strapdown INS shall be capable of normal opera-
tion during conditions of a relative humidity varying from 10 per-
cent to 100 percent, combined with temperature and altitude cycling
encountered in normal aircraft operation, as defined by ARINC 414,
for Category A (Std) environment.
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3.3.3 Explosive Atmosphere
Explosive atmosphere is not normally encountered by elec-
tronics equipment in airline type aircraft. Specific installa-
tions where explosive vapor presents an operating hazard are
normally defined by the airframe manufacturer.
3.3.4 Atmospheric Pressure
Normal atmospheric pressure range is from -305 m to
13,700 m. Decompression from a pressure altitude of 2100 m to
13,700 m in 15 seconds or less shall not degrade system per-
formance, per ARINC 414.
3.4 Logistics
The INURs design shall be compatible with the following
maintenance structure:
Level 1 Unit replacement, in aircraft
Level 2 Module replacement, in the shop
Level 3 Module repair (excluding gyros and
accelerometers)
Level 4 Gyro/Accelerometer repair
Level 1 maintenance shall not require the use of any standard or
special test equipment.
3.5 Major Component Characteristics
3.5.1 Inertial Measurement Module (IMM)
The IMM shall consist of one two-degree-of-freedom, tuned-
gimbal gyro, two sing!e-degree-of-freedom accelerometers, with
supporting loop-closure electronics. Compensation coefficients
for use in software for correction of systematic instrument errors
shall be contained in a memory which, when installed, may not be
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altered by any means. Self-test capability shall be included to
detect loop-closure failures.
3.5.2 Digital Computer
The digital computer shall be of the general purpose type
with the instruction sequence and constants stored in a memory
which, when installed, may not be altered by any means.
Space in the INM chassis shall be included for expansion of
instruction memory by 100 percent from that needed for the INURs
problem as defined in this specification. Spare computer execu-
tion time shall also be provided, for greater than 100,000 instruc-
tions per second with an average instruction mix as shown in
table A-III.
TABLE A-III. SPARE CAPACITY INSTRUCTION MIX
TYPE
PERCENTAGE
UTILIZATION
Load/Store ii. 9
D-Load/Store 31.8
Copy 5.5
Exchange 4.2
D-Sh ift 9.1
Add/Sub i0.5
D-Add/Sub 13.1
Multiply 6.4
D-Multiply 5.5
Divide 0.6
Transfer i. 4
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A portion of the computer memory shall be non-volatile with
removal of aircraft power. Last-computed values of the following
variables shall be retained following normal or failure-mode
power shut down, for a time duration of over 30 days without
external power:
a. Calibration constants which are modified during the
course of normal operation.
b. Latitude, longitude, velocities, and quaternions.
c. Maintenance data, e.g., self-test results, FDI informa-
tion, etc.
Computer self-test provisions shall be included such as:
a. A watchdog timer not driven from the main computer
clock, periodically reset under software control,
indicating a failure if not reset
b. Instruction tests
c. Memory tests
d. I/O tests
3.5.3 Computer I/O
Input/output provisions for interfacing the computer with
the various peripheral elements shall be included:
a. Interface with one IMM including the calibration
constant memory and temperature sensors.
b. Interface with external avionics via ARINC 575
transmitter/receivers.
c. Interface with up to three other INMs. Particular care
must be taken in the design of this circuitry to avoid
single-point INURs failure modes.
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3.5.4 Power Supply and Support Electronics
The power supply design shall include monitoring circuits
for over-voltage, under-voltage, and short circuit protection.
Automatic shutdown shall occur during failure modes to avoid
potentially hazardous or chain-failure conditions.
Computer and IMM clock and timing circuitry shall be included.
Provision for synchronization of all software executive inter-
rupts shall be included to avoid errors due to time-skew of sensor
data readouts. Particular care must be taken in the design of
this circuitry to avoid single-point INURs failure modes.
A-29
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APPENDIX B
PARITY EQUATIONS
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Parity Equations
Parity equations will now be derived for the semioctahedral
spin axis orientation. Equations are based on TDF gyro measure-
ments.
Test relations for a semioctahedral array are obtained as
follows. Four unit spin vectors are defined (Si, i = i, 2, 3, 4)
normal to and directed outward from the four triangular faces of
a semioctahedron, (figure B-I). From symmetry considerations the
following useful relations can be obtained.
^ ^ s3 1
-(-i) i S i = 0 = S 1 - S 2 + - S 4
S i • S = (-I! i+j3 3 i _ j (i}
The output planes (sensitive axes) of the TDF gyros lie in the
triangular faces of the pyramid, hence, a set of parity equations
can be constructed by resolving the gyro output rates along the
pyramid edges and comparing them. This leads to six independent
comparisons and can be formalized as follows. First, find the
unit edge vectors of the pyramid. These edge vectors must be
^
perpendicular to the adjacent spin vectors. Thus edge vector e.
^ ^ 13
can be defined from the spin vectors S i and Sj as:
A ^
^ S. X S.
l _ i 9 je = ^ ^
13 IS i x Sj I
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e41
Figure B-I. Semioctahedral Spin and Edge Vectors
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Since
we have
^ ^ 1
ISi • Sj I =
Isi x sjl -- i - =
thus
^ V_ (Si ^
eij = x Sj) i 9 j (2)
Now suppose the output rate of the ith gyro is W. and the
1
j th gyro W.. Then we can define the parity test as:3
Tij = W • e.- W" e. i 9 j13 3 ij
or
A
Tij* = (Wi - 3 )3 " e..13 i _ j (3)
Now, before proceeding, note that Tij = Tji , since both the sign
of the rate difference and the edge vector sign change on inter-
change of index. Thus the test equations can be written as
Tij = (W i - Wj) • eij i < j
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or expanding
TI2 = (W1 - W2) • el2
A
T 1 = (W 1 - W 3) • el33
TI4 = (W 1 - W 4) _ el4
A
T23 = (W 2 - W3) • e23
T24 = (W 2 - W 4) - e24
T34 = (W 3 - 34 ) • e34
In reality the gyros do not output rates but incremental
angles
(4)
= dt
i%At
Furthermore, these incremental angles have "noise" components.
Hence, it is desirable (necessary) to filter them. For the
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purposes of this treatment we define Tij = filtered I (Tij) thus
the test equations become
T. • = filtered
13
W, - W. • e..
j. j 1j
i = 1 ... 4, i< j < 4
1For example a first order filter of the form
T. ((n+l)At) = K T..(nAt) + T, .((n+l)At)
• 3 13 13
might be employed.
o (n+l) At * dt_- e-k (t-T) Ti 3
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APPENDIX C
LOGISTICS ANALYSIS
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LOGISTICS ANALYSIS
VTOL Operations
i. OPERATIONALCRITERIA
1.0 SYSTEM UTILIZATION
TYPICAL ROUTE PLAN
S TART
MAIN
BASE
S h u tdown
# 1 LEG
T
#4 LEG
# 3 LEG
ACTIVITY #i LEG #2 LEG #3 LEG #4 LEG
Ground Operations (Power on) 6.5
Unloading/Loading: 3.5
Ascent 2.5
Cruise 6.0
Descent 3.0
Servicing (Power off)
3.5 3.5 3.5
2.5 2.5 2.5
6.0 6.0 6.0
3.0 3.0 3.0
8.5
Total Time (Minutes) 21.5 15.0 15.0 23.5
Total Flight Time per Route
Total Ground Operating Time (Power On)
Total Time for One Complete Cycle
46.0 Minutes
20.5 Minutes
75.0 Minutes
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I. 1 OPERATIONALMODES:
Peak Demand Period 6:00 AM to 6:00 PM
Reduced Operational Period - 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM
OPTIONS :
Time Between Port Stops
A. i Aircraft per Route
B. 2 Aircraft per Route
C. 3 Aircraft per Route
D. 5 Aircraft per Route
Peak
90 Minutes
45 Minutes
30 Minutes
15 Minutes
Reduced
120 Minutes
60 Minutes
45 Minutes
30 Minutes
1.2
Total Routes Flown per day:
Peak Period
Reduced Operations Period
A B C D
14 28 40 72
8 16 24 48
6 12 16 24
slack Time Between Flights (Minutes)
Peak Period
Reduced Operations Period
Total Operating Hours per day
Avg. Operating Hours Per A/C/
day
Total Flight Hours per day
Avg. Flight Hours per A/C/
day
15 15 15 0
45 34 60 75
15.52 31.10 44.33 79.80
15.52 15.50 14 .78 15.96
10.73 21.47 30.67 55.20
10.73 10.73 10.22 11.04
OPERATIONAL SITES:
Given
Assuming 90% Operational
Readiness
200 Aircraft In Inventory
= 180 Aircraft Operational
= 20 Aircraft In Maintenance
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Assuming one (I) Main Base has five (5) separate routes, then:
TOTAL TOTAL
OP:A/C BACKUP TOTAL SATELLITE
OPTION REQD A/C A/C MAIN BASES PORTS OPER. SITES
A 5 1 6 30 450 480
B i0 1 ii 16 240 256
C 15 1 16 ll 165 176
D 25 1 26 7 105 112
1.3 OPERATING TIME:
AVG. FLIGHT NO. OF A/C TOTAL FLIGHT OP/FT HR
OPTION HRS. PER DAY IN USE HRS. PER MON. RATIO
A 10.73 150 48,285 1.444 :i
B I0.73 160 51,504 1.444 :I
C 10.22 165 50,589 1.446 :i
D ii.04 175 57,960 1.445:1
1.4 ESTIMATED RELIABILITY:
Channel: 3,000 Hours MTBF (4 per aircraft)
Consisting of:
IMM: 6,000 Hours MTBF
COMPUTER: 7,500 Hours MTBF
POWER SUPPLY: 30,000 Hours MTBF
Unit: 750 Hours MTBF (I per aircraft)
i. 5 FAILURES
1.5.1 "Hard" Failures, or "Soft" Failures exceeding system
de'gradation limits, encountered in flight will require removal
and replacement of failed unit at next ground operational site.
Take-off for next leg of route will not be attempted until all
INS Units operational.
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1.5.2 "Soft" failures in flight, not exceeding system degradation
limits, will require system monitoring until return to the main
base where the faulty unit will be removed and replaced.
i. 6 MAINTENANCE :
1.6.1 Maintenance at satellite ports restricted to removal and
replacement of INS units within 3 minutes (i minute installation
time) using minimal, common hand tools.
1.6.2 Maintenance at the main operating base shall consist of:
a. Fault verification and removal and replacement of failed
INS Units.
bo Fault detection and isolation to replaceable assembly
within the INS unit; removal and replacement of failed
replaceable assembly; and repair verification.
2.0 INITIAL AND REPLACEMENT SPARES COSTS.
modules not included)
(INS Unit only --
(PFH) (UF) (QPA) (1-RIP)
C 1 = (STK) (M) (UC) + (DRCT) (UC)MTBF
Where :
STK
M
UC
PFH
UF
QPA
RIP
MTBF
DRCT
= Stock Level at a site (units)
= Number of Operating Sites
= Unit Cost
= Peak Flying Hours per Month
= Ratio of Operating Hours to
Flying Hours
= Quantity of Like Items per
Aircraft
= Fraction of Failures which can
be repaired in place
= Mean Time Before Failure in
Operating Hours/Box
= Average Repair Cycle Time
(In months)
1 Box 4 Box
-- 1 --
- Ref. Para. 1.2
90K 23.75K
- Ref. Para. 1.3 -
- Ref. Para. 1.3 -
1 - 4
.00
750 3OOO
.0667 - .0500
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2.1 Spare units Stocked at Sites:
2.1.1 One Box Inertial Navigation System
Option A. = (i) (480) (90K) + (48,285) (1.444) (I) (I-0)
• 750 (.0667) (90K)
= $43,758,067.
B. = (i) (256) (90K) + (51,504)(1.444) (i)
750 ($6,003.)
= $23,635,272.
C. = (i) (176) (90K) + (50,589)(1.446)(1)
750 ($6,003.)
= $16,425,506.
D. = (i) (112) (90K) + (57,960) (1.445) (i)
750 ($6,003.)
= $10,750,353.
2.1.2 Four Box Inertial Navigation System
Option A. = (i) (480) (23.75K) + (48,285) (1.444) (4) (i-0)
3000 (.05) (23.75K)
= $11,510,396
B. = (I) (256) (23.75K) + (51,504) (1.444) (4)
3000 ($1,187.50)
= $6,197,755.
C. = (i) (176) (23.75K) + (50,589) (1.446) (4)
3000 ($1,187.50)
= $4,295,824
D. = (i) (112) (23.75K) + (57,960) (1.445) (4)
3000 ($1,187.50)
= $2,792,608
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2.2 On-Board Spares (i Replacement Unit per Aircraft)
C 2 = (Operational Aircraft) + (Standby Aircraft) + (Repair
Pipeline Units)
2.2.1 One Box Inertial Navigation System:
Option A. = (I)(150)(90K) + (i) (30) (90K) + 558,067
= $16,758,067.
B. = (I) (160) (90) + (i) (16) (90) + 595,272
= $16,435,272
C. = (i) (165) (90) + (i) (ii) (90) + 585,506
= $16,425,506
D. = (i) (175) (90) + (i) (7) (90) + 670,353
= $17,050,353
2.2.2 Four Box Inertial Navigation System:
Option A. = (i) (150) (23.75K) + (i) (30) (23.75K) + 110,396
= $4,385,396
B. = (I) (150) (23.75K) + (I) (16) (23.75K) + 117,755
= $4 ,O6O ,255
C. = (i) (165) (23.75K) + (i) (ii) (23.75K) + 115,824
= $4,295,824
D. = (i)(175)(23.75K) + (1)(7)(23.75K) + 132,608
= $4,455,108
3.0 ON-AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COSTS (MONTHLY)
(PFH) (UF)(QPA)[PAMH + (RMH + RVH)] (BLR + DDR)C3 = MTBF
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Where :
PFH
UF
3.1
3.1.1
= Peak Flying Hours per Month
= Ratio of Operating Hours to
Flying Hours
QPA = Quantity of Like Items per Aircraft
MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure in
Operating Hours
PAMH= Average Manhours for Preparation
and Access to Unit
RMH = Average Manhours to Remove and
Replace Unit
RVH = Average Time to Verify Restoration
of System to Operational Status
BLR = Basic Labor Rate for Maintenance
Personnel
DDR = Dispatch Delay Rate
Not Requirin@ System Shutdown
Four Box Inertial Navigation System
1 BOX 4 BOXES
- Ref. Para. 1.3 -
- Ref. Para. I. 3 -
1 4
750 3000
- i Min/4 Min
- 2 Min -
10 Min .5 Min
- $24. Hr
- $3,000. Hr
3.1.I.1 On-Board Spare Available
Option A. =
(48,285) (1.444) (i)
750 [.0166 + (.0333 + .0083)]($24. +$3,000.)
= $18,681
(51,504)(1.444)(1)
B. = 750
= $17,207.
(.0582) ($3,024.)
(50,589) (1.446) (i)
C. =
750
= $17,165.
(.0582)($3,024.)
D. = (57,960) (1.445) (i! (.0582) ($3 024 )
750 ' "
= $19,653.
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3.1.i.2 Replacement Spare Stocked at Site
Option A. =
(48,285) (1.444) (i)
750
= $35,512
[.0667 + (.0333 + .0083) ] ($24. + $3.000)
(51,504) (1.444) (i)
B. = 750
= $32,036.
(.1083) ($3,024.)
C. (50,589) (1.446) (i) ( 1083) ($3,024 )
750 " "
= $31,941.
(57,960) (1.445) (I)
D. = 750
= $36,572.
(.1083) ($3,024.)
3.2 Requiring System Shut Down During Maintenance
3.2.1 One Box Inertial Navigation System
3.2.1.1 On-Board Spare Available
Option A. =
(48,285) (1.444) (4)
3000 [.0166 + (.0333 + .1667)]
($24. + $3,000.) = $69,561
S. _- (51r504) (1"444) (4) (2167) ($3,024)
3000 " "
= $64,102
(50,589) (1.446)(4)
C. :
3000
= $63,912.
(.2167)($3,024.)
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Option D. = (57,960) (1.445) (4)3000
= $73,177.
(.2167) ($3,024.)
3.2.1.2 Replacement Spare Stocked at Site
Option A. =
(48,285) (1.444) (4)
3000
= $87,452
[.0667 + (.0333 + .1667)]
(51,504)(1.444)(4)
B. =
3000
= $78,892.
(.2667) ($3,024.)
C° ---_
(50,589) (1.446) (4)
3000
= $78,658.
(.2667)($3,024.)
(57,960) (1.445) (4) (.2667) ($3,024.)
m. =
= $90,062.
4.0 OFF-AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COSTS: (MONTHLY)
C4 = MTBF
(PFH) (UF) (QPA)
[ (RTS) (BMH) (SLR + SMR) ]
Where:
PFH
UF
QPA
MTB F
RTS
= Peak Flying Hours per Month
= Ratio of Operating Hours to
Flying Hours
= Quantity of Like Items per Aircraft 1
= Mean Time Between Failure in 750
Operating Hours
= Fraction of Units Expected to be
Repaired at Main Base
1 BOX 4 BOXES
- Ref. Para. I. 3 -
- Ref. Para. i°3 -
4
3000
1.00
C-10
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BM_{
SLR
SMR
1 BOX
= Average Manhours to Perform Shop 3
Maintenance on failed units
including fault isolation, repair,
and verification (INS Unit only-
module repair not included)
= Shop Labor Rate per Hour - $34. -
= Shop Material Consumption Rate per - $16. -
Ho ur
4 BOXES
2
4.1 One Box Inertial Navigation System
Option A. = (48,285) (1.444) (i)
750 [ (I) (3) ($34 + $16) ] = $16,265
B (51,504) (1.444) (i)
" = 750 ($150.) = $14,673.
C. = (50,589) (1.446) (i)
750 ($150.) = $14,628.
(57,960) (1.445) (i)
D. = 750 ($150.) = $16,750•
4.2 Four Box Inertial Navigation System
Option A _ (48,285) (1.444) (4)
• 3000 [ (i) (2) ($34. + $16.) ] = $10,843.
B. (51,504)(1.444)(4)
= 3000 ($100.) = $9,783.
C. = (50,589) (1.446) (4)
3OOO ($i00.) = $9,753.
m. (57,960)(1-445)(4)($100.)
30O0 = $ii ,167.
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5.0 LIFE CYCLE MAINTENANCE COSTS
Assuming :
Service Life of Inertial Navigation System = 10 years
Increase in Reliability = 5000 Hours MTBF for mature system
5.1 On Aircraft Maintenance Costs
C 5 = [C 3 - (K) (C3) ] (IUP)
Where :
C 3 = Monthly On-Aircraft Maintenance Costs
K -- Adjustment Factor to establish Average
Monthly Costs over Program Period
IUP = Inventory Usage Period (Operational Ser-
vice Life of System in Months)
Ref. Para. 3.0
20%
120
5.1.I Spares at Site
OPTION BOXES
A 1
4
B 1
4
C 1
4
D 1
4
5.1.1.2
OPTION
A
B
[87,452 - (.2) (87,452) ] (120) = $8,395,390.
[35,512 - (.2)(35,512)] (120) = $3,409,130.
[78,892 - (.2) (78,892) ] (120) = $7,573,632
[32,036 - (.2) (32,036)] (120) = $3,075,456.
[78,658 - (.2) (78,658) ] (120) = $7,546,848.
[31,941 - (.2) (31 ,941) ] (120) = $3,066,336.
[90,062 - (.2) (90,062)] (120) = $8,645,952.
[36,572 - (.2) (36,572)] (120) = $3,510,912.
Spares On-Board
BOXES
1
4
1
4
[69,561 - (.2) (69,561)] (120) = $6,598,907.
[18,681 - (.2) (18,681) ] (120) = $1,793,413.
[64,102 - (.2) (64,102) ] (120) = $6,153,792.
[17,207 - (.2) (17,207) ] (120) = $1,651,872.
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OPTION BOXES
C 1
4
D 1
4
[63,912 - (.2) (63,912)] (120) = $6,135,552.
[17,165 - (.2) (17,165) ] (120) = $1,647,840.
[73,177 - (.2) (73,177)] (120) = $7,024,992.
[19,653 - (.2) (19,653)] (120) = $1,886,688.
5.2 Off Aircraft Maintenance Costs
C 6 = [ (C 4) - (K) (C 4) ] (IUP)
Where :
C 4 = Monthly Off Aircraft Maintenance Costs
OPTION BOXES
A 1
4
B 1
C
D
4
1
4
1
4
[16,265 - (.2) (16,265)] (120) = $1,561,454.
[10,843 - (.2) (10,843)] (120) = $1,040.969.
[14,673 - (.2) (14,673)] (120) = $1,408,608.
[ 9,783 - (.2) ( 9,783)] (120) = $ 939,168.
[14,628 - (.2) (14,628)] (120) = $1,404,288.
[ 9,753 - (.2) ( 9,753)] (120) = $ 936,288.
[16,750 - (.2) (16,750)] (120) = $1,608.000.
[11,167 - (.2) (11,167) ] (120) = $1,072,032.
6.1 One Unit vs Four Unit Inertial Navigation System
6.1.i Spares Stocked at Sites:
UNITS
OPTION PER A/C
A
INITIAL & RPL'MT LIFE CYCLE M COST
SPARES COST ON A/C OFF A/C
TO TAL
($000,000)
1 43.8 8.4 1.6 53.8
4 11.5 3.4 1.0 15.9
DELTA COST: 32.3 5.0 .6 37.9
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UNITS INITIAL & RPL'MT
OPTION PER A/C SPA_S COST
B 1 23.6
4 6.2
DELTA COST: 17.4
C 1 16.4
4 4.3
DELTA COST: 12.1
D 1 10.8
4 2.8
DELTA COST: 8.0
On Board Spares:
1 16.8
4 4.4
DELTA COST: 12.2
B 1 16.4
4 4.1
DELTA COST: 12.5
C 1 16.4
4 4.3
DELTA COST: 12.1
D 1 17.1
4 4.5
DELTA COST: 12.6
LIFE CYCLE M COST
ON A/C OFF A/C
7.6 1.4
3.1 .9
4.5 .5
7.6 1.4
3.1 .9
4.5 .5
8.7 1.6
3.5 i.i
5.2 .5
6.6 1.6
1.8 1.0
4.8 .6
6.2 1.4
1.7 .9
4.5 .5
6.2 1.4
1.7 .9
4.5 .5
7.0 1.6
1.9 1 .i
5.1 .5
TOTAL
($oo0,ooo)
32.6
10.2
22.4
25.4
8.3
17.1
21.1
7.4
13.7
25.0
7.2
17.8
24.0
6.7
17.3
24.0
6.9
17.1
25.7
7.5
18.2
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS:
ao Initial and Replacement Spares Costs for a four unit
Inertial Navigation System are from 71 percent to 76 per-
cent less than a one unit Inertial Navigation System,
regardless of whether the spare units are stocked at the
site or onboard the aircraft.
Do On-aircraft maintenance costs for a four unit Inertial
Navigation System are 72 percent less than a one unit INS
when onboard spares are available and 59 percent less
when the spare unit is stored on site. The difference
is due, in part, to bringing the replacement unit aboard
and removal of the faulty unit from the aircraft.
Co Although initial and replacement spares costs are lower
when stored at the site (when the number of aircraft
exceeds the number of sites), the difference in cost is
offset by the increased on-aircraft maintenance costs.
d. Off-aircraft maintenance costs for a four unit INS are
from 31 percent to 35 percent less than a one unit INS
due to the added equipment complexity and time required
to fault isolate and verify repair of the single unit INS.
e. Total life cycle maintenance costs including cost of spares
is over $13M greater for a one unit INS than for a four
unit INS. Initial INS procurement penalty is only 5K
x 200, or $1M, for anet savings of $12M.
C-15
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APPENDIX D
STRAPDOWNGYROTRANSFERFUNCTION
D-I
403314
Strapdown Gyro Transfer Function
The dynamic model of the strapdown gyro is shown in
figure D-1. The basic equations of motion of the strapdown gyro
are determined by balancing all the torques acting on the rotor.
Torques about X:
,°
A0 X + D'Jx + K D 0x + HC 0y + KQ 0y = - Hey - A_X + Mex + MaX
(1)
and torques about Y:
.°
A0y + DSy + K D 0y -
where :
A =
D =
K D =
HC =
HC 0X- KQ 0 X = H$ x - A_y + Mey + May
(2)
Rotor moment of inertia about output axes
Damping on rotor about output axes relative to case,
D _ 2A/7
Gyro dynamic time constant
In-phase spring rate between rotor and case (function
of mistuning parameter AN) K D = H C AN/F m
Quadrature spring rate between rotor and case:
KQ = HC/[
Angular momentum of rotor for rotor displacements
• CX = 0relative to case for no case rates, i e., = Cy ,
H = (C + A )N
C g
Effective angular momentum of rotor for case rates
about input axes for rotor moving with case, i.e.,
0X = 0y = 0 H = {H C - N (Ag + B - C )/2} = H [I-I/2F m]' g g C
Figure of merit = H C N /KT, where K T = sum of all
torsional spring rates of suspension.
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S
_ ___jSHAFT SPINAXIS
ROTOR SPIN AXIS_/_ _/_,y
(_X'X/__/f-L ._' GIMBAL
/ I ,, I '. _---_Y
L_Y ' _- X, Y, s ARE AXES
" I
OX, 0y :
N •
N
o
K T
A :
g
B :
g
C :
g
C :
AN =
ANGULAR RATES OF CASE
RELATIVE TO INERTIAL SPACE
ROTOR ANGULAR DISPLACEMENTS
RELATIVE TO THE CASE (PICKOFFS)
SPIN SPEED
: TUNED SPEED =N/ET/(A + B - C )g g g
: SUM OF TORSIONAL SPRING RATES ATTACHED TO GIMBAL
GIMBAL MOMENT OF INERTIA ABOUT SHAFT-ATTACHED AXIS
GIMBAL MOMENT OF INERTIA ABOUT ROTOR-ATTACHED AXIS
GIMBAL POLAR MOMENT OF INERTIA
ROTOR POLAR MOMENT OF INERTIA
N -N
o
Figure D-I. Dynamic Model of Strapdown Gyro
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M and M are torques applied to rotor about X and Y
ax ay
respectively. M and M are error torques generated primarily
ex ey
by the non-linear terms in the equations of motion. The primary
terms are:
M = -(c - A) SS SY - HiS 0X - (C - 2A) _S 6y + A_s 0y
cx
Mey = (c - A) is SX - HSS 0y + IC - 2A) is 6x- A_s 0x
The first term is the expression for the anisoinertia term and is
present even for an ideal perfectly captured gyro, where
0x = Oy = 0. The second term is the cross coupling error gener-
ated if the capture loop is not ideal (0 x and 0y not equal to
zero). The third and fourth terms are other error terms which
are also generated for imperfect rebalancing. Additional terms
due to motor hunting are discussed in another section.
Gyro Transfer Function (Open Loop)
The output angle 0 (pickoff) versus input angle _ can be
determined from Equations (i) and (2). Assume $S = 0 and
inoperative capture loops.
Taking the Laplace transform and expressing in matrix form:
AN/F
AS 2 + D5 + IIC m
-IIC(_ + I/L)
(3)
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Solving (3) yields (for D << HC) :
0x(S)
Cx(S)
-S(S + l/T) (S 2 - DS/2A + HHc/A2)
IS + I/T)2 + (AN/Fm)2] [$2 + DS/A + (Hc/A) 2j
Direct Axis
0 Cs)
Y
¢ (s)
X
-HC SIS- Fm/T + _(Fm/T) +2ANH/A]IS-Fm/T-/(Fm/7)2+2ANH/A]cross
_][_+0_,_+ '_] _°2AFro [(S + 1/7) 2 + (AN/F m)
H
C
A Nutation frequency w n
= w
o [ im]-- w n 1 - _F
for
F >> 1
m
A typical frequency response for such an open-loop gyro is
shown in figure D-2.
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RATIO OF PICKOFF OUTPUT ¢I TO ANGULAR DISPLACEMENT
INPUT _8 VS. FREQUENCY (OPEN-LOOP)
PA RA ME TE RS
N 628 ]
Z F - 500
I0 -- rn I
_N/N - +1% IIIR
-r 50 sec10 -- Ill
1060 rad/sec II£0
" _ _H/"c I.,,- F 1
1 [ I .... i
T&0
n
4F __
rn
• I I •
o _'_ ,--_i_.x_ If,
," "_ I I
,o-_ i/_,/ ". ,-.-caoss-AxIsll;
-- ' vZAN_o " ._ Z_AN----Ho,o ),,2,
10-3 m I
10"4 Fit° ).__./_lor (+/_,,,
-5 1
10
10 "4 10 "3 10 "2 10 "1 1 10 10 Z 10 3 10 4 10
FREQUENCY _, RAD/SEC
Figure D-2. Open-Loop Frequency Response of Strapdown Gyro
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APPENDIX E
PENDULOUSACCELEROMETERANALYSIS
E-I
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Pendulous Accelerometer Analysis
Below is a brief analysis of a Pendulous Accelerometer.
Instrument level errors and dynamics are derived and error magni-
tudes evaluated.
Instrument axes defined by:
(X, Y, Z)
(OA, PA, IA)
OA
PA
IA
0
Case fixed axes
Principal axes of accelerometer
Output axis
Pendulous axis
Input axis
Pickoff angle
|OA. X)
/
IA
Resolving input case rates along principal axes to first order
in ().
I_IIA = mZ - (lU!y
c_pA = C_y + {i(jZ
_OA = _X + 6
E-2
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Input acceleration as measured by instrument is:
AIA = A Z - SAy
Since (OA, PA, IA) are principal axes, angular momentum, H, is
related to angular velocity by principal moments of inertia JOA'
JIA' JPA
HIA = JIA (_Z - 8_y)
HpA = JPA (_Y + 8_Z)
HOA = JOA (_X + 5)
Equations of motion are obtained from:
H_) = M( SPACE
(_)SPACE = (H_)BODY + a x H
The equation for torques along the OA axis is then:
HOA + _pAHIA - _IAHPA = MOA
Substituting for _ and H and collecting terms:
JOA (_X + _) + _Y_Z (JIA - JPA ) + % (_Z 2 - _y2) (JIA - JpA ) = MOA
External torques to the system along OA axis are:
MOA = PAIA - Kse - B@ + M e
E-3
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Where
P = Pendulosity (MI)
K0 = Torsional restraint of suspension
B = Rotational damping
M = Applied rebalance torque
e
Applying equilibrium of moments, we have:
JOA + M+ B0 + K00 = PAz + PAe e
Where A are the error terms measured by the instrument:
e
PAe = WY_Z(JPA - JIA )
+ 0(_Z2 _ _y2) (JPA - JIA ) - JOA_X - POAy
The magnitudes of these error terms will now be evaluated using
the A-1000 design parameters.
Anisoinertia
= _ w ( - JiA)/p_e Y Z JPA
e 2
= 0.5 UG/(°/sec)
Wy_ Z
Output Axis Sensitivity (Not Rectification)
JOA •
_e P _X
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With
JOA
2
0.9 gm - cm
wx = wO SIN (2_ft)
wx
= 210 _G/(°/sec) Hz
Governor Effect
2
w e = 0 (LOZ - Wy 2 ) (JPA - JIA )/P
e
2 2
O(wZ_ - Wy )
2
0.5 _G/(°/sec) /rad
Vibropendulous
_ = 0Aye
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APPENDIX F
DERIVATION OF DESIGN EQUATIONS
FOR TETRAHEDRALARRAY
OF 4 TDF GYROS
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APPENDIX F
DERIVATION OF LEAST SQUARES DESIGN MATRIX FOR n
TWO-DEGREE-OF-FREEDOM GYROS WHOSE SPIN AXES
ARE NOT COLLINEAR
When the instrument cluster consists of n TDF gyros, then there
are 2n channels that contain information of angular rate of the
cluster. The computed angular rate of the cluster,<_ is related
to the measured angular rates of the cluster, _ through the
matrix [D] as shown in Equation (i).
<w> = (i)
The purpose of this section is to derive and define the design
matrix in such a way that the sum of squares of the errors con-
tributed by all 2n channels is minimized.
Let _ represent the total angular rate of the instrument cluster.
A
Let the unit vector S i coincide with the spin vector of the i th
gyro and Ui represent the component of _ that is perpendicular to
the spin axis of the ith gyro. The relationship between the spin
axis of the ith gyro and the various vectors is shown in
figure F-I.
0
B
Figure F-I. Spin Axis of the i th Gyro and the Angular
Velocity Vectors
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It is noted that _ is the angular velocity vector measured by a
perfect i th gyro a_d this vector is given by Equation (2)
A A
_i = _ - S. (S. -_ ) (2)1 l
The dot product written in matrix form becomes
S i
where
L_z
R
S
xi + S _ +
_x yi y Szi z
0
0
0 _ 0
l I
..-L.___,,/___
I !
! I
f 0 i 0
I.... ./___
! I
J !
J 0 i 0
(4)
A
W_nere Sxi, S. i and Sz_ are components of the unit vector, S i,
resolved alo{g the re_erence coordinate set xyz , and Wx, _y and
w z are components of total angular velocity of the cluster also
resolved along the same set.
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Substitute (3) into (2) and express in matrix form.
(5)
Let
c,J- (6)
Substitute (6) into (5)
Expanding (6) we obtain
(7)
[si]
-- I I
1 - S 2 . I -S S I -S S
xl , xi yi I xi zi
i i
T
I I
I
I S 2 iI 1 - -S S
-Sxi Sy i I yi I yi zi
t I
L L
I I
I I
I I $2
_ -S S i -S S t 1 - •
xi zi I yi zi ' Zl _
(8)
Examination of Equation (7) reveals that when the total angular
rate vector, _, is premultiplied by the [Si] matrix the resulting
product yields a component of the total angular input rate that
is perpendicular to the spin vector of the ith gyro. Thus _i
represents the rate vector as would be measured by a perfect i th
gyro. Similar relationships may be written for the n TDF gyros
contained within the instrument cluster. Thus,
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= Is _
,i][;]
r" °
| _.
n.i
[$2] [_]
iSn] [7] .
(9)
Equation (9) may be written as
Iw. I
| i
w
u 4-, i
. '-,s
I U') ij
IWnl
or
mi
IS.I
L --"
IS.I
IS...
IS I
I nJ
[_] , (I0)
[_] = [A][_] , (ii)
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Where [_] is 1 by 3n matrix re/_resenting 2n measured rates and
[A] is the 3 by 3n matrix (sometimes referred to as the
mapping matrix)• [_] and [A] are defined by Equations (12) and(13) •
[_] =
LiJ
|_
L i]
F']
lWn
(12)
[A]
[sij
Is.l
P
Is_l
Sn _.
(13)
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Assuming that the spin axes of the n gyros used are not collinear
then we have 2n available measurements that represent the total
rate of the cluster. There is a variety of ways of extracting
the desired information out of the 2n measurements available. In
our approach we will consider the least squares regression method
which is given by Equation (14)
< _> = A _ (14)
Comparing Equation (14) with Equation (I) it is noted that
Next we will evaluate the least squares solution for matrix [D]
when n TDF gyros are present and operating within the instrument
cluster.
using (13) we obtain
[A T ] = [[sIT], [s2T],... [siT] . . . [SnT]] (16)
Examination of Equation (8) indicates that
Applying (17) to (16)
[AT] = [[SI], [$2],... [Si],... [Sn] ] (18)
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And thus
[ IS1] " [$2] • " " " [Si], - - - [Sn] ]
Is2]
!:,Jr
[i] [s]_ [s_]_ [_]_S 2 + 2 +'''+ +'''+ n " (19)
From Equation (6)
Si] 2
A A A
l l 1 l l 1
(20)
But since
A
_?s. = 1
l 1 (21)
F-8
/m-- 403314
Then Equation (20) becomes
Si = 1 - Si z Si (22)
Using Relationship (22) in Equation (19) we have
Substitute (18) and (23) into (14) we obtain
[[SI]+[S2] +---+[Si]+-'" [Sn]] -1[[SI], [S2J''''[Si]''''[Sn]] _
i=n ]-1 [[ ]]i=l
-I
(24)
-
since i wi = _i -
Equation (24) states the computed angular velocity, <w>, of the
instrument cluster based on outputs of the individual instruments.
In this equation the outputs of the individual instruments are so
weighted that the sum of the squares of the errors associated
with all the instrument axes is minimized.
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Equation (24) is a general one and prior to its solution, instru-
ment orientations have to be specified. This is done in the
following paragraphs for tetrahedral orientation.
DESIGN MATRIX FOR FOUR GYROS
Thus let us assume that n = 4. Using Equation (6)
"= f=l
i=4
i].
i=l
(25)
Next we evaluate the value of the sum of the products in Equa-
tion (25).
i=4 i=4
[_][_:]: _ Sx_][__ _]
i=l i=l I
Sy i I
.Szi]
$2 S S S S
I
xi xi yi xi zi
S 2
Syi Sxi yi Syi Szi
S 2
Szi Sxi Szi Syi zi
(26)
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Assuming orientation of the spin axes on the faces of a tetra-
hedron as shown _n figure F-2, it may be proven that the directioncosines for the i unit vectors are:
Z
Q
_ S 2
X
Figure F-2. Regular Tetrahedron
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for
i = 1 1 1 = 1
Sxl = _, Syl = _, Sz I
:_ i _ i - !
Sx2 _" SY2 _' Sz2 w_3
:_ i :_ i :_ i
SX3 _' Sy3 _' SZ3 _
4 1 _ 1 1
SX4 = ' Sy4 _3 SZ4
(27)
i =4 i =4 i =4
_'_ S 2 4 _-_ $2 4 _ $2xi = _' yi = _' zi
i=l i=l i= 1
4
3 (28)
i=4 i= 4 i=4
i=l i=l i=l
0 (29)
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Substitute (28) and (29) into (26) we obtain
i=4
i=l
"4
0 0
o £ o
3
4
o o
4[]3 (30)
Substitute (30) into (25)
i=4
8E [si] = 4[T]_-_
i=l
(30a)
and
i=l
l 3[]3[]=_i (31)
Substitute (31) into (24)
^ 3
60
8
(32)
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Substitute (12) into (32)
A
E z] "
["2]
(33)
But since in general
Then, the least squares solution for four gyros arranged in
tetrahedron configuration is given by Equation (35)
<w> 1234 = 8 1 + D2 + L3 + 54 (35)
Where ZI" _2, _3 and _4 are vectors representing outputs of the
four gyros.
The subscript 1234 to<_>indicates that solution is based on the
output data of all four gyros.
The relationship stated by Equation (34) may be derived from
physical reasoning as follows: Premultiplication of a vector by
the matrix [Si] y_elds the component of that vector that is per-
pendicular to theA_ i vector. Now, since _i is defined as being
perpendicular to S i, then premultiplication of _i by the matrix
[Si] must yield _i"
F-14
403314
DESIGN MATRIX FOR THREE GYROS
Next let us assume that n=3. When one of the gyros in a tetra-
heoral set fails, then we wish to process only the outputs from
the remaining three properly operating gyros. Let us make an
arbitrary assumption that gyro number 4 has failed.
The sum of matrices in Equation (24) becomes
i=3
Z;[,_]_-[.,.]+[,,]+[_,]+Is.]_[s,]
1=1
(36)
Note that the matrix involving the failed gyro, [S_], was added
and subtracted in Equation (36). Substitute (30a)-into (36)
i=3
[_] _[_][s_]
i=l
[.4])
Assume that the inverse of Equation (37) is given by Equation (38).
Thu s
-i
[s_] _ + [s_])
i=l
(38)
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The relationship stated by the Equation (38) may be verified by
performing multiplication indicated by Equation (39)
(39)
Substitute Equation (37) and Equation (38) into Equation (39)
[_]__[s_]]
3
I] + 24 - 1540 Is4] - _%40b]
- IllQ.E.D.
Where it was noted that relationship stated by Equation (22)
was used.
Substituting (38) into (24) and noting (34) we obtain
[ ] (40)
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Hquation (40) states the least squares solution for the tetra-
hedral set when it is desired to process the data from gyros I,
2 and 3 and disregard the data provided by gyro number 4. In a
similar manner when the data from gyro number 3 are disregarded
we obtain
< [ElE ]][ ]w>124 = _ I + _ $3 _i + _2 + _4 (41)
When the data from gyro number 2 are disregarded we obtain
(42)
When the data from gyro number 1 are disregarded we obtain
<w>234 = _ I + _ S1 2 (43)
DESIGN MATRIX FOR TWO GYROS
Finally let us assume that n=2, i.e., when two of the gyros in a
tetrahedral set fail, then, of course, we wish to process only
the outputs from the remaining two properly operating gyros.
As before, let us make an arbitrary assumption that gyro num-
bers 3 and 4 have failed.
The sum of matrices in Equation (24) becomes
i=2
i=l
(44)
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Assume that the inverse of Equation (44) is given by Equation (45)
]-i 2
i=l
(45)
As before, the relationship stated by Equation (45) will be veri-
fied by performing the following evaluation.
Define
Substitute from Equation (45)
(47)
Noting relationship expressed by Equation (6) we obtain
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Where
A AT
[SIll=SIS1
[ ] "",_$22 = S 2 S 2
(50)
(5Z)
Thus
(52)
Also
2
(53)
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Evalu ate
(54)
Substitute Equation (50) into (54)
[_][s_]_ ___
sll] (54)
AT
Because S 1 _i is the dot product of the same vector and this is
equal to unity.
Similarly
Next evaluate IS11 ] [$22 ]
Substituting from Equation (50) and (51)
A AT T[_._][s_] ___1_.%__
I A AT
= _ _ Sl s2
i[]= -7 s12 (56)
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Because _I _ is the dot product of two unit vectors and for the
case of tetrahedron orientation this dot product is equal to
- 1/3.
S imi far ly
z _ AT
= --_ 2 S1
i[ ] (57)= _ _ s2z
Substitute Equations (54), (55), (56) and (57) into (53) obtaining
4[-,-]_4[Is.,.,]+
(58)
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Substitute Equation (52) and (58) into (47)
9
[_-_-_ _ [_4 +_ - ] ]
[o[.I-,[[,,,i+I.,,j]-_[[,,I+[.,_i]]
+[;;:j[[,,,i+I ,,l]
(59)
Noting definition of [B] from Equation (46) multiply both sides
of Equation (59) by the inverse of [B].
+_[[.,,I.[ ,,]]
I.l-_[[,,_i•[.,,i]
+_[[.,,].[ ,,l]-_[[,,,]+E ,,I]'
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,_[[_][_]•I_][_]•I_][_]•Is_-_][s ]],0o,
Evaluate components of the last term of equation (60) using
definitions stated by Eqs. (50), (51), (56) and (57)
l[_ll]= _im2_l_l -
_1_2_2_2 2][._][s_] : 00 : [_
(61)
(62)
= _2_ISI 1 [$21 ] (63)[_][_] ^^__^ :
Evaluate the term
(65)
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Substitute Eqs. (61), (62), (63), (64) and (65) into (60).
+ 16 8 + 12 + 21
I] Q.E.D.
Table F-I shows the design equations to be used for the special
gyro failures. Note that the matrices IS1], [$2], [ S3]'and [$4]
are only dependent upon the specific orientation of the tetra-
hedron relative to the reference coordinate axes selected and are
entirely independent of the orientation of the gyro sensing axes.
The ith matrix is given by
where
2 _ J
_ t -S S t -S .S
i Xl zi1 Sxi l' xi yi i
4 4
I I
1 - S 2 i -S .S[
t • a yl zi-SxiSy i i yl I
4 4
I !
r -S S ! 1 - S 2
•S i ' ! zi_-Sxl zi ! xl zi
i = l, 2, 3, 4.
F-24
403314
Table F-I. Design Equations
GYRO
FAILED
NONE
2
4
1 & 2
1 & 3
1 & 4
DESIGN EQUATION TO BE USED
3
<_>1234 = 8 (_i + _2 + 53 + _4)
I + 5 1 L2 + _3 + _'4
<w>134 = _ I + _ S 2
= 3 + _2 + _41<w>124 _ <[I] + _ [$311<_ 1
<w>123 = 8 + _ [$4 1 3
<w >34 = [-,-]-[,,I-,-1,4111+[I,,l+I, .Ii17
<w>24 = (_ [I 1
_2 + _3)
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Table F-I. Design Equations (Continued)
GYRO
FAI LED
2 & 3
2 & 4
3 & 4
DESIGN EQUATION TO BE USED
<w>14 =
I_l + C4)
<w>13 =
ZI + 52)
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APPENDIX G
RELIABILITY DATA
G-I
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RELIABILITY DATA
Attached are two separate reliability predictions, of 18
pages each, for the redundant strapdown INS. Both predictions are
based upon MIL-HDBK-217B failure rates. The first assumes an Air-
borne Inhabited application with the part ambient temperatures
stabilized at a maximum of 70°C. The second prediction assumes
an Airborne Uninhabited application with a part case temperature
of 90°C.
The Airborne Uninhabited prediction is applicable to mili-
tary aircraft applications and is, therefore, conservative for
the VTOL application. The Airborne Inhabited condition is appli-
cable to Commercial Airline installations for inertial systems.
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SAVE REGISTER
AND PRIORITY OF
INTE RRUPTED TASK
DECREMENT TIME- I
TO-GO OF READY
TASKS IN QUEUE
4,
X = TOP OF QUEUE
REAL TIME INTERRUPT
(128/SEC)
X = NEXT TASK ON QUEUE '_
X >0
TTG
X NOT DY
STATUS
PRIORITY
OF QUEUE
TASK
> PRIORITY OFINTERRUPTED TASK
QUEUE TASKSJ
w_ RESTORE INTERRUPTED ITASK'S REGISTERS
"ESUME
I N"RERRUPTED/
TASK
Flowchart H-I. Executive Scheduler (128/sec)
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INPUT DELTA VELOCITIES AND
GYRO RATES AND MODES
AVAy • L_gGX • X MODE
AVBy ; _OGy • YMODE
BTT*
_VTx
AVTy
NOTES:
1. FOR IMM NO. 1 THE
MODE CONTROLLER
SET BTT = (BTT1)A
2. SIMILAR SETSOF
CODE EXIST IN
MEMORY FOR EACH
CHANNEL (I.E., BTT2,
BTT3, BTT4)
BODY TO TETRAHEDRON
COOROI NATE TRANSFORMATION
n-1 1
AV S = _ ( L_Vby - AVby - Z_Vbz}
ALIGN ACCELE ROMETE R AXIS
n-1
= 6AXX'_Vx+6AXY'AVy+6AXZ'_Vs
n-1
= 6AYx'_Vx+6Ayy'_Vy+6Ayz'_Vs
APPLY ACCELEROMETER
BIAS
_Vcx = AVTx +ABX'_t
_Vcy = _VTy+ABy'_t
I GYRO COMPENSATION I
n-1 I
Z_9S = _ (-- L_Sbx - ASby - A0bz)
¢
SELECT AND APPLY GYRO SCALE FACTORS !
NOTE 3: SEE GYROSCALE FACTOR
DATASGX = (SXl A ORGANIZATION
I ACCELEROMETER COMPENSATION I
+
APPLY ACCELEROMETER SCALE FACTOR
AV x = SAx'AVAx
AVy = SAy'AVAy
Flowchart H-2. Instrument Compensation
(Sheet 1 of 3)
X MODE
Z_Gy
Fast
= HIGH RATE MODE
1
SGX = SGY+6
I
<0
I
SGX = SGX + 3
1
( 128/sec )
H-3
403314
_X = [_X]'+[SGX+2]''_GX
_X = _X'_GX
SGY = (SY) A
Y MODE
= HIGH RATE
SGY = SGY+6
I
SGY =
_Sy =
<0
,_BGy
SGY + 3
[SGY] " + [SGY + 2] " L_Gy
SGY L_Gy
GYRO TORQUER AXIS TRANSFORMATION
L_TX = _GXX L_X +6GXY L_y
L_STy = 6Gy x L_y +6Gy Y L_y
GYRO INERTIA
COMPENSATION
n n-1
L_lx = IG (L_Ty -L_STy)
n n-1
_01Y = IG " I_TX -_TX )
i
Flowchart H-2. Instrument
( Sheet 2
GYRO SCALE FACTOR DATA ORGANIZATION
, ,|,
SX :_ 1ST ORDER S,F. } POSITIVE
, _ND ORDERS.F" INPUT
:} 1SToRDERS'F" _ NEGATIVE
_ 2NDoRDERS.F. INPUT
:} }  S,T,VE• ,"°O,OE,S.F.
•  "OO,OE,S.F. ,,,UT
• 2 ND ORDER S.F.
:} 'SToRDERS'F" } NEGATIVE
. 2NDoRDERS.F" INPUT
:} ISTORDERS'F" } POSITIVE
. 2NDoRDERS.F" INPUT
:} 1STORDERSF } NEGATIVE• 2 NDORDERSF b INPUT
LOW
RATE
MODE
HIGH
RATE
MODE
RATE
MODE
"t HIGH
RATE
MODE
Compensation Fast (128/sec)
of 3)
H-4
403314
GYRO SPIN AXIS ALIGNMENT
n-1
_PX : A81X -TGX" ASS
n-1
AOpy = L_IY-TGy'A9 S
GYRO G-SENSITIVE DRIFTS
n-1
_MX = _2_PX + MXX AVcx + Mxy'AVcy +MXz'AVS
n-1
_MY = AOpy + Myx " _Vcx + Myy "AVcy + Myz " _V S
¢
GYRO NON-G-SENSITIVE BIASES
ill
_CX = Z_MX +BX'At
_CY = _MY +BY'At
TBT.
( TBT1
TET RAH ED RON-TO-BODY
COORDINATE TRANSFORMATION
2
Z_Sb1x = _ "z_'SCX
1 1
_bly = _ "_CX ÷_ "Z_CY
1 1
_tBbtz = _ "L_CX-_ "Z_Cy
2
_Vblx = -_ "_Vcx
1 1
L_Vbly = _ "AVcx +_ 'Z_Vcy
1 1
Ab,ol z = _ 'AVcx -_ "AVcy
NOTES: 4. FOR IMM NO. 1 THE MODE
CONTROLLER SET
TBT = (TBT1)A
5. SIMILAR SETS OF CODE
EXIST IN MEMORY FOR EACH
CHANNEL II.E., TBT2, TBT3,
TBT4)
Flowchart H-2. Instrument Compensation Fast (128/sec)
(Sheet 3 of 3)
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COMPUTE GYRO PARITY EQUATIONS
|i
n
APg12 = Z_blx + Z_Sblz + Z_gb2x -N)b2z
n
APg23 = _b2x -_b2y + _b3x + Z_Bb3y
n
APg34 = L_b3x -_863z + Z_Sb4x + Z_Sb4z"
n
APg41 = -ASb4x + Z_b4y + _blx -_b1¥
n
Apg 13
n
APg24
= L_bly - Z_blz - Z:_gb3y + _b3z
= _b2y + /Vlb2z - _b4y _b4z
I FILTER GYRO PARITY RESULTS AND SET FAIL INDICATORS 1
L
Lgt2 = L923 = 1"934 1 = 1413 = 24 = 0
n n-1 At n-1 n
P912 = Pg12 -"_" *Pg12 + Apg12
n n-I At n-1 n
Pli"44 " P934 - T "P034 * APo34
Le34j, 1
n n-1 At n-1 n
PII41 = Pg141 - _" "Pg41 * APg41
<0
1-041 = 1
J
n n-1 At n-1 n
P913 = P913 - _ "P913 + APo13
<0
n
<0
n-1 At n-1 n
" PO23 - "T" "Po23 + AP923
1412 = 1
1
Flowchart H-3. Parity Equations/Design
(Sheet 1 of 5)
L913 = 1
J
n n-1 At n-1 n
Po_ = P024 - "7 "P024 + APe24
Equations (128/sec)
H-6
403314
COMPUTE GYRO-FAIL EQUATIONS
Lg 1 =
Lg2 =
Lg3 =
Lg4=
(Lg_ ® L,4_)Q (L.I_ ® Lg_3)Q (L,4_® Lg_3)
(Lg12® Lg23)Q (Lg_2® L._4)Q (L023® L024)
(Lg23 (_ I-g34)(_ (1-4123(_) Lg13)(_ (Lg34 (_)Lg13)
COMPUTE GYRO PARITY EQUATION ERROR DISCRETE
Lgng = {Lg12(_)(Lg 1 Q_)Lg2)I (_ {Lg23(_)(l-g2 (E)Lg3)]
+ [Lg34 (_ {Lg3 (_) L94)} _ [Lg41 (_ (Lg 4 (_ LQ1 )]
+ [Lg13(E)(Lg 1 (_)Lg3)} (_ [Lg24 (_(Lg2(_)Lg4)}
COMPUTE ACCELEROMETER PARITY EQUATIONS
n
APa12 = -AVblx + AVblz + AVb2x - AVb2z
f3
APa23 = -AVb2x - AVb2y + ZlVb3x + AVb3y
n
_Pa34 ; -AVb3x - _V_z + AVb4x + AVb4z
n
APa41 = AVb4x + AVb4y + AVblx - AVb4y
n
APa13 = AVbly
n
APa24 = AVb2y
_- AVblz -- AVb3y -¢-ZIVb3z
+ LIVb2z - LIVb4y - AVb4z
F ILTE R ACCELEROMETER PARITY RESULTS AND SET FAI L INDICATORS
Flowchart H-3.
La12 = La23 = La34 = La41 = La13 = La24 = 0
n n-1 At n-1 n
Pal2 = Pal2 - _- "Pal2 + APa12
Parity Equations/Design Equations
(Sheet 2 of 5)
( 128/sec )
H-7
403314
Pal2
<0
La12 = 1
J
n n-1 At n-1 n
Pa23 = Pa23 - _ *P023 + APa23T
<0
n n-1 At n-1 n
Pa34 = Pa34 - 7" "Pa34 + LIPai34
<0
L.a34 = 1
I
Flowchart H-3.
n n-1 At n-1 n
PI41 " P_I --_'- °PI41 +L)"PI41
n n-1 At n-1 n
Pal3 = P=13 --_- "P813 + /1Pal3
Parity Equations/Design Equations (128/sec)
(Sheet 3 of 5)
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n
Pa24 =
_<0 _ 1
,_ La13 =
1
n-1 At n-1
Pa24 *Pa24 + APa24T
COMPUTE ACCE LE ROMETE R-FAI L EQUATIONS
La1 = (La12(_La41)(_ (La12_13)_ (1-a41 _) La13)
La2 = (La12(_La23) (_ (La12(_) La24) (_ (La23(_ La24)
"3 = ,'.23® _341® ("_3® L.,3)® (L'34®",3)
La4 = (La34 (_ La14)(_ (La34(_)La24)_ (1"41 (_) La241
COMPUTE ACCE LEROMETE R PARITY EQUATION E RRO R DISCRETE
Lan9 " [IJ12 @ (La1 (_ La2)] (_) [La23 (_ (La 2 (_) IJ3)]
(_ (La34 (_)(La 3 (_) La4)] (_ [La41 (_)(IJ 4 @ LII)]
® I',,.,3® (,-.,® _'3)]® (L,_,® (L,2® _'4)]
Flowchart H-3. Parity Equations/Design Equations (128/sec)
(Sheet 4 of 5)
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SAVE LAST AS'S
ii
_ax = _bx
_ay = _by
L_6az = _,6bz
_gb x =
LSBby =
_6b z =
NOTES: 1. FOR IMM NO. 1 THE MODE CONTROLLER
SETS DES - (DES1)A
2. SIMILAR SETS OF CODE EXIST IN MEMORY
FOR EACH CHANNEL (I.E., DES2, DES,3,
DES4)
COMPUTE [_b] (I, 2)
+ (LlSblx + _b2x) + 112 (z_SSblz + _b2z)
+ 3/4 (Z_bly + _Sb2y)
+ 1/2 (Z38blx + ZSeb2x) + (ZSeblz + ZlSb2z)
COMPUTE [AV b] (1, 2)
AVb x = + (AVblx + &Vb2x) + 1/2 (_Vblz + AVb2z)
AVby = + 3/4 (_Vbly + AVb2y)
AVb z = + 1/2 (_Vb lx + AVb2x) + (AVblz + AVb2z)
["
COMPUTE [AVb] (1,3)
AVb x = + 3/4 (AVblx + AVb3x)
_Vbv = + (AVblv + AVe) ÷ 1/2 (_Vblz + AVb3z)
LIVb z = + 1/2 (LSVbly + &Vb3y) + (_Vblz + LSVb3z)
RETURN
Flowchart H-3. Parity Equations/Design Equations (128/sec)
(Sheet 5 of 5)
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ENTER
< Lgl_
YES
tg 2 > 0
YES
YES
Lg3 > 0
i 1,2,3,4
Qi =
J = 1,2,3
NO
IN° I
Oi(2) + Oi(3 ) = - 0i(3) i - 1,2.3,4 Qi - Qi(2) i - 1,2,3,4[
V: - V:(2) j = 1,2,32 J
Vj --- 2
Vj(2) + Vj(3)
SJl : 2
8j1 (2) + 8ji(3)
Bj2(2) + Bj2(3)
BJ2 = 2
!
Qi
Vi = Vj(3) j - 1.2,3
Bil = Bjl(3)
Bj2 - Bj2(3)
Bjl = Bjl{2)
Bj2 = Sj2(2)
Flowchart H-4. IMM Initialization (128/sec) (Sheet 1 of 2)
H-If
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YES
NO
YES
RETURN
YES
NO
_r
Qi(3) + Qi(4)
Qi 2
Vj(3) + Vj(4)
Vj = 2
Bjl (3) + Bjl(4)
%1 = 2
%2 =
Bj2(3) + Sj2(4)
2
I
i = 1,2,3,4
j = 1,2,3
IP
! ai = %(4)
Vj = Vj(4I j
%, = %,m
1%2 =. Bj2(4)
Ii_ Jl
,qlr
C RETURN )
= 1.2,3.4
= 1,2,3
q = Qi(3) i - 1,2,3,4
Vj = Vj(3) j = 1,2,3
%1 _ %1 (3)
%2 %2 (3)
Flowchart H-4. IMM Initialization (128/sec) (Sheet 2 of 2)
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Oi
Vj =
Bjl =
ej2 :
_NO , , i ....
Oi(2)+Qi(3) i = 1,2,3,4 Oi = Qi(3) i :.: 1.2,3.4 Qi
2 j = 1,2,3 vj = Vj(3) j : 1.2,3 Vj
Vj(2) + Vj(3) Bjl = Bjl(3) Bjl
2 Bj2 ": Bj2(3) Bj2
",q
(_ RETUR'N _
Bjl (2) + Bjl (3)
2
Bj2(2) + Bj2(3)
2
'f
•.: Qi(2) i = 1,2.3,4
- Vj(2) j - 1,2,3
- Bill2)
- Bj2(2)
Flowchart H-5. IMM Initialization (128/sec) (Sheet 1 of 2)
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La2
La4> 0
NO
NO
Vj =
ejl =
Bj2 =
Qi 13) + Oi (4)
2
Vj(3) + VII4)
2
Bjl (3) + Sjl (4)
2
Sj2(3) + Bj2(4)
2
YES
NO
YES
RETURN
p
ii
Oi = Qi(3) i = 1.2,3,4
Vj = V|(31 I = 1,2,3
Sjl = Bj1131
5i2 = Bj213)
I
I
Flowchart H-5. IMM Initialization (128/sec) (Sheet 2 of 2)
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ENTER
COMPUTE DIRECTION COSINES
n = n2 n2 n2 n2
CXX (Q1) -|Q2 } -(03 | +(Q4 )
n n n n n
Cxy = 2 (01"02-0304 )
n n n n n
CX Z = 2"(01"03 +02'Q4 )
n n n n
rt =.Cy X 2" (Q1"Q2 +Q3 04 )
n = n 2 n2 n2 n2
Cyy (021 - lO1) - (03) + (04)
n = n n n n
Cyz 2" (02" 03- 01 ' 04)
r'l I% rt ['1 n
CZ X = 2"(01"Q3-02 "04)
n n n n n
CZ Y = 2"(02"Q3 +Q1'Q4 )
n = n 2 n2 n2 n2
CZZ (03 } -(01 ) -(02 ) +(04 )
PERFORM BODY TO LOCAL LEVEL COORDINATE CONVERSION
n+ 1/2
AVxN =
n+112
_Vy N =
n+1/2
AVzN =
n n+1/2 n n+1/2 n n+1/2
Cx X . _Vb x + CX Y • AVby + CX z. A Vb z
n n+I12 n n+112 n n+I12
Cy x "L_Vb x + Cyy " A Vb¥ + Cy z- AVb z
n n+1/2 n n+1/2 n n+1/2
CZ x , _ Vb x + Cz Y • L_ Vby + Cz z • A Vb z
NAVIGATION VELOCITY SUMMATION
n+I12 n-I12 n+I/2
VXN = VXN +L_VxN
n+I12 n-I12 n+I/2
VyN = VyN +AVyN
n+1/2 n-1/2 n+1/2
VZN = VZN + AVzN
RETURN
Flowchart H-6. rcoordinate Transformation
H-15
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_x = L_Sax + _bx
_V = _aV + L_Sbv
_z = _az + _Sbz
L12ex = L_bx - Zleax
_x • LlSx + 1/3 (/1By "L128z - L12ey "L_z)
Z_v = L_v + 113 (L18z • Zl2 #x- A2 ez. L_x)
_8 z = AISz+1/3(L_ x'L_2ey-A28xL_v)
Flowchart H-7. Quaternion Body Rate (64/sec) Sheet 1 of 2)
H-16
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R 1 = Q2 - A'6z - Q3 " A'0y + Q4 • _' ex
R2 = Q3"A'Sx +Q4'_'6y--'Q1 "A'Sz
R3 = Q4"A'6 z +Q1-A'ey-Q2"A'0 x
R4 =-QI'Z_'8 x-Q2.A'Sy-Q3"4'Sz
RETURN
Flowchart H-7. Quaternion Body Rate (64/see) (Sheet 2 of 2)
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COMPUTE VEHICLE ATTITUDES
PITCH = SIN -1 (CZY)
CZY
ROLL = TAN "1 (- C---_)
CXX.
AZIMUTH = TAN ( -_---_._
HEADING = --AZIMUTH-ALPHA
FORMAT AND/OR SMOOTH THE FOLLOWING PARAMETERS
PITCH. ROLL: HEADING ; PITCH RATE ; ROLL RATE ;
YAW RATE ; LONG. ACCEL ; LATERAL ACCEL ; VERTICAL ACCEL ;
VELOCITY, NORTH ; VELOCITY, EAST ; VELOCITY, VERT. ; LATITUDE ;
LONGITUDE ; ALTITUDE
Flowchart H-8. Output Formatter (32/sec)
H-18
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ENTER
COMPUTE NAV SYSTEM VELOCITY
V x = V X+VXN+(VXC R+VXC L)'Z_tN
Vy = Vy+VyN+ (Vyc R+VYC L)'At N
V Z = V Z+VzN+(VZC R+VzC L)'AtN
--b
, , ,,=,
ZERO DELTA VELOCITIES
AND VELOCITY UPDATES
VXN = 0
VyN = 0
VZN = 0
<0 (ALIGN MODE)
DO ALIGN FUNCTIONS
V z = 0
W x = 0
Wy = 0
VXA = V x
VyA = Vy
TPX = TPX-VYA'KTAt N
TPY = TPY+VXA' KT'At N
WXC = TPX'8
WYC = TPY ' 8
TPX = TPX-WXC'At N
(NAV MODE
DO NAV FUNCTIONS
RHO x = -VY' RE2-V x'
RHO Y = -VX' REI+Vy"
W x = WXS + RHO x
Wy = Wys + RHO Y
W z = WZS
Bll = Bll - RHoy'B31'AtN
B21 = B21+ RHO x'B31 "At N
B31 = B31+(RHoy'B11- RHOX
B12 = B12-RHo Y'B32"AtN
B22 = B22 + RHO x • B32 • At N
RE3
RE3
• B21 ) • AtN
TPY = TPY - WYC " At N B32 =
Vxc L = -VXA'KV-GEE•TPY
Vyc L = -VYA'KV+GEE'TPX
BXC = BXC -VYA' KV'At N
BYC = BYC- VXA" KV'At N
1
B32 + (RHo x • B12 - RHO x • B22 ) • AtN
NAV RATES
WXY = - (W x + WXC+ BXC}
WYN = - (Wy+WYC+BYC)
WZN = - (W z)
Flowchart H-9. Nav Fast/Align (8/sec) (Sheet 1 of 2)
H-19
403314
UPDATE QUATERNIONS
I L_812 = (WXN " WXN + WYN " WYN + WZN • WZN) " (AtN)2
slel- I_12
48
clel 1_12=¢ "l'_
8 2
TI = (- (]2" WZN + Q3" WYN + O4 WXN) "At N
T2 = (-Q3"WXN-Q4"WYN +QI"WZN)'At N
T3 = (- Q4" WZN - Q1 " WYN + Q2" WXN)" At N
T4 = (- Q1 " WXN - Q2" WYN- Q3" WZN)" LStN
o, = o, +o,-clei +1/2.T, +,/2slel "T,
- %. o,- cleI +,n.T=+,n.slel •T=
Q3 " Q3 +%clel + _/2-T 3 . ,_-slo I "T 3
04 = o4.04.cle I +l/2"T4.l/2"sle I "T4
e = 1-(O 12+Q22+Q32+(]42)
Flowchart H-9. Nav Fast/Align (8/see) (Sheet 1 of 2)
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ENTE R
TEMPERATURE-SENSITIVE GYRO BIAS
Bx = BGTXO+ BGTX1 (TGXt + BGTX2 (TGXI 2
By = BGTYO+ BGTY1 (TGY)+ BGTY2 (TGY} 2
CORRECT GYRO SCALE FACTOR TABLE FORTEMP
DSGX = SGTXO + SGTX1 (TGX) + SGTX2 (TGX) 2
DSGY = SGTYO + SGTY1 (TGY) + SGTY2 (TGY) 2
+ = S+SGX1 GXO + OSGX, S_x 1 = S_x 0 + DSGX
%;y, = S_yo+osGY.SOy,=S_xo+osGY
f
i
TEMPE RATURE-SENSTIVE GY RO G-DRI FT
MXX = MGTXO + MGTXl (TGX) + MGTX2 (TGX] 2
Myy = MGTYO + MGTY1 (TGY} + MGTY2 (TGY] 2
, '
TEMPERATURE-SENSITIVE ACCEL BIAS AND SCALE-FACTOR
SAX =
SAy =
ABX =
ABy =
SATXO + SATXl (TAX] + SATX2 (TAX) 2
SATY0 + SATY1 (TAY) + SATY2 (TAY) 2
BATX0 + BATXl (TAX) + BATX2 (TAX) 2
BATYO+ BATY1 (TAY) + BATY2 (TAY) 2
_ RETURN _
Flowchart H-10. Instrument Compensation, Slow (2/see)
H-21
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ENTE R
ALIGN
<0
(NAV MODE)
OPEN LEVELING LOOP AND CLEAR CONTROL TORQUES
VXC L = 0
Vyc L = 0
WXC = 0
Wyc = 0
VZC R = 0
COMPUTE CORIOLIS CORRECTION
VXC R = (2" WZN" VY) - (2 WyN - RHO x) • V Z
Vyc R = - (2" WZN " VX) + (2" WXN - RHO x} " V Z
AZC R = Vx(RHox+2_B22)-VY(RHox+QB12 )
COMPUTE RADII OF CURVATURE
RE1 I --1 ' (1 ---1 "h b-f'(1 -3"(B12)2-(B22)2)
a a
RE2 I --1 • (1 ---1 " hb - f" 11 - 3 • (B2212 - (812121)
a a
RE3 = al "(2"f'812"B22)
Flowchart H-If.. Nav Slow (2/sec) (Sheet 1 of 2)
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ZERO CORIOLIS TERMS
VXC R : O; Vyc R = 0
COMPUTE POSITION
LONGITUDE TAN "1 B31
= (B11 . 822 - B12" B21
LATITUDE = SIN "1 (B32}
ALPHA = TAN -I' (-812)
B22
r
COMPUTE EARTH RATES
WXS = _-B12
Wys = ,_Z.B22
WZS = ,_. B32
RETURN
Flowchart H-II. Nay Slow (2/sec) (Sheet 2 of 2)
H-23
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t = 0.5
>0
NLP = NLP + I
,,q
At = 0.5
h = h + V z • At- S3" (0.125)
V z = V z - $3" At
_lr At = 2
NLP = -3
DGR = (Z_ - hO)' (0.5)
DGR2
KTA = rl(1 +_--)
KI = 3" KTA
K4 = DRG S21(16 * (I + DGR $2116))
K2 = 4'(KTA) 2+g'10 "7
K3 = 2" (KTA) 3
Z_h = h - $4 - hbi
hO = h
S4 = S4 + K4 "L_h
S3 = S3 + K3" Ah " At
V z = Vz-K2-Z_J_.A t
h = h - Kl'Z_h "At
I
Flowchart H-12. Altitude (2/sec)
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I INPUT'INPUT JDISCRETE WORDS'
0 TO MODE NO._
MODEADVANCE
MODE NO. = MODE NO. + 1
< )MODEEXIT
OUTPUT 'OUTPUT JDISCRETE WORDS'
RETURN )
MODE1
SE LF-TEST
PASS?
YES
UP TO
OPERATING
TEMP?
YES
SPIN
SPEED
YES
i COMMAND JCAGE
MODE )ADVANCE
MODE2
GYRO
CONTROL
YES
PRE GYRO CONTROL
NO
NO
MODEEXIT
NO
PRE ALIGN
,./ MODEh
I_ EXIT J
Flowchart H-13. Mode Controller (i/sec) (Sheet 1 of 2)
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LATITUDE NO
AVAI LAB LE
CHANNEL
AVAILABLE
YES
NO
SET:
BTT =
TBT -
DES =
(BTT (CHANNEL NO.)) A
(TBT (CHANNEL NO.)) A
(DES (CHANNEL NO.)) A
LINK TO QUEUE:
FAST NAV, SLOW NAV
FAST INST COMP; SLOW INST COMP
PARITY/DESIGN EQU; QUATRATURE INTEGRATION
COORDINATE TRANSFORMATION: GAIN SELECT;
OUTPUT FORMATTED
MODE
ADVANCE
MODE3
MODE
ADVANCE
MODE 4
_V
_f
MODE EXIT
MODE5
_V
IV
ALIGN MODE
MODE
EXIT
NAV MODE
_ REINITIATEMODE
Flowchart H-13. Mode Controller (i/sec) (Sheet 2 of 2)
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.5 o
GAIN TIMER = GAIN TIMER + 1
GAIN TIMER =O
KT = 0
KZ = 0
BXC = 0
< NEW GAIN TIME BYjC =
O
IVl
NEW GAIN TIME = NEXT GAIN TIME
KV = NEW KV
KT = NEW KT
KZ = NEW KZ
- RETURN
Flowchart H-14. Gain Select (i/sec)
H-27
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APPENDIX I
ADVANCED FAILURE DETECTION AND
ISOLATION ALGORITHM
I-i
403314
i. Failure Detection and Isolation Alqorithm for Tetrahedral
Array of Four Valid Gyros
Test relations for a tetrahedral array are obtained from
the centroid relation
el3 - e23 + e33 - e43 = 0 (i)
where spin axes er3 are taken outward from sides of a pyramid.
For test directions
er3 x es3 \_-
e T = So where S o - 2
rs
Note, by multiplying (i) by er3X,
e T - e T + e T - e T
rl r2 r3 r4
= 0
Since
e T _ - e T and e T = 0
rs sr rr
Then
eTl 4 = eTl 3 - eTl 2
= - e T
eTl3 eT23 34
= - eT
eTl2 eT23 24
(2)
eTl 4 -- eT24 - eT34
I-2
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Using the first relation, the absolute value yields CT T =
• 13 14
1/2 and multiplying by _, a relation for test duratlon rota-
tions is
814 = 813-812 (3)
where subscripts indicate the test direction.
Note, the unit vector
= + 2 1 + C T
eNl4 eTl2 13T12
= eTl3 12_
-+
is normal to eTl 4, hence, in the No. 1 gyro sensitive plane
G13 + 812 )
+ e
0 = el4 _Tl4 _3 N14
(4)
The magnitude of the rotation is
2 _ _ 2
0 = _.0= e
14 + (813 + 812)2/3
2( + 8132 1 ) + 71814= _ e122 + e 42 1 2
= _(8122 2 2)2 + 613 + (_143
(5)
using (3)
I-3
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Defining Trs as the test difference of r gyro and s gyro
outputs in the direction eTr s, then it follows the square of
rotation amplitude 81 of gyro No. i, if other gyros are perfect
is given by the calculation,
* 2 + TI32 + TI4F1 _ (TI22 2)
* 2
, that is F 1 = 81 for only gyro No. 1 drifting.
Multiplying (2) by 8 - obtain relations
e = e - e
13 23 34
el2 = e23 _ 824 (6)
el4 = e24 = 934
hence if only gyro No. 3 drifts,
TI3 = -813 = -923 + 834 = T23 + T34
and if only gyro No. 2 drifts,
TI2 = -el2 = -823 + 924 = _ T23 + T24
and if only gyro No. 4 drifts,
TI4 =-@14 = -824 + 834 = T24 - T34
I-4
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It follows that the calculation
F1 = 2 T12 + T1 + T1 _ T23 + T34 T243 3 - (6a)
has the output
F 1 =4
_i 2 if only gyro No. 1 drifts
0 if only gyro No. 2 drifts
0 if only gyro No. 3 drifts
0 if only gyro No. 4 drifts
Thus F 1 serves to detect failure of gyro No. 1 if only one gyro
fails at a time.
It may be similarly shown that test functions for the other
gyros are:
= 2 T12 + + T2 - TI4 4 3F2 3 T23 4 + T3 _ T1 2
2 2 _ T242 + T23 + T34 - TI2 + TI4 (6b)
F 3 =
F4 2 T14 + + - TI2 3 33 T24 T34
In order to evaluate the response of the test functions for
general drifts of all gyros we shall express the drifts in terms
used in a later section.
|
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Extending (17) for four gyros in tetrahedral configuration
it may be shown
= C81_30o C82-30oTI2 DF1 - DF2
= $81 + C83-30oTI3 DF 1 DF 3
= $82 + S 8T23 DF2 DF3 3
TI4 = DFI $81-60° - DF4 C84-30°
= S 8 -60 ° S 8
T24 DF2 2 - DF4 4
=- S8 -60 S 8 -60 °
T34 DF3 3 o- DF 4 4
where @k are drift directions relative worst case directions.
Where
Xr = DF C8 + 30° ' Yr = DF " $9 + 30°
r r r r
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it may then be obtained,
TI2 = (X1 - X2) 12+ (YI - Y2) _-32
TI3 = (X3 - Xl) • 12+ (Y3 + yl ) _-32
T23 = -(X 2 + X3)
TI4 = -X 1 - X4 •
1
+ (Y2 + Y3)%F3T
i- y4 _32 2
(6C)
T24 =-X2 + X4 2- Y4
T34 = X 3 + X 4
Note,
(TI2 + T23 - TI3) = X 1 - X 2 - X 3
_-X 1 X 2
(TI2 + TI4 - T24) 2 + T- x4 + (YI - Y2 ) 9
-x I x 3 x 4
(TI4 + T34 - TI3) - 2 + T + 2 (YI + Y3 + Y4 ) _/__32
x 2 x 3 x 4
(T23 - T24 + T34) - 2 + T + T + (Y2 + Y3 + Y4 ) %F3T
The selection of variables X r, Yr
which is simpler than other F r.
leads to analysis of F 4 of (6b)
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Obtain
2
F4 = DF42 + _ X4 (X1 - X
2
2 + 2X3) + _ Y4 (Xl + X2)
4
+ _ (XIX2 + XlX 3 - X2X3)
F3 = DF32 + _ X3 2X4 - --2 + _- + _ (YI - Y2)
2 . ( 3 3 _3 (X1 + X2))+ _ Y3 2 Y1 + 2 Y2 - -_
X2 2
2
+_ (X4 Y1 - X4 Y2) + YIY2
(7)
2 2 2
where DFr = Xr + Yr Consider the mean and standard deviation
of Fr if gyro No. r fails with given DFr over the set of random
phases. Note, Fr = DF 2
r
assuming independent gyro drifts. Also,
(F4_F 4) 2 _ 4 2 . _ 2
= X4 " 9 (Xl - X2 + 2X3 )2 + Y4 3 (Xl + X2)
16 2
+ _- (XIX 2 + XiX 3 - X2X3)
4 2 2 4 4
= _ DF 4 aN + _ _N
j m
using Xr 2 = yr 2 = _N2/2 for r = i, 2, 3 and X42 = Y42 = DF42/2.
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Then
OF 2 r2
4/_ =_ r _i + where r = N/DF4 . 4
(8)
If the noise is .l°/hr and the failure rate 1.°/hr then the
io variation of F 4 is 11.6 percent about the average due to noise
of the other gyros. By symmetry the same relation holds for all
F r, however to demonstrate the consistency of the above relations
for F 3, obtain as expected,
(F3__3)2 4 ( Xl X2 )2
= X32 9 2X4 - -2-+ -2--+ _ (YI - Y2 )
2
+ Y
3 4(I Yl 3" 9 + _Y2 -_
+ XI2 94 (_ _ X4 _ y2_) 2
(X 1 + X2)) 2
g x4-Y1-y
4
+ _ (X4Y 1 - X4Y2) 2
2
+ Y
1
2"
Y
2
4 2 a 2 4 c 4
= _ DF 3 N +'3 N
If none of the gyros failed, then = = o N
r
2
c F = (F r -
r
-- 2 8
F r) = _ aN4
and
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Expressed as a fraction of the output with a test failure
rate D F, then the io spread of outputs is given by
2 - r 1±2
DF
where r = CN/D F. If CN = "l°/hr and D F = l.°/hr then the output
ranges Ic from -.63% to +1.63% of the output for an actual
failure with test level magnitude D F-
In order to evaluate the probability of no detection of a
failure and false alarm a more detailed analysis of the probability
distribution of errors is necessary. This can be done by
examining F 4 of (7) assuming the gyro noises are Gaussian.
The analysis of probability distribution of F r is facilitated
by putting F 4 of (7) in the form,
F 4 = R 2 _ r 2
where
R 2 ,2 + y_2
= X 4
2
r = _ (X 3 + X 2 - X I)
, 1
X 4 = X 4 + _ (2X3 + X 1 - X 2)
= y + _Jl (X 1 +Y4 4 X 2 )
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2 2
=oIt is readily shown using Xr = Yr N
2
/2 for r = i, 2, 3
2 2/3
aX, = o N
4
2 2
N /3
=
ay.
4
a 2 N 2= 2 o /3
r
Regarding X 4, Y4 given
X* 4 = X4
_-_ = y
4 4
_= 0
(X* 4 - _)(r - r) = 0
(Y*4 - _44) (r - ?) = 0
-_ - Y* ) = 0(X*4 ) (Y*4 4
regarding X 4, Y4 as given rather__than __rand°m variables. Regarding
X4' Y4 as random variables with X42 = Y4 2 = aDF2/2, X4 = Y4 = 0 then,
2 2 2/
Ox, = o /2 + o N 3
4 DF
2
o
Y*4
_-o 2/2 ÷ oN2/3
D F
o 2 = 2 ON2/3
r
X* 4 = 0
Y*4 = 0
Regarding X4,Y 4 as
random variables
_= 0
I-ll
403314
(X_ - X_) (r - r) = 0
(Y_ -Y_)(r - r) = 0
w(x_ x_)(Y_Y_): 0
is r.
Since X l, X 2, X 3 are assumed normally distributed then so
It follows r 2 has a Rayleigh distribution
_(r 2) = 1 . e-r2/_r 2
Or2
Since r is independent of X_, Y_ the joint probability
2
density of X_, Y_, r is
_(X_, Y_, r 2) dX_dY_ dr 2 : _(X_, Y_) e
_r2/a 2
r d (r2/Or2) dX_dY_
The probability distribution of F 4 is obtained substituting
• 2 _ such that
r2 = X_ 2 + Y4 - F 4 and integrating over X_, Y4
_2 _2X 4 + Y z G(F4,0),
F 4
_(xl __
fj- . ,e Or2 02 4 <9,#(F4)dF 4 = X_dY *(XI,Y 4) r
o
r
(xl_ +_I_)_>_(_,,o)
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where G(F4,0) is the greater of F 4 and 0, and F 4 has the range
- _ to (X_ 2 + y_2). Consider the case where gyro No. 4 has not
Then
failed and simply has noise.
dX_dY _4
dX4dY 4 _(X_ ,Y%) 2_Ox, Oy,
4 4
d8 dR
= 2R
R
-R2/OR2
e
where
5 ON 2 and R 2 _2 + y_2 Then
oR2 = 2Ox,2= 2 oy,2= _ - x4 F4
i_!__+
-R 2 _--_
r
R_2! G 2R d@ dR e dF4
_(F4 )dF 4 = -2_ _ _ -_
R r
(F4,0)
F 4
2
O
r
= dF 4 e
F 4
O
r
= dF 4 • e
dF 4
7/3 °N2
dF 4
--7/3 °N2
dR 2
_ G (F4,0)
• 2
o R 2
e
-G (F 4, 0)
e __
+ Or 2)
e-F4/5/3_N 2
2 2
+ F4/_ aN
e
+
• or
if F 4 > 0
(i0)
if F 4 < 0
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The probability of false alarm, PFA, using test level e2
against F4 is
f dF -F4/5/3 ON2PFA = --- " e
J7/3_N 2
2
£
5 3 (%2=-- e -_ )
7
(ll)
If oN = .l°/hr and £ = .5°/hr then PFA = 2. x 10 -7 .
Raising e to .6°/hr reduces PFA to PFA = 2.6 x 10 -10 The frac-
tion of false alarms to actual failures is
PFA
fFA - I s
• (MTBF)
MTBF = Mean time
before failure
1 = Test smoothing
s time
For MTBF = 3000 hr, As = 1./60. hr we see in the last example
with e = .5°/hr we have fFA = .036 and with e = .6°/hr we have
fFA = .00005•
Consider the case of failure of gyro No. 4 having occurred
where the distribution of failure magnitude is _(D F) and the
distribution drift direction is flat with respect to angle 6 F.
isThe probability distribution of X_, Y4
1I x -0Fc0/2 /l
Oy_2
/ / e dX,4dY_ . ¢(DF )2_ gx*gv*
-4 -4
DF=0 8F=0
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assuming (X_ - X4), (Y_ - Y4) are normally distributed where
2 o 2 OR2/2
X4 = DFCe F' Y4 = DFS6F" Using ox* 4 = Y_ =
,2
R2 = X_ 2 + Y4
_x_.Y_dX_dY_
R2 DF2JeUdX_dY_ o 2 o 2 deF
R R ¢(DF )dD F 2---_-
w° 2 . e •
R DF=0 8F=0
(12)
where
2D F
U --
o 2
R
2DF" R" ( ) 2DF'R"= + S8 = - 5 CBF-8(x__ +_ s_) ;_ _ _ s_ o
R R
using X_ = R C 8 , Y_ = R S B. Except* in rare cases K - 2
DFR
o 2 >>i.
R
Then,
le I dBF _ eK%
DF=0 _=0
/2"n-K(I-C¢) f K#2de _ e K . _e de K. -T
2_ _'_0 _=e _m e
K
e
_t 2/2 DFR
e dt = e K 2 _ OR
t=0_2_K =e
de
2_
(12a)
*Cases unimportant to non-detection of failure.
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Substituting this result in (12), obtain
(R-D F )
[ o 2* * * e R _(DF) dDF
6(X4,Y4 ) dX_dY4 = 2Tr3/2OR .,_ "! _F
DF= 0
(13)
, ,2
R2 = X42 + Y4 " Substituting (13) into (9) obtainwhere
-R2/o 2 =ofJ "dX4dY 4 e@(F4)dF4 = 2_3/20R R_--
Rz G (F4,0) DF= 0
(DF-R)
o2
R
e
F4/O 2
dD F dF4 r
_(D F) --.e --
r
Changing variables of integration X 4, Y4 to R, 8 using
dX_ dY; _ R dO dR __ dR d8
2z3/2 aRV _ 2 _3/2 oRV_ o R 2_
and noting that the integrand does not involve 8,
@(F4)dF4 = J (_G(F4,0)) .e
F 4
o 2
r
dF 4
o2
r
(14)
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where
2
R2 _ (DF-R)
o e R e _R2 dDF
= __ . _(DF)
R=Y R DF= 0
Consider the probability of non-detection of a failure, PND,
using the test F 4 >62 in which case
2
£
PND = / 4_(F4) dF 4
--aD
E2
_- ./" _(F 4) dF 4
0
Using (14), and integrating by parts
J (Y) d e
Y=0
2
L
: 2
r
- J(_-) 'e -J(O)
+ . dy / e
y"O DF=0
" _dY
o
0
• 2
-e
2
y2 (DF_Y)
2 ; , 2 oD F
_r }" ]e R O(D F) -- (15)
D],=O
on collecting integral forms J(£), J(0).
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Consider the case of a distribution of failure rates
_(DF) =
I_D F for DFL_ D F 5 DFu
0 otherwise
3 (DFu3/2 DFL3/2)-Iwhere I = _ - The distribution is rather
flat with bias toward higher values. Since non-detection occurs
mostly in a band of D F values less than o N wide at the lower end of
of the distribution, consider the probability
DFL + oN
£
D <- < + /
F L
+ -i 3
(rD3/2_ l) 2u r 3/2
DF L DF U DF L =where u = /o N , rD = / . For u = ii, r D I0, the
probability is 4.5 x 10 -3 for occurrence of D F value where
non-detection is modeled as practically possible.
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For R < - OR'DFL
D
f
DF--0
2
o R
DF U- R
o R
f _y2e dyo R
DF L- R
oR
=l.a R
2 e . /_\
o R
2
(DrU-R)
e --Ir [ R
a R
2
o R
e o
R (16)
since (DFu DF L) >> oR and using the assymtotic property of the
normal function, substituting (16) into (15), obtain
/(y2 _ e 2) ,0_
e \ r
0
assuming DFL-E >> OR' that is, c, the test
sigma less than the failure rate.
2
DF- Y)
2 2 - (-__o 2'
r 2( DFL- _)
(17)
level is many noise
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The exponential terms dominate variation of the magnitude
of the integrand where appreciable contributions to PND occur.
2 2 2 2
For the tetrahedral case oR = or = _ c N hence for y, e>>a N
o+).
=e
1 2
2 (Y-DF)
o
r
for y< e
(18)
The maximum of this function occurs at y = DFL/2 when ¢ __DFL/2
and at y = _ when DFL/2<£<DFL hence
=( )Ymax G D /2, eF L
It is desirable to use the least £, so as to minimize PND,
consistent with acceptable PFA which by (ii) is £-_5.5 o N . For
DFL/O N >-ii then £ _<DFL/2 using e = 5.5 o N and the integrand of
(17) is approximately maximized at y = DFL/2. When DFL/O N z Ii,
we model GF 2 failure. In general, (17) is approximately
evaluated setting y in non-exponential terms to y = DFL/2 where
y>eand y = e where y<e, and integrating. Then, forc_<DFL/2, obtain
2
1 N.I.
PND = ¢2-D F 2 I][e ( (20 2 £-DF _ / £D F -eN L/2I+_/ L . DFL
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1 2
where G(x) = e dy and aR = a = a
%f2z r N
X
_ J/ FL _ND -e /o /_3 is large for the GF 2 failure model
Note, since
V E -DFL C DFL- £
G
,I£ "D F o N
//_3V
/D - E_2
ill FL I
I
e
using the assymtotic expansion. Modeling r D = DFu/DFL >> 1
then 1 -- 3/2
(r D DFL) 3/2. For cases where £< DFL/2,
PND = ]1 3 _u • v 2 (u-v)
2U 2 . rD3/2 "G %/6(v-u/2)) + (u-v) 2 " e
(2O)
where u = DFL/O N, v = 6/0 N. Adopt a nominal value of r D = i0,
noting adjustment of PND is readily made with any change of
assumption regarding r D. Consider the marginal case for GF 2
failure with u = ii where v = 5.5 to hold PFA to an acceptable
level, PFA = 10 -8 obtaining
PND = 1.3 x 10 -4 • + .18 e-45"_ =10-24
GF 2 Failure Model e = DFL/2
DFL = ii.o N
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When u = DFL/a N < ii and v = e/a N = 5.5, since e > DFL/2 the
maximum value of (18) is at y = e. Substituting y = e for non-
exponential terms of (17) and otherwise making the same approxi-
mations as in (20), obtain for e > DFL/2,
PND
2u 2 rD3/2 (u-v) 2
_3 (u2/2_v 2) _3 (u-v)
2 2
[e (u-v)._2 G(_6(v-u/2)) + 2_--3_ e]
(21)
A table of PND for several u values is:
DFL/a N
ii
9
8
7
PND
i0-24
-12
1.3 x i0
-6
I. x i0
-5
2.7 x i0
rD = i0
E/o = 5.5
N
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Consider the statistical properties of
2 2 2 2 2 2
F 0 = TI2 + TI3 + T23 + TI4 + T24 + T34
Using (6c) ,
2
2 2 2( x, ?) ( x, _)TI4 + T24 + T34 ......-Xl 2 -Y4 + -x2 + 2 Y4
2
+ (x 3 + x 4)
2(x,x24 ) (xlx2
= _f2 _r2 Y 4 + +
_r2 _f2
x 4
2
+ (x 3 + x 4)
2
_r2 _r2 \ _r 6 _6 Q2 X
Xl+ - m +
_2
x2 x3)
_r3 _3
2
<_ ) ( +)2+°2 J1a%2+ SUI °Uwhere the identity UI2 = U 1
is used with e = I/_,F2, 1/43 to isolate Y4' x4 to single terms to
remove correlation of variables. Introducing the variables
x I x 2 x I x 2
- F , x s - + m with variance ON2 ,X D
_2 42 42 _2
2 2 _( _)2(xo_ _)2TI4 + T24 + T34 = Xs + Y4 + -- + x4 + x3
+ _ 2 XD + %f31
where correlation of variables due to x 4, Y4 was removed.
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Yl Y2
Where we also introduce variables YD .... ' Ys
_F2 *,,f2
then by (6c) ,
TI22 + TI32 + T23
Yl Y2
+ --
_2 r_2
2 XD 3 YD + 3 + (y + yl)
= + 2 3
- 2 + (Y2 + Y3 )
x0+ 2 + YD
uslng the above identity with s = 1/_2.
and introducing the variables
Adding the two results,
X 4 =- + x 4 + x 3
_3
= +_23- Y4Y4 Xs
Xs +_Y3 +?Y sY3 =--2-
X3 = 5 x3 + 3 YD -6 XD2J5
U =_x D + 3
%/-5 YD
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obtain
F0 = X42 + Y42 + Y32 +
where
2
_= xD + -- +
J3 J2
x D _C3 X D
2 + YD _- + -- + YD4-2
= + YD + x3
4%0
7 3 + P + YD3 YD -6 XD
2V5 J2
= U2 + X 2
3
using e =.I_ in the identity, then collecting terms.
Note that
variables generated by the identity have a covariance
UIU 2 = (au I - i_- __a _ u2) (i_-_- _ 2 u I + e u 2)
J
In the case, U12 = U22
usinga = i/_2. Since
then the new variables are uncorrelated
2 2 5 2
Y4 = Y3 = _ ON
we may apply the identity with _ = I/%r2 to obtain
2 2 2 2
Y4 + Y3 = U4 + U3
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where
_3 X
U 4 - + ys/Xf2) +2 (Y4 + Y3 s
2_2
_f3 3 x s
U3 - 2 (Y4 - Y3 - YS/%f2) + 2_2
and U 4 " U 3 = 0.
X 3 , U.
Also note U 4, U 3 are uncorrelated with X4,
Note, _ = _ °N2, = -- . To use the identity to form
uncorrelated variables when the variances are unequal, use the fol-
lowing general result
/I -l//l + I 2e= 2 I=
2 2
U 1 - U 2
2 UIU 2
" N2/%F5Where U 1 = X U 2 = U then UIU 2 = X4U = o so obtain
1 then_ 24' _2 = _5.
4, s - 3
The new independent variables are
XD - YD x4 + _ x3
ii
V2- 3_15
XD + 2 _ i_
%/5 YD + x4 + _ -- x3
where V 1 V 2 = 0 and X42 + U 2 = Vl 2 + V22 We know V I, V 2 are
uncorrelated also with U 3, U 4, but must determine correlation
with X 3 to obtain
VlX 3 = 0
3 o 2
V2X3 = i-0 N
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The only non-zero covariance is V2X3 which is removed using
2the identity with U 1 = V2,U 2 = X 3 using aX32 = 21/10 o N ,
aVe2 29/10 aN2= , for which I = 4/3 to obtain a = i/_"i0,
1 - _2 = 3/_f10 hence
_ 7 YD 1 17
U 1 - x 3 + _ x 4 + xD
6_3 2¢2 2_r3 6%16
3 3 3 3
U2 - x3 + YD + x4 + -- XD
2_F3 2_r2 2_,53 246
whe re
"UlU 2 = 0, X32 + V22 = U12 + U22
Collecting results,
TI22 2 32 2 2 2F 0 _ + TI3 + T 2 + TI4 + T24 + T34
= U12 + U22 + U32 + U4 2 + V12
where the variables
7 YD 1 17
Ul = 6_3 x3 + -- x4 + -- xD2_2 243 6_6
3 + 3 + 3 + 3
U2 = 2_---_x3 _-_ MD 2_/3 x4 2--_ XD
U3 = _3 (Y4 - Y3 - Ys/_2) + _ x
2 2_-2 S
U4 _ _F3 (Y4 + y + YS/_2) + -LI Xs
2 3 2%/-2
2 2 1 XDVl = 3_ -_ x3 - YD +_ - x4 3_3
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are uncorrelated where
XD = (XI-X2)/_2
XS = (YI-Y2)/_2
YD = (YI-Y2)/%r2
YS = (YI+Y2)/%/2
2
oN
It is assumed Xr, Yr
so
r = i, 4 are independent with variance
2 2
aU1 = 2a N
2 2
_U 2 = 3a N
2 2
aU 3 = 3a N
2 2
aU 4 = 2g N
2 2
aU 1 = 2a N
2 2aN 2 F_ = 12aN2 in agreement with the resultSince CTrs =
for the new independent variables.
Consider evaluation of the probability distribution of F 0,
which involves the sum of independent Rayleigh distributed
variables with differing means. First consider the case where
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means are equal. It may be shown that the probability distribu-
tion for the case of sum of two and three Rayleigh variables with
equal mean is Distribution of:
-S2/M 2
e S2 dS2#($2) dS2 = 2
M2
-$3/M3 2Se 3
¢($3) dS3 - 3 2 dS3
M3
Sum of Two Rayleigh
Variables, Means M2
Sum of Three Rayleigh
Variables, Means M3
= 3aN2 2 2 V12
Let S 2 =2U22 + U32 where M 2 and S 3 = U 1 + U 4 + where
M 3 = 2a N Then F 0 = S 2 + S 3 has a probability distribution
given by integrating the product of the two distributions with
substitutions dF 0 = dS 2, S 2 = F 0 -S 3
-(F 0 - S3)/M 2 - S3/M 3
(to- s3)" s2¢(F 0) dF 0 = e- 3
2M 2 2M 3
$3=0
-F0/M 2
dF 0 e
• I
2 3
2M 2 M 3
where
0 -ex (F0_x)x2d
I = e x , _=
=0
1 1
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It may be shown by integration and taking M2 = 3aN2, M3 = 2aN
that
¢(F0) dF0 -2u= 54[2 (u-3) e + (u 2 + 4u + 6) e -3u] du
where u = F0/6 a N . The probability that noise causes F 0 to
exceed e 2 is
P(F0 > £2) = ]2 _(F0) dF0
= [-27 (5-2u) + 2 (68 + 42u + 9u 2) e -u ] e -2u
2
where u = 1/6 (£/a N ) .
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, Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm for Tetrahedral
Array with Three Valid Gyros
When one of four gyros in tetrahedral array is invalid, say
gyro No. 4 then @14 in (5) must be estimated using data of other
gyros using (3), hence
@2 = 2 [@ + + el42]122 8132
2 [01223 + 6132 + (013 _ 012) 2]
4 [@122 2=- +@3 13 - %12e13]
The test function
F1 4 [T122 2 . T1 ]
= 3 + TI3 - T12 3
2
correctly estimates D F if only gyro No. 1 drifts and at drift
1
rate DFI. When a gyro other than gyro No. 1 fails it is important
that the test function for gyro No. 1 be minimized, in order to
isolate the failure. This may be done by elaborating the test to
the bilfnear function
!
4 1j 32 "F 1 = _ TI22 + T 1 - TI2 • TI3 - T23 [K 1 " TI2 + K 1 . TI3 + K
(22)
2
which correctly estimates D F when only gyro No. 1 drifts since
1
T23 = 0. Constants K 1, K1, K 2 are chosen to minimize F 1 if either
gyro No. 2 fails or gyro No. 3 fails.
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Consider the case only gyro No. 2 drifts. Then (22) reduces
to
412 lF 1 = _ TI2 - KIT23TI2 - K 2 T232 (23)
(_TI 2 _ )Using (2) it may be shown • eT23 = 1/2, hence when gyro
No. 2 drifts in a direction wlth angle ¢2 from e_12, we have
TI2 = -DF2 C_2 and T23 = DF2 C60o - #2
When only gyro No. 2 drifts, it may be shown
2 2
F 1 = D IC¢ + K 1 C# C 6 - K C
2
3 F2 _ 2 2 0 - _2 2 60°- #2
2o211 JF2 1 + T - K2 + D • Cz _ 2 -A (24)
where
D = 1 + _--+ T + 4 (KI - K2)
C A = K1 K 2 )i+T+ T /D
S A _3
= T (KI - K2 )/D
The worse case direction of drift _2 is _2
F 1 is maximized to
where K 2
2o21}F 1 = _ F2 K 2 + D
K 1
= 1 + T- K 2
= A/2 for which
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Eliminating K2 show
3 * 3 2D = (I + Kl )2 +(K 2 - _)
SO F
K1
is a function of K I, K2*. Note F 1 is minimized taking
1
= -I in which case (ii) reduces to
22{ +13 1 2sF1 = _ DF 2 K2* _ - K2 I C2¢ 2 -4
For the worse case direction of drift ¢2 = - A/2 it is readily
W
shown
2
F 1 __ DF2
the equal sign holding for K 2 _ 3/2, which is desirable to hold
done worse case El. Measuring drift rate direction relative the 2
= = = 1 -2 S e ,
worst case direction with 02 ¢2 -4/2 note C2_2_ a C202 2
hence (25) takes the form
* 3 *F 1 = _ DF 2
= DF 1 - 5 (_- K2 ) SO
2 2
for K * 5 3/2.
2 *
Then F 1 is seen to be minimized by making K 2 as large nega-
tive as possible (noise being the counter consideration). Since
1 *
K 2 = _ - K 2 , it follows K 2 should be as large as possible. Note,
with K = -i, generally _ = -60 ° so the worst case drift direction
1 +
is ¢2 = -30°' that is 90 ° to eT23.
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For only gyro No. 3 drifting, the same relations hold except
for sense of T23, TI3 so K1 = i.
The derived algorithm is
4
F I =
2
TI2 + TI3 - TI2 - TI3
- T23. IT13 - TI2 + K 2 • T23 ]
(26)
which has properties
2
DF
1
DF 2 "I 4 2_2 i--_ (i + K2) Se2 1
O 2 "I 4 21
F3 i--_ (i + K 2) Se3 I
if only gyro No. 1 drifts
if only gyro No. 2 drifts
if only gyro No. 3 drifts
where K 2 is as large as consistent with noise levels.
gate the behavior of F 1 in the general case where all
use
To investi-
gyros drift,
= - C¢TI2 DFI C¢I DF2 2
TI3 = DFI C60°-#i + DF3 C03
where
= + C60o_
T23 DF 2 C60°-02 DF3 ¢3
¢i is the angle from eTl 2 to DFI about eSl
¢2 is the angle from eTl 2 to DF2 about es2
03 is the angle from eTl 3 to DF3 about es3
as seen in figure I-l.
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eT24
eT34
eT23
DF 2
eT12
eT 13
Figure I-1
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Note, Eq (26) may be put in the form
2
F I = 2 J
- + --_ K T23
(28)
where K = K 2 + i, where, using (27)
(TI2
= - .S + .S + D F S
DFI ¢i-30° DF2 @2-30° 3 ¢3-30 °
3 2 D 2 3 2
2 = D 2 • (_ - S_ )+ F2 (_ - S _ )
_Tl2 +_1_+T 3_ _1 1-30o 2 -30o
2
+ DF3
3 2
(_- S o) 2 C_ C¢
¢3-30 - DFI DF2 1 2
+ 2 D F
DFI 3
using (C¢- C60o_ ¢) =-S¢_30 o
C C + 2 DF2DF3 C ¢2 C60°-¢i ¢3 60°- 60°-
3 2
and (C_ + C60o2_¢ ) = _ -S¢ _30o
_3
Then
F 1 F 2 + DF3
4
-_ DFIDF2 112
4
-3 DFIDF 3 " 113
4 12
+ 3 DF2DF 3 3
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where
112 = C_1%2 + S • S¢ = Cel - Ce2- + C@I C_i-30 o 2-30 ° 30 ° 30 ° +30 ° % +30 °
113 =-C60o_#iC¢3+ S_ S_ = -S 8 C 8 + C01 C 81-30 ° 3-30 ° 1 3-30 ° + 30 ° 3 + 30 °
S¢2-30o 30 o S@ 3 + 30 °123 = C60o_02C60o_¢3 + S__ = S02 + C82 C e
using ¢r = er_30 o noting e2,03 are angles measured from worst
case directions in terms of which, using (27),
3 + 30 °
(29)
TI2 = DF o1 C01-30° -DF2 " C02-30
• + DF3" C83_TI3 = DFI Se I 30 °
(3O)
T23 = DF2 • S@2 + DF • S e3 3
Then, in general
= D 2 2 4
F1 DF12÷ F2 + D_3 -_ DF_D_2112
S02÷ D_ S0)2}+ K (DF2 3 3
+ DFI DF3 113 -DF2" DF3" 123
(31)
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where by expanding cosines
3112 [ C 02= 01C 2 2-62 (32)
i ) j IC 0 + [ C 0 S = -C@ . 2 C e+60 ° +01-30° 3 1-30 ° 83 3-63 i
1 =(3 1123 = C0283-2 S02 + 83 + 30 ° 2 C82+60° C83 + 60° + _ s82 + 60°S 3+60 °)
It may be shownl 121 3/2,1x1 1 3/2,I  231 3/2.
Note the phase of DFI cannot maximize 112 with 01 = 0, 180 °
for @2 = 62 and maximize 113 with @i = -60°' 120 ° for @3 = 63
simultaneously, rather[ll2 [+ [113[ 
The selection of K should at last be held so if gyro No. 1
fails, the noise level in terms of DF2 DF3 does not reduce the
apparent failure magnitude by more than a fraction E on average.
This occurs when
(l-e) 2 DF 2 = F 1 = DF 2 - ]K4 "°N2
3 DF2/ON 2for which K : _ ¢
In the worst case when noises of gyro No. 2 and No. 3 are
equal and 82 = @ 3 = z/2,
3 DF2/ON 2K = _ £ (33)
would be necessary to hold the apparent failure rate reduction to
e D F .
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The apparent failure magnitude can also be reduced by the
terms 112, I13' 123 by worst case phase relationships subject to
(32) so it may be shown the worst case reduction factor in
apparent failure magnitude is,
The total reduction in apparent failure magnitude from the K term
and I terms of (31) is ( e + e *) D F which may be compensated for in
testing by lowering the test level accordingly.
The derived algorithm* tests F r<6 r = i, 2, 3 where
2
F1 = F4 - _ " T23
2
F2 = F4 - a TI3
2
F3 = F4 - _ " TI2
where
F4 2 { 2 2 _ + T23)2}= 3 T122 + T13 + T23 + (T12 T13
4 4
= _ (i + K 2) = _ K
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If a single test fails, say Fr* a6 then the gyro No. r* is
concluded to have failed. The functions F r have the properties:
FI=
F2=
2
DF 1
2
DF 2
2
D F
3
2
D F
1
2
DF 2
2
D F
3
I -_" S 6 2t
I 2 _
_l-_-s 21
I e31
-_ i-e" S 2[
I e I 1
21
I @ 3
if only gyro No. 1 drifts
if only gyro No. 2 drifts
if only gyro No. 3 drifts
(35a)
if only gyro No. 1 drifts
if only gyro No. 2 drifts
(35b)
if only gyro No. 3 drifts
* e + 60 o, 03 +beingwhere 93 = 3
zero for drift normal to eTl 3
F3=
D 2 . i I _eS0 2 _
F I i* }
2 I 21
DF 2 I 1 -aS82, I
2
D F
3
if only gyro No. 1 drifts
if only gyro No. 2 drifts
(35c)
if only gyro No. 3 drifts
* = 6 + 60 ° and 02* = e
where _i 1
*, being zero for drift
O I 62*
+
normal to eTl 2
+60 °
2
*Which amounts to testing T23 ,
2 2 relative (_4 -6)/_
TI3 , TI2
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The variation of F4 due to noise of other gyros when
gyro No. r failed is limited to
I_F41_ _ DF a N if 6N << DF (36)
r r
where oN is the noise amplitude and worse phases of the other gyro
drifts occurred (by (31) with K = 0). Writing the algorithm (21)
in the form,
Test No. 1 :
Test No. 2 :
Test No. 3 :
T232>6 *
T132>6 *
T122>6 *
where
6* = (F4 -6)/_
If only Test No. 1 fails the gyro No. 1
failed
If _ Test No. 2 fails the gyro No. 2
failed
If only Test No. 3 fails the gyro No. 3
failed
(37)
Consider the case when two of the tests fail, say Test No. 1
and Test No. 2. This can occur when only one gyro actually failed,
2
say gyro No. i, as seen by (35a), (35b) if SOl is sufficiently
small. Deciding which gyro failed may use (34) to compare F 1 and
F 2. If F 1 > F 2 then it is more probable that gyro No. 1 failed
than gyro No. 2. The exact probability depends on noise level of
FI-F 2 whereby (34)
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IC 2Using (17) and the general relation 83 _30 o
_3 C , consider the statistic
-2- 20 -30 °
3
2
- TI3 -
= IDFISSI
= D 2S 2
F 1 e 1
- D 2 2
F 2 S@ 2
2
T23
+ DF3Ce3-30ol 2 - (DF2S_2 + DF3S63 _2
DFIDF3S01 C DF3 Q3 C2+ 2 83_300 + -7 @3-300
- 2 DF2DF3S@2S@3
(38)
If gyro No. 1 failed at angle e I and other gyros have only noise,
the mean value of A is
_i = D 2 S 2 _o2 /2
F 1 01
(39)
using C 2
failed at angle @
of A is
V -----2 -----2 2 2
= = 1/2, C = S = 0, D F = D F = o N
If gyro No.
and other gyros _ave only noise, the mean value
2
_2 = -DF22 $622 + o2 /2 (40)
2 2 2
using also = o N
DF1 = DF3
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If gyro No. 1 failed at angle e I , using (26)
A 2 (A - _i )9 A - $8 )2
1 F1 1
D 2 2)2 (_i- D 2 S 2) a 2= (/X - F1 Sel + F 1 e 1 N
+ aN 4 /4
= (A - D 2 2)2F1 S81 -ON4 /4
Denoting drifts of other gyros as noises N 2, N3,
<4- D 2 S 2F 1 01 ) [= -N2S_2 + N2._ C 2 + 2N 3 -2N2N3S82S@303_30o DF 1 $8 ICe3_30o
N24 S 4 3 J 4 • + •
= + N34 4 F1 @I N32 N22
since none of the cross product terms contribute.
_ 4 V 3/8 thenN24 = N34 = 2 a N , =
Using *
(A_ D 2 2) 2 . [D 2 S 2 5 23F 1 $81 = 2ON 2 F 1 e I + _ aN J
*An amplitude distribution of two components which are normally
distributed is modeled.
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Hence
aAl2 = 2 ON 2 • [DFI2
If gyro No. 2 failed at angle 82,
o2 -- [( DF22A2 = (A - A2)2 = A+ S022 ) - ON2/2] 2
F 2 $82 - 2 + DF 2 " °N2 +04/4
A + 2 $822) 2 _ ON 4/4DF 2
Denoting drifts of other gyros as noises
F2 02 = N12 S j + -- C 2 + 2NIN 3 S C -2 DF2N3S<,2S1 N32 !33- 30° ':l L:3-30° 3
4
= N 1 s7 3 _ 4 N32 s2 c-_ 2 2 --+ N34 _ N12 4 S
• + " + DF2 "2 N32
=2 ,N 2 -[DF22 S 2 + 5CN2 ]
_2 4
Hence,
2
°A
2 2 902 ]• 2 . S82 + 8 N= 2 o N 2 DF 2
(42)
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2 2 is approximately normally
The observable A _ TI3 - T23
distributed when the failure term exceeds the noise level accord-
ing to probability density
e if gyro No. 1 failed
¢(a) = /-2To
n I
¢(a} = e
A
2
(43)
if gyro No. 2 failed
To investigate the maximum probability density for
X = D F
2 2
1 $81
put (43) for gyro No. 1 fail in the form
1
1 -2 Q
¢ (A) = _ e
where
Q
(A- AI)
2
G A
1
+ tn (o a 2).
1
Using (39) , (41)
2
_i = x - °N /2
Note Q =
2
OA 1 = 22 2 o N
2
+ £n 2 o N y
9 N 2 )(x+_o
9 2
where y = x + _ o N
6 = A + _ ON2
(44)
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Since ¢ (A) is maximized when Q is minimized, take BQ/ay = 0
to obtain
2 62
0 - Y + y
2 2
2a N 2 ON
So
21
2
Since aAl >0, consider only the positive root.
2
y = 6. For A >3/8 a N '
For 6 >>c note
N
(45)
that is
1 aN4/6 2y = 6+_ - a N
A 1 ON 2 2x - A + /(13/8 + _/CN ) (46)
minimizes Q and maximizes ¢ (A) when& >0.
A
for x = i approximates
Max ¢ (A I #i fail)--
IDFISell
The probability density
1 e
_2 20 N 2 5 2 1 4(4 + _ o N + _ o N /6)
(47)
For the same _ observation, A >0, if we assume gyro No. 2
D 2
failed we have using (43), (40) , (42) and redefining x = F2 S
1
1 -2 e
#(A) - e
2
@2
1-46
403314
where
(A - _2)22 ( 2, (y - 6")22 2Q = + £n oA2 )= + £n 2o N y
2a N Ya_
2
(48)
where
9 aN 2y=x+_
b = -A + _ 0N2
Since (48) and (44) have the same form except 6* replaces 6
the solution (45) for the maximum density holds with 6+6* pro-
9 N2vided y >[ _ (since x >0) hence
2
2[ ]IL l)y = a N -i + /i + (b*/ON2)2 = 6* +aN2 aN (49)
if 6* > , which by (48) requires A>[ a N For cases
2 aN > A >0, where I 6"I < gN 2 let us examine Q and its deriva-
tive using (44) with 6 +6",
2aN2 y - 26* +--y + Zn y + £n 2ON2
Try y
O __
dQ _
dy
dQ _ 1 [ 6_'2] 1
dy 2aN2 1 Y [ + Y--
9 G 2
8 N , the minimum value of y for which x > 0, obtaining
4 3 u + £n _ o N where u- aN 2
(50)
2]
18a N
7 2
[ a N >A>0
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8
Since we consider the case _-_ u - 215 aN
dy_--_>0 and that Q is larger for values of y = _9aN2
ity density for the most likely value of DF2 S02Lfailed is by (50) , (48)
8 6*
<i, it follows
The probabil-
if gyro No. 2
I 1
-- 3 2
Max _(A No. 2 fail) /_ _ a
;DF2Se2 I N
Max ¢(A I No. 2 fail) 1
[ 2seDF 2 J 2_ 20N2
9 aN2 2
7
aN2>_>0
e
(51)
7
L>_ aN2
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° Calculation of the Probability of Isolating a Gyro-Failure
in the Three Gyro Case
When only one edge test clearly fails in the three gyro case
it is clear that one or the other gyros associated with the edge
test that failed was a failed gyro. The best that can be done
is estimate the probability that one gyro failed rather than the
other, on the basis of the three test values. The principle by
which this is calculated here is the relative probability densi-
ties of the test results for alternate hypothesis of failure, the
probability densities being those for maximum liklihood values
with respect to amplitude and direction of the hypothesized fail-
ure rate. This procedure then is
Max ¢ (A I#I Fail)
PFI (DFIS 81) 1
PF 2 Max ¢ (AI#2 Fail) r
(DF2S 82)
_ 1 = I-PF 1 where (34) (38)where PF 1 + PF2 = 1 so PFI l+r' PF2
are used for the peak probability densities for given A _(TI32-T232)
when TI2 failed. Using (34), (38) obtain
PFI = [i
PFI : [I
g aN2 forA>7 2
+ e ] ON .
A 13 a2
8 N
2
})]jr -+ _-- e 32>A>_ _0N2o N -
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A table of a number of values is
6/aN2
2.
3.5
5.
i0.
2
For values of A/aN_
PF 1
.52
.80
A= TI32-T232
.956
.999746
1.5 the formulae are in accurate
because of approximations made in the deviation.
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4. Navigating with Improved Accuracy with Four Valid G[ros
The proposed configuration generates four navigation program
outputs in parallel. To minimize navigation error the parallel
outputs x i of any navigation parameter x can be estimated by use
of weighting coefficients, _i'
4
t0.X.
1 1
A i=l
X = 4
i=l
where _i should be selected according to quality of the ith chan-
nel estimates. When no failure has occurred and all gyros behave
according to specification, selection w. = 1/4 is a practical
1
selection. Consider the case of soft failure of one gyro, GF 1
type, where already available test functions Fr, r = i, 4 do not
indicate failure. In this case, the use of
_l = [Fj + Fk + C] -I
where the ith channel uses gyro j and k, and C = constant, will
reduce the weights on two channels using the degraded gyro. This
selection of weights is further justified as follows:
a. For errors in x i independent from channel to channel,
the theoretical weight is _i = i/axi2
b. Actually errors in x i are correlated because certain
pairs of channels have one gyro in common. However, the
correlation of drift rates in the constructed reference
using two gyros is JPJ < 1/3. Neglect this correlation
since the effect on magnitude is fairly small, by
%/1 - p2 = .943.
c. The reference error of the constructed reference; using
two gyros has variance proportional to (aDj2 + aDk2).
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2
where aDjor k is the variance of gyro j or k. Gyro
cluster orientation is such that most navigation variables
relate to total reference error, so
2 = C1 (_ 2 + ODk2) + Co
_x.1 Dj
Note :
d.
e.
where Co includes errors not related to reference error.
For four gyros, the test function F. for test of gyro j
approximates F i =Di 2, when one gyro3j has distinctly
larger drift t_an £he other gyros, for which Fk is noisy
but small.
Then
2
_. = i/a
l X.
1
-i
C o
where C -
C 1
This weighting technique is contemporaneous to the smooth-
ing time of the test so that if a gyro shows some recovery,
the channels using it are given more weight.
5. Preliminary Gyro Failure Detection and Isolation Program
FORTRAN Listing
* T 2S(4) = T23 3
* T 2S(5) = T24 4
S(6) = T34 * T34
F(1) = S(6) + S(5) + S(4)
* T 1S (2) = TI3 3
S(3) = TI4 TI4
F(2) = S(3) + S(6) + S(2)
S(1) = TI2 T12
F(3) = S(1) + S(3) + S(5)
1-52
403314
F(4) -- S(1) + S(2) + S(4)
F0 = (F(4) + F(3) + F(2) + F(1))*.5- 64
p
F(1) = (T23
F(2) = (TI4
F(3) = (TI2
F(4) = (TI2
v(5) = v5
TL
- T24 + T34)*'2 + F(1)
+ T34 - T13)*'2 + F(2)
+ TI4 - T24)*'2 + F(3)
- TI3 + T23)*'2 + F(4)
= (F(JB) -63) * a
DO i0 J = 1,4
7
IF (v(5).EQ.0.) Go to 1
IF (F(J)-F0) > 0 Go to i0
v5 = 0.
IF (F(_).LT.62) GO to 7
2BAD = i.
SM = S (i)
Go to 4
v(J) = 0
JB = J
Fo r
2 BAD
Fou r
Gyro
Case
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1 IF (v(J).EQ.0.) Go to i0
DO 2 K = 1,4
IF (K,LE.J) GO to 2
IF (v(K).EQ.0.) Go to 2
L= J + K-I
IF (J. EQ.I) L = L-I
IF (2BAD.EQ.I.) TL = SM
IF (S (L) .GT. TL) Go to 2
IF (2BAD.EQ.0.) Go to 7
SM = S(L)
JM= J
KM = K
Go to 2
7 KB0 = KB
KB = TEN-J-K-JB
v (KB) = 0.
ARG - S(L)-ARG
2 CONTINUE
10 CONTINUE
IF (v5*F0.LT.0.) Go to 5
2BAD = 1.
v5 = 0.
GO to 4
5 IF (2BAD.EQ.0.) Go to 6
JB = 3
IF (JM. GT.I) JB = 1
IF (KM. LT.4) JB -- 4
v(JB) = 0.
2BAD = 0.
GO to 4
For 2BAD
For
2BAD
Three
Gyro
Case
Optional
(Long Shot
Case)
For 2BAD
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6 IF (KB_.EQ.0.) Go to 3
READP (ARG) Table
v(KB_) = P(ARG)
v(KB) = l.-v (KB)
3 CONTINUE
Initialize:
v(1) = i.
v(2) = I.
v(3) = i.
v(4) = i.
v 5 = 1
JB = 1
TEN = I0.
2 BAD = 0.
KB = 0.
KB@ = 0.
ARG = 0.
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APPENDIX J
PROBABILITY OF EFFECTIVELY SIMULTANEOUSFAILURE OF
TWOGYROSAND IMPACT ON FAILURE ISOLATION AND
SYSTEMFAILURE
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Probability of Effectively Simultaneous Failure of Two Gyros and
Impact on Failure Isolation and System Failure
On missions where two gyros failed during a half hour
period, the probability the failures occurred within 60 seconds
of each other is PSF - 60/1800 = 0.033. Since testing involves
a smoothing time, two failures within 60 seconds can involve
testing in the presence of effectively simultaneous failures.
To see the impact of simultaneous failures on testing substitute
(6c) of Appendix I for say gyro No. 1 and No. 2 failed into (6a) ,
(6b) to obtain an algebraic reduction the test functions Fr of
the sophisticated procedure:
F1 D 2 4
= F1 - _ DFIDF2Cel-30°C02-30°
F2 = D2F2 - _3 DF IDF2Cel-30°C92-30° DFr = failure drifts
4
F 3 = _ DFIDF2S61Se 2
O r = angle of drift
4
F4 - 3 DFIDF2CeI+30°Ce2+30°
Say DFI > DF2> DFMIN where2 DFMIN is the minimum rate for failure.
Note that testing F 1 > e where E = DFMIN/2 for detection of gyro
No 1 failure is unsuccessful if satisfies
• DF2
[ ()I/DF2 3 3 DFMIN-- > 4 16 A
DF 1 DF 1
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3
4A usually when < <DFMIN DFI or 2 DFMAx
where
A = C * - C * % = e
e I 02 ' 1 1
- 30 ° 02 = e - 30 °
' 2
The probability given 0
3 < is:
DFI DF2< DF 1
e
i' 2
that the drift rate satisfies
i 3 ,2 ,2_D
- 4-A) DFI 3 (2- el- e2 I F 1
PD = (DFMAx- DFMIN) -_-_ (DFMA x - DFMIN)
,2 ,2
where 0 + 0 < 2/3, assuming a flat distribution of failure
1 2
drift rates. It is believed that the actual distribution of
failure rates is a combination of two flat distributions of 0.5
area each in the ranges l.°/hr to 20.°/hr and 20°/hr - 100°/sec
(360,000°/hr), in which case failures of near equal magnitude
practically always occur in the range l.°/hr to 20.°/hr with half
the probability for a single flat distribution.
The probability that gyro No. 1 will not be isolated by F 1
test is
S:de 2 d01PFIPASS = 7_" --7 PD
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where
(_2 .2)PD = a - O 1
Integrating,
, a --
3DFI/8 (DFMA x - DFMIN)
PFIPASS
= th
. a. 4_3
3
2 0* 2 3/
?-
2
dO
8a
27_ 2
DF 1
90(DFMA x - DFMIN)
averaging with respect to DFI
PFIPAS S z
1
180
for D F >> DF The fraction of flights where two failures
X M N
occurreM_ in whic_ non-isolation of the larger failure rate
resulted from simultaneous failures is
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1.8 x 10-4
PG = PSF " PFIPASS = Non-detection probabilityof greater failure
The probability that the gyro which failed with a lesser drift
rate is not detected may be shown to be
PL
3
DFMAx - _ DF 2
2(DFMA x - DFMIN)
Non-detection probability
of lesser failure
2
On average, for _ DFMAx > DF2 > DFMIN
PL
DFMAx 3 DFMIN)
for DFMAX >> DFMI N. Thus about 25% of the cases of dual failures
the lesser failure is not detected by its Fr test.
Tests Fr with dual failure not involving r can fail. The
average value of F 3, F 4 for positive cases, which occur 50% of
the time is
F3 = _ F O
DFMA x DFMI .1 N
:
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Comparing with a test level
2
2 ( DFMINI
£ = 2 l
it is clear that almost half the time (when sign of F 3 positive)
it will fail the test.
2
Consider the probability that no test fails, F <
r
(r = i, 2, 3, 4), in the dual failure case. The probability
r = 1 passes is 1/180, that r = 2 passes is near i, in this
case, while the probabilities of r = 3 pass or r = 4 pass are
near equal as
PrPASS = 2(1 @_ad)
2
DFMA X
2
I°FMIN) r34where 01 2|DFAvERAGE
-3
z 1.3 x i0 for = 40
DFMA X DFMI N
Then the probability of system failure because no test fails is
PSYS FAILURE
ALL PASS
= = 10 -8
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In the extremely likely case one or more Fr tests fail, it is
proposed that dual failures be handled as follows. For four
gyros, if a test Fr failed, make the three gyro test not using
gyro r* and if any test fails conclude that dual failure has
occurred.
In the event of deciding that dual failure has occurred,
revert to the simple test procedure
ITrs I < e
If only one test passes, Tr,s, < E, it is concluded gyro r* and
gyro s* are good and that the remaining gyros are bad, a certain
conclusion. If two tests pass, Tr,s, and Tq,r,, having a gyro
in common then conclude certainly that r* is good and the fourth
gyro p* is bad (since either s* gyro or q* gyro is good and it is
known two gyros are bad), thus reducing the situation to the
ambiguous case of three gyros, r*, s*, q* where p* is known bad,
r* is known good but s* gyro or q* gyro is bad with calculable
probability based on the magnitude of ITr,s, I and ITr,q, I. The
probability of a test passing given that two GF 2 failures
**
occurred is :
PPASS,I BAD DFMIN f 1
DFMAx
D F
JDFMI N
dD F
DFMAx - DFMIN )
Pass
Probability:
if either
gyro r or
gyros
failed
Dma x = 20. Dmi n for a range l.°/hr - 20.°/hr, but half the time
= and getGF 3 failure occurs so we may usually take Dma x 40 Dmi n
**correct results.
Using notation defined in 5.3.3 on attitude rate failure.
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DFM_ N
DFMA x
IDFMA X
DFMIN 1
PPASS,2 BAD _ 27 D_ "
DFMIN
dD F
DFMAx - DFMIN }
if both
gyro r or
gyros
failed
DFMI N
2_
• _ \ FMIN!
DFMA X
Only the case where a test with both gyros bad has ITrs I <
leads to system failure directly associated with simultaneity of
failures of two gyros, having probability within the subclass of
missions in which two gyro failures occurred:
PSYSTEM
FAILURE
= PSF " PPASS,2 BAD
= 0.33 •
DFMI N
Probability of system failure
due to simultaneous failure of
2 gyros. Given: 2 gyros
failed during mission
• FMIN
DFNA x
-3
: 0.Sx10 using = 20
DFMA X DFMI N
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